Earl Caldwell appeals from an order holding him in contempt of court for disregard of an order directing him to appear before the Grand Jury of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California pursuant to a subpoena issued by the Grand Jury.

Appellant is a black news reporter for the New York Times. He has become a specialist in the reporting of news concerning the Black Panther Party. The Grand Jury is engaged in a general investigation of the Black Panthers and the possibility that they are engaged in criminal activities contrary to federal law.

In order to protect First Amendment interests asserted by appellant, the District Court order of attendance, which appellant disregarded, expressly granted appellant the privilege of silence as to certain matters until such time as the Government should demonstrate “a compelling and over-riding national interest in requiring Mr. Caldwell’s testimony which cannot be served by any alternative means.” This protective order provided :

Appellant contends that the privilege granted by the District Court will not suffice to protect the First Amendment interests at stake; that unless a specific need for his testimony can be shown by the United States he should be excused from attendance before the Grand Jury altogether. Thus it is not the scope of the interrogation to which he must submit that is here at issue; it is whether he need attend at all.

The case is one of first impression and one in which news media have shown great interest and have accordingly favored us with briefs as amici curiae. As is true with many problems recently confronted by the courts, the case presents vital questions of public policy: questions as to how competing public interests shall be balanced. The issues require us to turn our attention to the underlying conflict between public interests and the nature of such competing interests. 1

While the United States has not appealed from the grant of privilege by the District Court (which it opposed below) and the propriety of that grant is thus not directly involved here, appellant’s contentions here rest upon the same First Amendment foundation as did the protective order granted below. Thus, before we can decide whether the First Amendment requires more than a protective order delimiting the scope of interrogation, we must first decide whether it requires any privilege at all.

THE PROTECTIVE ORDER

The proceedings below were initiated by a motion by appellant to quash subpoenas issued by the Grand Jury. 2 In *1084 his moving papers appellant’s position was that the “inevitable effect of the subpoenas will be to suppress vital First Amendment freedoms of Mr. Caldwell, of the New York Times, of the news media, and of militant political groups by driving a wedge of distrust and silence between the news media and the militants, and that this Court should not countenance a use of its process entailing so drastic an incursion upon First Amendment freedoms in the absence of compelling governmental interest- — not shown here — in requiring Mr. Caldwell’s appearance before the Grand Jury.”

Amici curiae solidly supported appellant in this position. The fact that the subpoenas would have a “chilling effect” on First Amendment freedoms was impressively asserted in affidavits of newsmen of recognized stature, to a considerable extent based upon recited experience. Appellant’s own history is related in his moving papers:

The response of the United States disputed the contention that First Amendment freedoms were endangered.

Assuming, arguendo, that this statement is correct, it is not fully responsive to the claim that First Amendment freedoms are endangered. The premise underlying the Government’s statement is that First Amendment interests in this area are adequately safeguarded as long as potential news makers do not cease using the media as vehicles for their communication with the public. But the First Amendment means more than that. It exists to preserve an “untrammeled press as a vital source of public information,” Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 , 56 S.Ct. 444, 449 , 80 L.Ed. 660 (1936). Its objective is the maximization of the “spectrum of available knowledge,” Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 , 85 S.Ct. 1678 , 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965). Thus, it is not enough that Black Panther press releases and public addresses by Panther leaders may continue unabated in the wake of subpoenas such as the one here in question. It is not enough that the public’s knowledge of groups such as the Black Panthers should be confined to their deliberate public pronouncements or distant news accounts of their occasional dramatic forays into the public view.

The need for an untrammeled press takes on special urgency in times of widespread protest and dissent. In such times the First Amendment protec *1085 tions exist to maintain communication with dissenting groups and to provide the public with a wide range of information about the nature of protest and' heterodoxy. See, e. g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 , 65 S.Ct. 1416 , 89 L.Ed. 2013 (1945); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 , 60 S.Ct. 736 , 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940).

