(specially concurring).:

I concur in that portion of the majority opinion holding that a partnership is subject to indictment for violating the Sherman Act. I cannot concur in the remainder of the opinion, for I seriously question that United States v. A & P Trucking Co. (1958) 358 U.S. 121 , 79 S.Ct. 203 , 3 L.Ed.2d 165 can bear the burden the majority places ■ on it. The Court there held simply that a partnership could violate certain regulatory statutes even if the individual partners did not participate in or have knowledge of the violations. The Court then added as dictum the sentence relied upon by the majority: In such an instance the fine levied on the partnership should not be collected from the partners’ individual assets. The setting in A & P was thus very different from the setting in our case. I doubt that the Court’s dictum can be expanded to a case in which a partner is not “completely free of personal guilt.” In addition, A & P dealt with a specific intent crime (United States v. Chicago Express, Inc. (7th Cir. 1956) 235 F.2d 785 ), and hence its limitation of liability is not necessarily transportable to a Sherman Act offense. 1

But even if A & P Trucking can be read as broadly as the majority suggests, I question its relevance. Hazan’s argument is not that he might be placed in double jeopardy should the partnership assets prove insufficient to meet the partnership fine — the problem referred to in A & P Trucking. He is arguing that double jeopardy results from simultaneously levying upon (a) his personal assets for the personal fine and (b) those assets in the partnership that are legally his property for the partnership fine. Although the Supreme Court adopted the entity theory for the one particular problem presented in A & P Trucking, it does not follow that that theory is applicable to' Hazan’s different claim.

I see no reason to stretch A & P to reach Hazan’s constitutional claim, because I believe he waived that claim below. The double jeopardy issue was raised for the first time almost two months after appellants were convicted upon their pleas of nolo contendere on a motion to correct sentence. A plea of guilty to a two-count indictment waives a later double jeopardy argument that *446 the two counts were in fact for the same offense (Harris v. United States (8th Cir. 1956) 237 F.2d 274 ), and, of course, a nolo plea is the equivalent of a guilty plea for waiver purposes. Hence, I would hold that Hazan’s nolo plea waives his claim that he was indicted and punished in two capacities for the same offense. (See also Haddad v. United States (9th Cir.) 349 F.2d 511 , cert. denied (1965) 382 U.S. 896 , 86 S.Ct. 193 , 15 L.Ed.2d 153 ; Berg v. United States (9th Cir.) 176 F.2d 122, 125 , cert. denied (1949) 338 U.S. 876 , 70 S.Ct. 137 , 94 L.Ed. 537 ; Caballero v. Hudspeth (10th Cir. 1940) 114 F.2d 545 .) Moreover, double jeopardy is a personal defense, and Western cannot raise it on Hazan’s behalf.

. Specific intent is not required for a Sherman Act conviction. See, e. g., Arthur Murray, Inc. v. Reserve Plan, Inc. (8th Cir. 1969) 406 F.2d 1138 .