Kevin Marilley v. Charlton Bonham

Good Law
802 F.3d 958·2015 WL 5472732·45 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20174·2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 16634
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitSeptember 18, 201513-17358California12,574 words

Opinion

Lead Opinion

Friedman, J.

Opinion by Judge FRIEDMAN; Dissent by Judge GRABER.

*961 OPINION

Commercial fishers in California are subject to a bevy of fees. For certain fees, however, non-residents are charged two to three times more than residents. Plaintiffs represent a class of non-resident commercial fishers who contend that California’s discriminatory fees violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the United States Constitution. Because California has failed to offer a closely related justification for its discrimination against non-residents, we agree with plaintiffs and therefore affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the plaintiff class.

BACKGROUND

The named plaintiffs are commercial fishers residing outside California. They represent a class of non-residents who, since 2009, have purchased commercial fishing licenses, registrations, or permits from California and paid higher fees than residents. Plaintiffs sued Charlton Bon-ham, in his official capacity as the Director of the California Department of Fish and Game, alleging that the differential fees violate the Privileges and Immunities, and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution.

Plaintiffs…

Dissenting Opinion

Judge, J.

dissenting:

I respectfully dissent. Although I agree fully with the majority’s analysis at step one of the inquiry, I would hold, at step two, that the differential fees survive summary judgment. Further evidentiary development is necessary to determine whether the nonresident fees “merely compensate the State for any added enforcement burden [nonresidents] may impose or for any conservation expenditures from taxes which only residents pay.” Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 399 , 68 S.Ct. 1156 , 92 L.Ed. 1460 (1948).

We have little guidance to assist us in determining what the United States Supreme Court meant in the foregoing passage from Toomer. Only twice since Toomer has the Court quoted the phrase “taxes which only residents pay” in a privileges and immunities context, and in neither case did it explain the meaning of those words. Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 436 U.S. 371, 401 , 98 S.Ct. 1852 , 56 L.Ed.2d 354 (1978); Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415, 417 , 72 S.Ct. 428 , 96 L.Ed. 458 (1952). As I explain in more detail below, two state supreme courts have reached different conclusions about the proper interpretation of that phrase. But we do not know which (if either)…

Opinion

BACKGROUND

The named plaintiffs are commercial fishers residing outside California. They represent a class of non-residents who, since 2009, have purchased commercial fishing licenses, registrations, or permits from California and paid higher fees than residents. Plaintiffs sued Charlton Bonham, in his official capacity as the Director of the California Department of Fish and Game, alleging that the differential fees violate the Privileges and Immunities and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution.

Plaintiffs challenge four specific fees: general commercial fishing license fees, commercial fishing vessel registration fees, Herring Gill net permit fees, and Dungeness Crab vessel permit fees. See Cal. Fish & Game Code §§ 7852, 7881, 8550.5, 8280.6. While the parties dispute the prevalence of Herring Gill and Dungeness Crab permits, it is undisputed that, at a minimum, non-resident commercial fishers must purchase the general license to fish in California waters and a vessel registration to do so from a boat they own or operate. See id. §§ 7852, 7881. In 2012–13, the relevant fees were as follows:

• Commercial fishing license: $130.03 for residents; $385.75…

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