James Alvin Heffley, serving a life sentence in Nevada State Penitentiary, appeals from an order denying his application for a writ of habeas corpus.

Heffley’s incarceration is pursuant to a 1 burglary conviction and a subsequent habitual criminal conviction obtained in 1966. The burglary conviction was upheld on appeal on March 20, 1967, one justice dissenting. Heffley v. State, 83 Nev. 100 , 423 P.2d 666 (1967).

Heffley alleged in his application for a writ that he was deprived of his Fourth Amendment rights because documents seized during an illegal search of his automobile were received in evidence against him at his state burglary trial.

The facts pertaining to the seizure of these documents are not in dispute. On November 13, 1965, Officer George San-tich of the Sacramento, California police department, received an order to investigate a report that a person driving a 1957 blue and white Buiek with license number LUS 507 was trying to sell some *882 guns. Sometime thereafter Santich saw this automobile being driven along a Sacramento street. Santich drove along behind the Buick until it stopped for a traffic light. He then got out of the police car and approached the other car. As he did so he observed a large quantity of guns, partially covered up, on the back seat of that vehicle.

Santich asked the driver of the Buick, Heffley, for his identification and driver’s license. As Heffley was in the process of getting his wallet, Santich observed the butt end of a gun protruding from under the seat where Heffley was sitting. He then asked Heffley to get out of the car, and placed him under arrest for possession of the gun. Santich did not have a warrant for Heffley’s arrest. The officer called for another squad car to take Heffley to police headquarters. Santich then drove Heffley’s car about three blocks to the same police station.

Although Officer Santich looked over the guns in the back seat of the Buick when he arrested Heffley, he made no exploratory search of the car at that time. Heffley was removed to the police station within three minutes after the arrest. Santich placed the Buick in a private stall at the police station and, without a search warrant, immediately searched “the whole car, the trunk, back seat, under the hood, wheels, and everything.” Heffley was in police custody in another part of the police station at that time. After the search was completed, the car was taken to a private garage and impounded.

In the course of his search, Santich found the documents in question on the rear floor of the Buick. He had not seen them before conducting this search. The documents consisted of two passports, a certificate of registration for a two-wheel trailer, and a certificate of ownership for a one-half ton pickup. All of these papers had been stolen during the burglary for which Heffley was convicted. They were received in evidence over the objection of Heffley’s counsel that they were obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure. 1

The district court questioned whether there was a search at all, under these facts, pointing out that most of the articles seized were in plain view in the rear portion of the sedan. The court conceded, however, that the documents here in question may have been covered or obscured by the guns and other paraphernalia.

In all probability, the documents were not visible from outside the automobile, since Officer Santich testified that he had not seen them before conducting the search. In any event, if it be assumed that the documents were plainly visible so that no search was required, that alone would not validate the seizure of the documents without first obtaining a search warrant. Amendment IV proscribes unreasonable seizures as well as unreasonable searches. See Pendleton v. Nelson, 404 F.2d 1074 (9th Cir. 1968). 2

The facts of this case are distinguishable from those of Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 , 88 S.Ct. 992 , 19 L. Ed.2d 1067 (1968), in which a police seizure of a registration card found in an impounded automobile was upheld. While there was a police search of the Harris automobile, the court stated that *883 the registration card was not discovered or seized while the police were conducting the search.

The impounded car was being held in a place open to the weather and it had begun to rain. The windows of the car were rolled down and the doors were unlocked. The officer opened the front door on the passenger side “in order to secure the window and door.” As he did so he saw the registration card lying face up on the metal stripping over which the door closed. The Supreme Court held that since the officer had a right to open the door in his effort to protect the vehicle, he had a right to seize the card which was then plainly visible and could be obtained without an unauthorized entry. The Court made it clear that, with regard to the registration card, no entry into the vehicle for the purpose of search, or even for the purpose of seizing a card visible from the outside, was involved. It was in this context that the Harris Court said:

In our case the officer saw, from a point outside the car, weapons on the back seat of the car. The removal of the guns would probably have revealed the documents in question without the need of a further search or possibly, as the district court thought likely, the documents might themselves have been visible from the outside. But the officer still could not enter the unoccupied car after it reached the police garage without a warrant to search and seize, except for some other appropriate reason as in Harris . In Harris the officer’s presence in the car was lawful — he was engaged in protecting the car by rolling up the windows and locking the doors. In our case, the officer’s presence in the car was not lawful, for he was engaged in a seizure, if not a search, without a warrant. The “narrow circumstances” of Harris are not present here.

