This case is presently before the Court upon the application of the National Labor Relations Board (hereinafter “the Board”) for enforcement of its order issued on February 19, 1968, against the respondent Lenkurt Electric Company (hereinafter “the Company”) pursuant to the provisions of Section 10(e) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (e). The jurisdiction of the Board and of this Court is not in dispute.

The respondent Company is engaged in the design and manufacture of communications equipment for sale in interstate commerce. It maintains a manufacturing plant at San Carlos, California, and employs approximately 3,500 employees at the plant, of whom some 2,800 are represented by various unions. The remaining personnel are primarily supervisory and administrative personnel, engineers and other professional employees, and the employees in Department 83, the Publications Service Department. The employees in Department 83 prepare and publish the printed material which the Company ships with the products it sells.

On August 29, 1966, the Union 1 filed a representation petition with the Board seeking an election for certification as the bargaining representative of 14 unrepresented employees in the Publications Production Division of Department 83. These employees operated certain printing equipment used in the production and duplication of printed matter. After a representation hearing, the Regional Director for the Board ordered that an election be held on October 14, 1966. The election resulted in a rejection of the Union by a vote of 7 to 5, with two ballots being challenged. The Union thereafter filed an unfair labor charge and objections to certain conduct of the Company which allegedly affected the outcome of the election.

Briefly stated, the contentions of the Union, which the Board here seeks to uphold, are that in the two weeks imme *1105 diately prior to the election, the manager of the printing department, one Kenneth Linka, made certain statements to groups of the printing department employees which restrained and coerced these employees in the free exercise of their rights under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, thereby violating Section 8(a) (1) of the Act. The Company takes the position that Linka’s statements were fair comment and permissible predictions of the consequences of unionization, and are protected under Section 8(c) of the Act. 2

The unfair labor practice charge and the objections to the Company’s conduct were consolidated for hearing before a trial examiner, who concluded that the Company had committed no unfair labor practice or otherwise objectionable acts, and recommended that the complaint be dismissed. The Board reversed, finding that the preelection statements made by Linka, considered in the context in which they were made, constituted an implied threat that the Company would deprive its employees of certain benefits and employment, and would impose more rigid working conditions if the Union were elected as the employees’ bargaining representative. The Board did not reject the findings and conclusions of the trial examiner, nor did it disturb his resolution of credibility of witnesses, except to the extent that the Board disagreed with the inferences and legal conclusions to be drawn from the facts found. 3 We conclude, for the reasons hereafter set forth, that the petition of the Board for enforcement of its order should be denied.

It is well established law that an employer has the right to express opinions or predictions of unfavorable consequences which he believes may result from unionization. Such predictions or opinions are not violations of the National Labor Relations Act if they have some reasonable basis in fact and provided that they are in fact predictions or opinions rather than veiled threats on the part of the employer to visit retaliatory consequences upon the employees in the event that the union prevails.

The most recent and authoritative enunciation of the rule is found in N. L. R. B. v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 , 89 S.Ct. 1918 , 23 L.Ed.2d 547 (1969). The Supreme Court there' set forth a clarification of the standards to be used in determining the impact of an employer’s pre-election statements. The Court stated, 395 U.S. at 618, 619 , 89 S. Ct. at 1942 :

We read this opinion as establishing two standards by which an employer’s utterances may be objectionable. It appears clear that an employer may not make predictions which indicate that he will, of his own volition and for his own reasons, inflict adverse consequences upon his employees if the union is chosen. This would constitute a threat of retaliation. Also, an employer may not, in the absence of a factual basis therefor, predict adverse consequences arising from sources outside his volition and control. This would not be a retaliatory threat, but would be an improper restraint nevertheless. N. L. R. B. v. C. J. Pearson Co., 420 F.2d 695 (1st Cir. 1969). Thus, an employer may not impliedly threaten retaliatory consequences within his control, nor may he, in an excess of imagination and under the guise of prediction, fabricate hobgoblin consequences outside his control which have no basis in objective fact.