The affidavits contained in this record required the conclusion of the District Court that “compelled disclosure of information received by a journalist within the scope of such confidential relationships jeopardizes those relationships and thereby impairs the journalist's ability to gather, analyse, and publish the news.”

Accordingly we agree with the District Court that First Amendment freedoms are here in jeopardy.

On the other side of the balance is the scope of the Grand Jury’s investigative power.

In his moving papers appellant complained that the Government had not disclosed the subject, direction or scope of the Grand Jury inquiry and that efforts of counsel to obtain some specification had been unavailing.

The Government in opposing appellant’s motion to quash, stated its position in these terms:

Thus, as is true in innumerable instances, the Grand Jury does not know what it wants from this witness. It wants to find out what he knows that might shed light on the general problem it is investigating. This type of wide-ranging, open-ended inquiry is, of course, typical of many Grand Jury proceedings. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 , 26 S.Ct. 370 , 50 L.Ed. 652 (1906); Note, “The Grand Jury as an Investigatory Body,” 74 Harv.L.Rev. 590, 591-92 (1961). If the privilege of silence as defined by the District Court is made available to news gatherers, the Grand Jury will be deprived of their assistance as witnesses in such general investigations.

The question posed below was whether, as a matter of law, this loss to the Grand Jury, this impediment to its tra-”" ditionally broad scope of inquiry, outweighs the injury to First Amendment freedoms.

The Government stresses the historic traditions of the Grand Jury with its extensive powers of investigation, see, e. g., Hale v. Henkel, supra, and the corresponding duty of the citizenry to come before the Grand Jury to give testimony. United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 , 70 S.Ct. 724 , 94 L.Ed. 884 (1950); Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273 , 39 S.Ct. 468 , 63 L.Ed. 979 (1919). But these general propositions of Government authority necessarily are tempered by constitutional prohibitions and other exceptional circumstances. See United States v. Bryan, supra, 339 U.S. at 331 , 70 S.Ct. 724 , 94 L.Ed. 884 ; Blair v. United States, supra, 250 U.S. at 281-282 , 39 S.Ct. 468 , 63 L.Ed. 979 . In this respect we find guidance in the Supreme Court decisions regarding conflicts between First Amendment interests and legislative investigatory needs; 3 the Court has required the sacrifice of First Amendment freedoms only where a compelling *1086 need for the particular testimony in question is demonstrated. 4

If the Grand Jury may require appellant to make available to it information obtained by him in his capacity as news gatherer, then the Grand Jury and the Department of Justice have the power to appropriate appellant’s investigative efforts to their own behalf — to convert him after the fact into an investigative agent of the Government. The very concept of a free press requires that the news media be accorded a measure of autonomy; that they should be free to pursue their own investigations to their own ends without fear of governmental interference; and that they should be able to protect their investigative processes. To convert news gatherers into Department of Justice investigators is to invade the autonomy of the press by imposing a governmental function upon them. To do so where the result is to diminish their future capacity as news gatherers is destructive of their public function. 5 To accomplish this where it has not been shown to be essential to the Grand Jury inquiry simply cannot be justified in the public interest.

Further it is not unreasonable to expect journalists everywhere to temper their reporting so as to reduce the probability that they will be required to submit to interrogation. The First Amendment guards against governmental action that induces such self-censorship. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 , 84 S.Ct. 710 , 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 , 80 S.Ct. 215 , 4 L.Ed.2d 205 (1959).

It was on such considerations as these that the balance was struck by the District Court. It ruled:

Finding that the Government had shown no compelling or overriding national interest for testimony of the sort specified, the District Court imposed the limits we have set forth earlier in this opinion. It reserved jurisdiction to modify its order on a showing of such governmental interest which cannot be served by means other than by appellant’s testimony.

We agree with the District Court that the First Amendment requires this qualified privilege, and we find nothing unreasonable in the terms in which it was there defined. 6

*1087 ATTENDANCE

As we have noted, the issue upon this appeal goes beyond the question of a privilege to decline to respond to interrogation in certain areas. The District Court ruled that, although protected by its limited privilege, Caldwell was required to respond to the subpoena by appearing before the Grand Jury to answer questions not privileged. Appellant contends that his mere appearance before the Grand Jury will result in loss of his news sources. The Government questions this result.

