In 1964, Tweedy pled guilty to a charge of bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (a) and (d). He was sentenced to imprisonment for 15 years. In 1967, he filed a motion to set aside his conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 . The motion was denied without a hearing, and he appeals.

1. Was a hearing required?

Tweedy asserts that his plea was induced by the promise of an F.B.I. agent that, if he pled guilty, he would be sentenced to a term of not more than five years. He also says that nobody advised him of the allowable range of punishment, up to 25 years imprisonment.

Normally, an evidentiary hearing must be held where a § 2255 motion raises factual allegations, unless the “files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ; Machibroda v. United States, 1962, 368 U.S. 487 -495, 82 S.Ct. 510 , 7 L.Ed.2d 473 . See also, Walker v. Johnston, 1941, 312 U.S. 275 , 61 S.C.t. 574, 85 L.Ed. 830 ; Wells v. Craven, 9 Cir., 1968, 404 F.2d 745 ; Coleman v. Wilson, 9 Cir., 1968, 401 F.2d 536 ; Castro v. United States, 9 Cir., 1968, 396 F.2d 345, 348 ; Bright v. Rhay, 9 Cir., 1968, 391 F.2d 915 ; Jones v. United States, 9 Cir., 1967, 384 F.2d 916 ; Gilmore v. California, 9 Cir., 1964, 364 F.2d 916 ; Wright v. Dickson, 9 Cir., 1964, 336 F.2d 878, 882-83 . Moreover, the transcript of the proceedings on plea and sentence may not be conclusive. Anthony v. Fitzharris, 9 Cir., 1968, 389 F.2d 657 ; Jones v. United States, supra. Thus, a defendant might solemnly affirm to the court that his plea had not been induced by promises of leniency because he thought that this was all part of the game, and that honest answers would destroy the deal. He might even keep silent after the judge had pronounced a more severe sentence than expected because he might think that it was then too late to withdraw his plea. See Castro v. United States, supra.

On the other hand, where the question is, was he given certain information, and the transcript unequivocally shows that he was, this can normally be treated as conclusive.

Here, we think that the judge properly treated the records as conclusive. First that record shows that Tweedy did know what the possible penalty was. He first pled guilty on June 26, 1964. At that time, there was filed a written petition to enter a plea of guilty, signed by Tweedy, in which he stated: “My attorney has advised me that the punishment, which the law provides, is * * * 25 years imprisonment.” His attorney signed a statement that he had read and fully explained the accusations to Tweedy. The court then proceeded:

On July 20, 1964, Tweedy was permitted to withdraw his plea, and a psychiatrist was appointed to examine him as to his sanity, both at that time and on the date of the offense. The psychiatrist found him sane, a finding that is not now contested. On August 10, 1964, Tweedy again pled guilty. At that time, the following occurred:

We think that the record does conclusively show that Tweedy knew the possible penalty.

As to the promise of leniency, the record of the acceptance of the first plea shows:

At the second plea, the following occurred:

Standing alone, this would not be conclusive under the authorities we have cited. But there is more.

Tweedy appeared for sentencing on August 25, 1964. The probation report recommended sentence to the Youth Authority. But the court said, in part:

Tweedy’s reply was a plea for a “chance to make something out of myself, put the past behind and face the future.” There is not even the suggestion of a hint that he was expecting a sentence of not more than five years. After further colloquy the court asked, “Are you ready for sentence, Mr. Tweedy?” Tweedy’s only reply was: “Yes, sir,” and sentence was pronounced.

Moreover, September 14, 1964, October 9, 1964, April 24, 1967, and May 24, 1967, Tweedy, by letters, asked to have his sentence modified, but not by reduction of the term by reason of any promise of a five year sentence. In his first letter, he says:

In the next, he says:

The later letters point to his efforts at rehabilitating himself. The request contained in them was denied on June 1, 1967, for lack of power of the court to grant it. Tweedy’s motion under § 2255 was filed November 2, 1967. Where was the promise of a five year sentence during the more than three years after his sentencing? We think that this record as a whole demonstrates that Tweedy’s claim is patently false and frivolous. See Wright v. Dickson, supra, 336 F.2d at 881 n.l.

No hearing was required.

2. Was there compliance with Rule 11?

We hold that the procedure in this case satisfied the requirement of Rule 11, as it was interpreted in 1964. See Munich v. United States, 9 Cir., 1964, 337 F.2d 356 . We need not decide whether it satisfied the requirements of Heiden v. United States, 9 Cir., 1965, 353 F.2d 53 , because Heiden is applicable only to pleas entered after its date of decision. Castro v. United States, supra, 396 F.2d at 349 . See also Halliday v. United States, 1969, 394 U.S. 831, 833 , 89 S.Ct. 1498 , 23 L.Ed.2d 16 .

Affirmed.