With these basic premises in mind, we turn to an evaluation of the Company’s communications to its employees in the instant case. The record reflects that in his conversations with the printing department employees, Linka suggested that if the employees were to unionize, it was possible that a more strict regimentation of working hours would be implemented. He explained that under the present working conditions, company policy with respect to coffee breaks, lunch hours and conversation while working had been fairly casual in the printing department, while in the unionized departments of the plant the employees were strictly controlled as to coffee breaks, lunch hours and general attention to their labors. Linka further explained that if these employees were unionized, and the basis of their compensation changed from monthly salary to the hourly rates which were the basis for compensation of other union employees in the plant, a more strict observance of working time would probably result. These observations were based largely on Linka’s own observations when other employees in the plant were unionized and had gone to an hourly basis of compensation.

Linka further suggested that working conditions might be made more difficult by unionization because the Company might seek to reduce operating costs by using less expensive paper stock in the printing department. He explained that while the employees usually worked with “premium stock” paper, that if it were necessary to reduce costs he would probably introduce lower quality stock, which *1107 might cause more problems for the operators of the various machines.

In the course of the meetings, Linka also stated that sick leave and other fringe benefits, particularly the company’s policy of providing working smocks and laundry service to the employees, might be changed by unionization. With respect to sick leave, Linka explained at the hearing that it was his understanding that employees with the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Union, which represented most of the employees in the plant, did not get paid if they did not come to work. The possibility of discontinuing the laundry service and working smocks was described as potentially necessary to reduce costs and to “remain competitive.”

The Board also found an unfair labor practice in Linka’s statements to two female employees to the effect that their lack of diversified experience in operating the printing machines might work to their disadvantage in the event of unionization. It appears that these women had limited ability in the print shop and could operate only one or two of the machines. It had been company policy in the past, when these machines broke down or when work was slack, to move these women to other departments in the plant in order to fill out their work day. Linka told these women that from his observation of union shops, unions were adverse to temporary transfer of employees outside their primary department, and in the event that the print shop were unionized and work was slow in the printing department, the Company might be unable to send these women out to work in other departments in order to obtain a full day’s time. Linka further pointed out that it might be necessary, if these women were unable to work in other departments, to lay them off temporarily during those periods when they were unable to work in the printing department.

We find, contrary to the Board; nothing in these expressions by the Company’s supervisor to constitute either an express or implied threat of retaliatory action by the Company. In determining whether an employer’s communications constitute permissible argument or prohibited threats, the statements must be considered in the context of the factual background in which they were made, and in view of the totality of employer conduct. N. L. R. B. v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469 , 62 S.Ct. 344 , 86 L.Ed. 348 (1941) ; P. R. Mallory & Co. v. N. L. R. B., 389 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1967). The record reveals no background of antiunion animus on the part of the Company nor on the part of Linka. Virtually all the employees of the respondent Company were already represented by union bargaining representatives except supervisory and professional personnel and the printing department, and there is nothing whatever in the record to indicate that the Company was adamantly opposed to the advent of the Pressmen’s Union. The record clearly shows that Linka had been on friendly terms with the employees in the printing department, had been a union member in the past, and had known most of the employees in the printing department for some years. Moreover, the record is persuasive that the Company and Linka studiously avoided any campaign against the union until the last two weeks preceding the election, that the employees themselves had on several occasions approached Linka of their own accord to obtain his views on the prospective unionization, and that the meetings were held, at least in part, in response to requests by the employees. On the basis of the record, we are convinced that there was no implied or expressed threat of retaliation by Linka, but that his statements were at most predictions of possible disadvantages which might arise from economic necessity or because of union demands or union policies. Don The Beachcomber v. N. L. R. B., 390 F.2d 344 (9th Cir. 1968); N. L. R. B. v. Sonora Sundry Sales, Inc., 399 F.2d 930 (9th Cir. 1968); N. L. R. B. v. TRW-Semiconductors, Inc., 385 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1967); N. L. R. B. v. Laars Engineers, Inc., 332 *1108 F.2d 664 (9th Cir. 1964); Automation & Measurement Division, The Bendix Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 400 F.2d 141 (6th Cir. 1968); N. L. R. B. v. Golub Corp., 388 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1967); P. R. Mallory & Co., Inc. v. N. L. R. B., supra.