The affidavits on file cast considerable light on the process of gathering news about militant organizations. 7 It is apparent that the relationship which *1088 an effective privilege in this area must protect is a very tenuous and unstable one. Unlike the relation between an attorney and his client or a physician and his patient, the relationships between journalists and news sources like the Black Panthers are not rooted in any service the journalist can provide his informant apart from the publication of the information so obtained. Goldstein, “Newsmen and their Confidential Sources,” The New Republic 13 (March 21, 1970). The relationship depends upon a trust and confidence that is constantly subject to reexamination and that depends in turn on actual knowledge of how news and information imparted have been handled and on continuing reassurance that the handling has been discreet. 8

This reassurance disappears when the reporter is called to testify behind closed doors. The secrecy that surrounds Grand Jury testimony necessarily introduces uncertainty in the minds of those who fear a betrayal of their confidences. These uncertainties are compounded by the subtle nature of the journalist-informer relation. The demarcation between what is confidential and what is for publication is not sharply drawn and often depends upon the particular context or timing of the use of the information. Militant groups might very understandably fear that, under the pressure of examination before a Grand Jury, the witness may fail to protect their confidences with quite the same sure judgment he invokes in the normal course of his professional work.

The Government characterizes this anticipated loss of communication as Black Panther reprisal; as manifesting a Black Panther demand that, “if you subpoena Caldwell, we will never speak to you again.” It argues that it is unthinkable that the American people would capitulate to such extortion.

But it is not an extortionate threat we face. It is human reaction as reasonable to expect as that a client will leave his lawyer when his confidence is shaken. The news source has placed no price tag or exaction on enjoyment of First Amendment freedoms save its continuing confidence in the discretion of the reporter. 9

As the Government points out, loss of such a sensitive news source can also result from its reaction to indiscreet or unfavorable reporting or from a reporter’s association with Government agents or persons disapproved of by the news source. Loss in such a case, however, results from an exercise of the choice and prerogative of a free press. It is not the result of Government compulsion.

We conclude that the privilege not to answer certain questions does not, by itself, adequately protect the First Amendment freedoms at stake in this *1089 area; that without implementation in the manner sought by appellant the privilege would fail in its very purpose.

On the other side of the balance is the Grand Jury’s right to summon this witness before it and in secrecy compel him to answer questions or to resort to his privilege. It is not the right to secure appearance and testimony that is itself in issue; the District Court’s protective order alone would suffice were that all. It is the right to compel presence at a secret interrogation with which we are concerned.

Throughout history secret interrogation has posed problems and caused unease. See, e. g., Note, “An Historical Argument for the Right to Counsel During Police Interrogation,” 73 Yale L.J. 1000 , 1034-45 (1964). We do not doubt that secret interrogation is in general essential to the integrity and effectiveness of the Grand Jury process. However, implicit in the extraordinary nature of secret interrogations, is the possibility of conflict with basic rights. When this is shown to occur it is appropriate to inquire into the need in the particular case for the specific incursion. Since compulsion to attend and testify entails the exercise of judicial process, it is appropriate that the inquiry be judicially entertained.

The question, then, is whether the injury to First Amendment liberties which mere attendance threatens can be justified by the demonstrated need of the Government for appellant’s testimony as to those subjects not already protected by the privilege.

Appellant asserted in affidavit that there is nothing to which he could testify (beyond that which he has already made public and for which, therefore, his appearance is unnecessary) that is not protected by the District Court’s order. If this is true — and the Government apparently has not believed it necessary to dispute it — appellant’s response to the subpoena would be a barren performance —one of no benefit to the Grand Jury. To destroy appellant’s capacity as news gatherer for such a return hardly makes sense. Since the cost to the public of excusing his attendance is so slight, it may be said that there is here no public interest of real substance in competition with the First Amendment freedoms that are jeopardized.

