This Petition for Review filed by the union complains of the failure of the National Labor Relations Board to make a “successor” employer fully Hable to respond to the relief ordered by the Board against the original employer, found to be in violation of Section 8(a) (1), (3) (4) of the National Labor Relations Act 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq.

The case comes to us without any dispute as to the facts. The Board stated the basic facts as follows:

The Board also adopted the following findings of fact by the Examiner:

The Board did not expressly find to the contrary of the italicized fact finding, but neither did it approve or adopt the findings. The Board used its “boiler plate” language which, unfortunately leaves it to us to make a detailed analysis of its decision to determine whether the critical finding emphasized above was approved by the Board.

In view of the fact that the Union places its case almost entirely on the Board’s decision in Perma Vinyl Corp., 164 N.L.R.B. 968 (1967) and the order enforcing it at United States Pipe and Foundry Co. v. N. L. R. B., 398 F.2d 544 (1968), we conclude that, as to the principal issues before us — reinstatement and backpay obligations of the successor corporation — it is necessary to de termine whether this finding of “substantially the same work force” made by the Trial Examiner became a finding by the Board.

In Perma, Vinyl, supra, the successor employed “essentially the same personnel” as its predecessor. Under these circumstances the Board stated in Perma Vinyl:

The Union, in its reply brief, states flatly that the Trial Examiner’s finding emphasized above — “There has been substantially the same work force * * * ” “was adopted by the Board.” This is an incorrect statement.

Although not expressly rejecting the finding, the board took pains to distinguish this case from Perma Vinyl in the following passage:

We would agree that there should be no distinction between a finding that “essentially the same personnel were hired by the successor” and a finding that “There has been substantially the same work force.” However, the Board did not find there was substantially the same work force. It clearly rejected the finding in the analysis it made of the basic facts. Unfortunately, perhaps neither party undertook to establish the facts whether the particular job classifications held by the persons discrimi-natorily fired by the predecessor were among the few non-Thomas . employees hired by Upshur.

The Court of Appeals strongly stressed the fact that jobs were open for the fired employees when it enforced the Board’s order in Perma Vinyl:

We are forced to conclude that neither the Board’s decision in Perma Vinyl, which it announced as “the principles by which we will be guided in future cases,” nor the Court of Appeals opinion is in conflict with the action of the Board here in declining to enter a cease and desist order and in declining to order a reinstatement of the unlawfully fired employees and in declining to enter a backpay order, except for such period as might exceed five days following any refusal by Upshur to comply with the limited rehiring order.

Petitioner complains of the refusal of the Board of its motion to reopen hearings, following the Board’s decision which, it says, would have permitted the Union to prove that within a relatively short time after the reopening of the plant additional Thomas employees were hired — enough to make a complement of within 10-15 as many as before the shut down. We cannot find error in this refusal in light of stipulations twice made by the parties as to the figure of 90 Thomas employees out of a total of 97 as compared with a total Thomas employment of 120-130 at closing. As stated by the Board, these facts were within the knowledge of the Union long before the decision of the Board and within its discretion, the Board could determine the proposed data as not being newly discovered evidence under Board rules and regulations 102.-48(d) (1).

We think it not amiss to sound a caveat to what appears, although not expressly articulated in the opinion, to be a down grading of the importance of the Perma Vinyl rule, announced by the Board as “principles by which [it] will be guided in future cases.”

The' General Counsel states, in his brief: “In effect the Board [in this case] indicated that the backpay aspect of the Perma Vinyl remedy will be narrowly construed — presumably, restricted to aggravated situations in which unusual remedial action is appropriate.”

We do not affirm the Board’s action here on any basis other than the ground that it has not been shown that “substantially” or “essentially” the same work force manned the successor’s plant. We consider the remedy of requiring the successor to “share a joint and several responsibility in the matter of back pay” and rehiring with the predecessor to be an appropriate remedy to “effectuate the policies of the act” in situations like that here before the court, but with the added circumstance that the company has maintained substantially the same workforce.

The Order of the Board will be enforced.

. “The Board * * * hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner only to the extent consistent herewith.” . “The Board ordered them hired if, and when vacancies occurred.” . It is difficult to envision what is comprehended within the General Counsel’s formulation of a rule that would make this remedy available only in “aggravated situations,” short of a finding that the successor is itself actually guilty of the unfair labor practices, or a finding that the successor is not a bona fide successor as distinguished from an alter ego — a circumstance which has always required that it be treated as if it were the real wrongdoer. Regal Knitwear Co. v. N.L.R.B., 324 U.S. 9, 13-14 , 65 S.Ct. 478 , 89 L.Ed. 661 ; J. Howard Jenks d/b/a Glendora Plumbing, 172 NLRB No. 197 (1968) 71 LRRM 1055.