United States v. Hubert Hall Irvin, Jr.

Irvin appeals from a judgment of conviction of bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (a), (d), and (e). We need consider only his claim that the trial judge should have granted his counsel’s motion for an examination to determine his competency to assist in his own defense. We reverse.

On November 6, 1967, the case was set for trial on Tuesday, December 5, 1967. On that day, Irvin’s appointed counsel stated that she had “a motion to make,” and the following occurred:

A jury was then empanelled and the matter recessed until December 9. On that day, before the jury was brought in, Irvin’s counsel told the trial judge that Irvin “has further stated to me to reiterate to the court that he does not feel he is competent to assist in his defense at this time.” The judge replied: “The court has already found, and finds again, for purposes of the record, that the defendant Irvin is competent to assist in his defense.”

These proceedings do not comport with the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 4244 . 1 *970 It does not matter whether we view the trial judge’s action as a finding, on the merits of the issue, that Irvin was competent to stand trial, or as simply a denial of Irvin’s motion for a…

(dissenting) :

I dissent. The fact that appellant did not cooperate with his attorney does not establish that he was unable to assist in *971 his own defense. One accused of bank robbery, such as appellant, when faced with the adverse testimony of at least four eyewitnesses, might have excellent reasons for not responding to an attorney’s questions. For example, he might know that he had no defense. In such case, why should he waste his time answering a lawyer’s questions ? I suggest that the court’s questions, in most instances, were precise and to the point, rather than “perfunctory” as suggested by the majority. So were appellant’s responses. Here, it is obvious the trial judge felt that there was no merit whatsoever in the contention that appellant was unable to assist in his own defense and that such a contention was frivolous within the doctrine stated in Meador v. United States, 332 F.2d 935 (9th Cir. 1964). The accused’s mental competency under § 4244 is to be determined by the trial court and its determination is not to be set aside on review unless clearly arbitrary or unwarranted. Hall v. United States, 410 F.2d 653, 658 (4th Cir. 1969), cert, denied, 396 U.S. 970 , 90…

450 F.2d 968 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Hubert Hall IRVIN, Jr., Defendant-Appellant. No. 23773. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Oct. 8, 1971. James McWilliams (argued), San Francisco, Cal., for defendant-appellant. John M. Newman, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty. (argued), Roger A. Browning, Asst. U. S. Atty., Robert L. Meyer, U. S. Atty., David R. Nissen, Chief, Crim. Div., Irving Prager, Asst. U. S. Atty., Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiff-appellee. Before DUNIWAY, ELY and KILKENNY, Circuit Judges. DUNIWAY, Circuit Judge: 1 Irvin appeals from a judgment of conviction of bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2113 (a), (d), and (e). We need consider only his claim that the trial judge should have granted his counsel's motion for an examination to determine his competency to assist in his own defense. We reverse. 2 On November 6, 1967, the case was set for trial on Tuesday, December 5, 1967. On that day, Irvin's appointed counsel stated that she had "a motion to make," and the following occurred: 3 "MRS. CUTLER: [defense counsel] 4 I realize the lateness and I realize all of the witnesses the government has subpoenaed are present. I was furnished with a list of…