If any competing public interest is ever to arise in a case such as this (where First Amendment liberties are threatened by mere appearance at a Grand Jury investigation) it will be on an occasion in which the witness, armed with his privilege, can still serve a useful purpose before the Grand Jury. Considering the scope of the privilege embodied in the protective order, these occasions would seem to be unusual. It is not asking too much of the Government to show that such an occasion is presented here.

In light of these considerations we hold that where it has been shown that the public’s First Amendment right to be informed would be jeopardized by requiring a journalist to submit to secret Grand Jury interrogation, the Government must respond by demonstrating a compelling need for the witness’s presence before judicial process properly can issue to require attendance.

We go no further than to announce this general rule. As we noted at the outset, this is a case of first impression. The courts can learn much about the problems in this area as they gain more experience in dealing with them. For the present we lack the omniscience to spell out the details of the Government’s burden 10 or the type of proceeding that *1090 would accommodate efforts to meet that burden. 11 The fashioning of specific rules and procedures appropriate to the particular case can better be left to the District Court under its retained jurisdiction. Cf., White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 , 83 S.Ct. 696 , 9 L.Ed.2d 738 (1963).

Finally we wish to emphasize what must already be clear: the rule of this case is a narrow one. It is not every news source that is as sensitive as the Black Panther Party has been shown to be respecting the performance of the “establishment” press or the extent to which that performance is open to view. It is not every reporter who so uniquely enjoys the trust and confidence of his sensitive news source.

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT ISSUE

Appellant also moved to quash the Grand Jury subpoenas on- the ground that they were based upon information obtained by unconstitutional surveillance of his interviews with Black Panther members. He sought a hearing to determine whether the subpoenas were so obtained. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 , 89 S.Ct. 961 , 22 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969). The District Court denied the motion solely on the ground that appellant lacked standing to raise the Fourth Amendment contention. This is assigned as error.

In light of our disposition of the First Amendment question in this case, we need not reach this issue. The United States might never meet the First Amendment burden imposed upon it by the District Court order as here implemented. Even if the Government does meet that burden, the court may not have to reach this Fourth Amendment claim; the Government’s showing of need for appellant’s testimony may disclose a basis for the Government’s information which would present no Fourth Amendment problem. If such a problem is presented it' could then be discussed in light of the specific facts.

Accordingly, we regard decision upon this question as unnecessary to the present disposition of the case. We reserve the issue and decline to reach it here.

Reversed and remanded with instructions that the judgment of contempt and the order directing attendance before the Grand Jury be vacated. The District Court under its retained jurisdiction may entertain such further proceedings as may be initiated by the United States.

. AVhere, as here, the alleged abridgement of First Amendment interests occurs as a by-product of otherwise permissible governmental action not directed at the regulation of speech or press, “resolution of the issue always involves a balancing by the courts of the competing private and public interests at stake in the particular circumstances shown.” Barenblatt v. United States. 360 U.S. 109, 126 , 79 S.Ct. 1081, 1093 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1115 (1959); see, e. g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 50-51 , 81 S.Ct. 997 , 6 L.Ed.2d 105 (1961); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 , 80 S.Ct. 412 , 4 L.Ed.2d 480 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Pattersen, 357 U.S. 449, 460-467 , 78 S.Ct. 1163 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958); Kalven, “The New York Times Case: A Note on ‘The Central Meaning of the First Amendment,’ ” 1964. Sup.Ct.Rev. 191, 214-16 (1964).

. The first subpoena was served February 2, 1970. It directed appellant to appear- and testify and to bring with him notes and tape recordings of interviews reflecting statements made for publication by officers and spokesmen for the Black Panther Party concerning the aims, purposes and activities of the organization. On March 16, after appellant had protested the scope of the subpoena, a second subpoena was served. It simply required appellant’s attendance. Appellant’s motion to quash was directed to both subpoenas. The court denied the motion and directed compliance with the March 16 subpoena subject to the protective order. 311 F.Supp. 358 . Appellant appealed that decision; but the appeal was dismissed, apparently on the ground that the District Court order was not appealable. By then the term of tlie Grand Jury had expired, and a new Grand Jury was sworn. A new subpoena ad testificandum was served on May 22, 1970. All proceedings had in connection with the earlier subpoenas were made a part of the record of the proceedings concerning this last subpoena. A new order directing attendance was issued; this order also contained the protective provisions or privilege. It is appellant’s disregard of that order which resulted in the judgment of contempt now before us.

