Rob Lear v. Seattle Housing Authority
Opinion
Opinion
MEMORANDUM
Rob Lear appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that defendants conspired to harm him and deprive him of his property. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review de novo. Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 436 (9th Cir.2002). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Lear’s conspiracy claims because Lear failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants had an agreement to violate his constitutional rights. See id. at 441 (elements of § 1983 conspiracy); see also Caf-asso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics Ck Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1061 (9th Cir.2011) (“To survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must set forth non-speculative evidence of specific facts, not sweeping con-clusory allegations.”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Lear’s request for an injunction in his state eviction proceedings because the proceedings were unrelated to the instant action. See Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, 645 F.3d 1109, 1116 (9th Cir.2011) (setting forth standard of review and factors for evaluating an injunction request).