But the district court did not rely solely on the possibility that the documents were visible. That court’s primary reason for denying the habeas application was that where, as here, the accused was arrested in his automobile in a traffic lane on a public street, a search of the vehicle made immediately after removal of the car to a nearby police station should be considered incident to and substantially contemporaneous with the arrest, and therefore reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

The majority of the courts of appeals that have dealt with the problem support this view. See Price v. United States, 121 U.S.App.D.C. 62 , 348 F.2d 68 (1965); United States v. Dento, 382 F. 2d 361, 365-366 (3rd Cir.1967); United States v. Powell, 407 F.2d 582, 585 (4th Cir.1969) ; 3 United States v. Evans, 385 *884 F.2d 824, 825 (7th Cir. 1967). 4 Contra: Barnett v. United States, 384 F.2d 848, 860-861 (5th Cir. 1967); Colosimo v. Perini, 415 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1969). 5

The definitive Supreme Court decision in this area is Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 , 84 S.Ct. 881 , 11 L.Ed.2d 777 (1964). In that case the police arrested three men for vagrancy after receiving a report that the men were “acting suspiciously” because they had spent most of the night seated in a motorcar parked in a business district. The three men were immediately searched for weapons at the scene and then taken to police headquarters. Subsequently the police towed the car, which had not been searched at the scene of the arrest, to a garage and twice searched it. This search turned up evidence of a planned robbery, for which the trio was convicted. The police acted without a warrant in conducting this search and attempted to justify it on the ground that it was incidental to a lawful arrest. The Court rejected this argument, holding expressly that:

The Price, Dentó, Powell and Evans cases cited above were decided after Preston . In each, the court sought to distinguish Preston because the time interval between arrest and search was shorter than in Preston ; or because, unlike Preston , a search of the vehicle on street was impracticable due to traffic or a gathering crowd; or because, unlike Preston , the search was related to the charge upon which the arrest was made; or because the accused was present when the search was made at the police station. In Barnett and Colo-simo, Preston was held to be applicable despite factual differences of this kind.

Appellee attempts the same kinds of distinction between the facts of the instant case and those of Preston , claiming, for example, that the time lag and distance involved here were much less. However, reading the Preston precedent literally, as this court has consistently done in the past, we do not believe such distinctions are valid. See Pasterchik v. United States, 400 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1968); Schoepflin v. United States, 391 F.2d 390, 393 (9th Cir. 1968); Lu-cero v. Donovan, 354 F.2d 16, 20 (9th Cir. 1965). The above-quoted language from the Preston decision is in such categorical form that any disposition to relax the application of the rule announced there should appropriately come first from the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court has not indicated approval of any such dilution of the Preston holding, but has, in fact, recently made it clear that Preston is to be stringently applied. Late last term in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 , 89 S.Ct. 2034 , 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), the Court emphasized the continued breadth and vitality of the Preston holding that an incidental search must be conducted at the same time and place as the arrest. There the Court cited Preston as authority for a sharp curtailment of the permissible scope of a warrantless search of a home conducted pursuant to a lawful arrest. The Court quoted with approval the following language from Preston :

In very similar language Chimel holds that a warrantless search of a residence, incident to a lawful arrest, may not go beyond the person of the accused “and the area from within which he might have obtained either a weapon or something that could have been used as evidence against him.” 395 U.S. at 768 , 89 S.Ct. at 2043 . However, we do not here rely on the Chimel holding as such because the rule of Chimel does not apply to searches conducted before June 23, 1968, the date of the Chimel decision. 6 Our holding here rests directly on Preston, forcefully adhered to in Chimel .

In the only other court of appeals case decided since Chimel , this same view concerning the significance of Chimel in construing Preston has been expressed. We refer to Colosimo v. Perini, decided by the Sixth Circuit on September 17, 1969. 7

The “justifications” for a warrantless search found absent in Preston were similarly lacking here. When the search of Heffley’s automobile was made at the police station, Heffley was not in the vehicle nor in its immediate vicinity. He was in another part of the building in police custody. At that time he had no power to obtain from the interior of the automobile either a weapon or something that could have been used as evidence against him. This is the critical fact. The circumstances that the search was conducted shortly after the arrest, and that it was impracticable to search the automobile on the street, are immaterial. It was practicable for police officers to obtain a search warrant before making the search. The automobile, after being removed to the police station, was in no danger of being ransacked or moved without police approval. 8

*886 Under Preston , read in the light of Chimel , the warrantless search of Heffley’s automobile at the station was in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 9 Accordingly, the introduction at the burglary trial of the documents seized as a result of that search deprived him of his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), and entitled him to habeas relief.

Heffley also alleged in his habeas application that the prosecution’s introduction of incriminating statements made by Heffley while in police custody violated his constitutional rights, because such statements were obtained through the use of the illegally-seized documents referred to above. The district court did not reach this question since it held that the documents were not illegally seized. This is a matter to be explored in the further proceedings that may follow this opinion.

In his reply brief on this appeal, Heffley argues for the first time that his arrest was illegal because it was not pursuant to a warrant nor based upon probable cause. Apart from the untimeliness of this point, it is moot. The legality of the arrest would be material only with regard to the lawfulness of the search and seizure. Since we have already held that the search and seizure was unlawful, Heffley will not benefit further from a holding that the arrest was also illegal.

The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded with directions to allow the state a reasonable time within which to retry Heffley on the burglary charge, failing which the district court shall issue a writ of habeas corpus.