. like the Grand Jury, legislative committees have long been viewed as invaluable instruments of governance. See, e. g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111 , 79 S.Ct. 1081 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1115 (1959); United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 43 , 73 S.Ct. 543 , 97 L.Ed. 770 (1953).

. DeGregory v. Attorney General of New Hampshire, 383 U.S. 825 , 86 S.Ct. 1148 , 16 L.Ed.2d 292 (1966); Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 372 U.S. 539 , 83 S.Ct. 889 , 9 L.Ed.2d 929 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama. 357 U.S. 449, 460-467 , 78 S.Ct. 1163 , 2 L.Ed. 2d 1488 (1958); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 , 77 S.Ct. 1203 , 1 L.Ed.2d 1311 (1957); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 , 77 S.Ct. 1173 , 1 L.Ed.2d 1273 (1957); United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 , 73 S.Ct. 543 , 97 L.Ed. 770 (1953). It is necessary that, as the investigation proceeds, step-by-step, “an adequate foundation for inquiry must be laid.” Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, supra, 372 U.S. at 557, 83 S.Ct. at 899 .

. It is a paradox of the Government’s position that, if groups like the Black Panthers cease taking reporters like appellant into their confidence, these journalists will, in the future, be unable to serve a public function either as news gatherers or as prosecution witnesses.

. Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 , 79 S.Ct. 237 , 3 L.Ed.2d 231 (1958), is not to the contrary. That ease involved a libel suit in which an author attributed alleged defamatory remarks reported by her to a “network executive.” The author, when *1087 called as a witness in tlie libel action against the network, claimed a First Amendment privilege not to disclose the informant’s identity and was held in contempt for her refusal to divulge the source.

The Second Circuit (per Judge, now Mr. Justice, Stewart) affirmed the judgment of contempt. But, in doing so, it accepted the proposition “that compulsory disclosure of confidential sources of information may entail an abridgement of press freedom * * * ” Id., at 548. The test was “whether the interest to be served by compelling the testimony of the witness in the present case justifies some impairment of this First Amendment freedom,” Id. In that case the court noted that it was “not dealing here with the use of the judicial process to force a wholesale disclosure of a newspaper’s confidential sources of news nor with a case where the identity of the news source is of doubtful relevance or materiality.” Id., at 549-550. There the information was essential for the trial of plaintiff’s case; “the question asked of appellant went to the heart of plaintiff’s claim.” Id. Thus an over-riding need for the specific testimony was shown.

. One reporter for the New York Times states: “[0]n every story there is a much subtler and much more important form of communication at work between a reporter and his sources. It is built up over a period of time working with and writing about an organization, a person, or a group of persons. The reporter and the source each develops a feeling for what the other will do. The reporter senses how far he can go in writing before the source will stop communicating with him. The source, on the other hand, senses how much he can talk and act freely before he has to close off his presence and his information from the reporter. It is often through such subtle communication that the best and truest stories are written and printed in The Times, or any other newspaper.”

Appellant relates his own experiences as follows:

He concludes:

A fellow black reporter, on leave of absence from The New York Times, states:

. This is not necessarily- true of every news source. In political and diplomatic areas where the source is an undercover tipster the relationship may well be sufficiently protected by a privilege not to disclose the source.

. Quite a different situation would be presented were the demand unrelated to the privileged relationship: E. g. “The police must free our leader.”

. Appellant, in his brief to this court, has carefully spelled out what he feels would be required:

. Appellant suggests that the Government’s specification of need could be presented m camera to the District Court with appellant or his counsel present.