MEMORANDUM

Carlos Miranda-Godoy appeals his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g). He also appeals the district court’s imposition of a 120-month sentence for the conviction and a one-year consecutive sentence for violating the conditions of supervised release from a prior case.

Sufficient evidence supports the § 922(g) conviction. “[A]fter viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1163-64 (9th Cir.2010) (quoting Jackson v. Virgi nia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)).

The district court did not commit procedural error when it sentenced Miranda-Godoy to 120 months of imprisonment for the § 922(g) violation. The district court did not clearly err in finding by clear and convincing evidence that Miranda-Godoy committed attempted murder. U.S.S.G. §§ 2A2.1(a), 2K2.1(c); see also United States v. Armstead, 552 F.3d 769, 776 (9th Cir.2008).

The district court did not err when it sentenced Miranda-Godoy to 12 months of imprisonment for violating the terms of his supervised release. Courts “may not impose a revocation sentence solely, or even primarily, based on the severity of the new criminal offense underlying the revocation.”. United States v. Simtob, 485 F.3d 1058, 1063 (9th Cir.2007). The district court did not sentence Miranda-Godoy for the supervised release violation “solely, or even primarily, based on the felon in possession conviction. It considered Miranda-Godoy’s criminal history and the likelihood that he would resume gang activity in the future, which are permissible sentencing considerations.

AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.