There remains the question of whether the predictions made by Linka had any “basis in objective fact.” We conclude that there was such a factual basis for all the predictions made. The suggested necessity of eliminating the smock and laundry service and of using a lower grade of paper stock arose out of anticipated higher wage costs. The Union had, as part of its campaign, given the employees a copy of the then current contract for the Pressmen’s Local No. 24, which clearly indicated that such a contract would increase the Company’s costs. The statements regarding sick leave and more strict accounting of employees’ time were based primarily on prior union contracts with other unions in the plant, and on Linka’s own experience and observations of the results of prior union organizations. 4 The predicted difficulty in transferring employees among departments was based on his own prior experience as a union member and on his observations of union shop printing operations in the area. 5 On this record, we hold that each of the challenged statements was founded on objective facts, and that the predictions advanced by Linka were, under all the circumstances, demonstrably probable consequences which might be anticipated as the result of unionization.

The Supreme Court and this circuit are committed to the principle that debate in union campaigns should be vigorous and uninhibited, subject to the limitations we have heretofore set forth. Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 62 , 86 S.Ct. 657, 663 , 15 L.Ed.2d 582 (1966); N. L. R. B. v. TRW-Semieonductors, Inc., supra. The exercise of free speech in these campaigns should not be unduly restricted by narrow construction. It is highly desirable that the employees involved in a union campaign should hear all sides of the question in order that they may exercise the informed and reasoned choice that is their right. Colonial Corporation v. N. L. R. B., 427 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1970); N. L. R. B. v. TRW-Semiconductors, Inc., supra; P. R. Mallory & Co. v. N. L. R. B., supra. The statements of Linka do not justify the strained interpretation given them by the Board, but were within the protection of the free speech provisions of the First Amendment, as implemented by Section 8(c) of the National Labor Relations Act. N. L. R. B. v. Laars Engineers, Inc., supra. The petition for enforcement of the Board’s order is denied.

. San Francisco & Vicinity Printing Pressmen Offset Workers & Assistants’ Union No. 24, International Printing Pressmen and Assistants’ Union of North America, AFL-OIO.

. Section 8(c) provides that:

“The expressing of any views, argument or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this subchapter, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.”

. The Board found no fault with the factual findings or resolutions of credibility by the examiner, but held that the witness Linka’s own testimony supported the Board’s inference that Linka’s statements constituted implicit threat. We note that where a disagreement between the Board and the trial examiner does not turn upon questions of fact or upon the credibility of witnesses, but upon the inferences to be drawn from the record as a whole, no special weight need be given to the conclusions of the trial examiner. Hawkins v. N.L.R.B., 358 F.2d 281 (7th Cir. 1966) ; Cheney California Lumber Co. v. N.L.R.B., 319 F.2d 375, 377 (9th Cir. 1963). The Board is free to accept the basic facts and credibility determinations and to draw inferences therefrom different from those drawn by the trial examiner. In such cases, however, the reviewing court will carefully examine the Board’s findings, and overbearing evidence calling for inferences contrary to those of the Board must be considered controlling. Jervis Corp., Bolivar Division v. N.L.R.B., 387 F.2d 107 (6th Cir. 1967) ; N.L.R.B. v. Mt. Vernon Telephone Corp., 352 F.2d 977 (6th Cir. 1965).

. Where an employer’s predictions relate to consequences which are likely to occur because of union activity, it is proper for him to base his opinion or prediction on past events or personal experiences, if these are truthfully depicted. P. R. Mallory & Co. v. N.L.R.B., supra, 389 F.2d at 707, n. 2 .

. Similar prediction of adverse consequences to employees arising out of union objection to such interdepartmental transfers was held to be permissible prediction in Suprenant Mfg. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 341 F.2d 756 (6th Cir. 1965). Cf. also, Russell-Newman Mfg. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 370 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1966), where prediction that the employer might have to discontinue its voluntary make-work policies during slow seasons was upheld as permissible argument.