. Heffley’s trial counsel did not make a particularly forceful objection to tlie introduction of these documents. However, any problems of waiver were cured by the Supreme Court of Nevada’s consideration of the search and seizure question on the merits. See Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 297, n. 3 , 87 S.Ct. 1642 , 18 L.Ed.2d 782 ; Curry v. Wilson, 405 F.2d 110, 112 (9th Cir. 1968).

. We there stated:

“The view of the [evidence] through the window may have provided probable cause to obtain a search warrant but, since no exigent circumstances were shown to exist, such view did not authorize a seizure without such a warrant or consent.” 404 E.2d at 1077.

. In Powell , however, the court also pointed out that the automobile in question was subject to forfeiture under 49 U.S.C. § 782 because it was being used to carry contraband (counterfeit money). Id. at 585. This would appear to bring that case under the exception recognized in Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 , 87 S.Ct. 788 , 17 L.Ed.2d 730 (1967). Moreover, in Powell , the court observed that if the reception of the seized articles deprived the defendant of his Fourth Amendment rights, the error was not prejudicial because at the same trial Powell was also convicted of uttering a forged bill, for which he received a concurrent sentence. 407 F.2d at 585 .

. The force of the Evans decision was somewhat undercut by the Seventh Circuit’s subsequent decision in United States v. Harvey, 397 F.2d 526, 528-529 (7th Cir. 1968).

. In Colosimo , the Sixth Circuit withdrew from the position it had previously taken in Arwine v. Bannan, 346 F.2d 458 (6th Cir. 1965), and Crawford v. Bannan, 336 F.2d 505 (6th Cir. 1964), that Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 , 84 S.Ct. 881 , 11 L.Ed.2d 777 , could be distinguished on the facts.

. The question of the retroactivity of Chimel rvas expressly left open by the Supreme Court in Von Cleef v. New Jersey, 395 U.S. 814, 815 , 89 S.Ct. 2051 , 23 L.Ed.2d 728 (1969) and Shipley v. California, 395 U.S. 818, 819 , 89 S.Ct. 2053 , 23 L.Ed.2d 732 (1969), and by this circuit in Jordan v. United States, 416 F.2d 338 (9th Cir. 1969), decided September 15, 1969. However, in Williams v. United States, 418 F.2d 159 (9th Cir. 1969), decided October 17, 1969, we held Chimel to be applicable only as to searches made on or after June. 23, 1969.

. In Colosimo , the Sixth Circuit said :

"We are now of the view, however, that since we made those decisions, and since the District Judge’s ruling here, further illumination of the Preston decision by the Supreme Court in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 , 89 S.Ct. 2034 , 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), requires a different result. In a case as this where there was sufficient opportunity to procure a search warrant after the. defendant was arrested and taken' to the police station and while the automobile to be searched remained in police custody, the search of an automobile without a warrant, away from defendant's person, cannot stand Fourth Amendment attack.

“With the person, or persons, suspected of crime and the automobile to be searched botli in police custody, the precipitous action of a warrantless search is no longer justified. It is true that in Preston the vehicle was searched at a point away from the scene of arrest, while here the vehicle remained at the place where the defendant was arrested. Chimel , however, persuades us that such factual distinction is not of controlling importance. We believe that Chimel instructs us that the rule of Preston , decided prior to the trial hero involved, is the law that controls this case. Therefore, we need not consider whether Chimel is to be given retrospective effect. The evidence seized should have been suppressed.”

. Tlie Xevada Supreme Court upheld the search of Heffley’s car at the police station on the theory that it was meant solely to inventory Heffley'» belongings for safekeeping. Since the court did not view Santich’s actions as an exploratory search, there was no need to decide whether it was incident to a lawful arrest. Heffley v. State, 83 Nev. 100 , 423 P.2d 666 (1967). In this habeas proceeding the district court declined to adopt this theory and, on this appeal, the warden *886 (loos not defend the search on that ground. "Whatever merit there may bo to an “inventory" exception to the general search warrant requirement, the undisputed evidence here, demonstrates that the purpose of the search of Heffley's automobile was. exploratory. There is no other reasonable explanation for Officer Santieh's search “nder the hood, wheels, and everything,’- as he testified.

. To bo distinguished are cases in which the automobile is or may be held as contraband, Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 , 87 S.Ct. 788 , 17 L.Ed.2d 730 (1967) ; United States v. Powell, 407 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1969) ; where a stolen automobile is being held for the rightful owner, Schoepflin v. United States, 391 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1968) ; or where articles are discovered while police are taking measures to protect an automobile after the occupant has been arrested. Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 , 88 S.Ct. 992 , 19 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1968).

It should also be clear from the foregoing discussion that we are not here concerned with the search of an automobile under circumstances where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle or its contents can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. The continued validity of this distinction was made clear in Chimel , footnote 9, and in Call v. United States, 417 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1969), decided October 27, 1969. In the latter case a warrantless search of a duffel bag found on the tailgate of a parked station wagon was uphold because the bag “could have been quickly moved."