Appellant was convicted of first degree murder by a jury in the Superior Court of Maricopa County, Arizona, and sentenced to life imprisonment. His conviction was affirmed on appeal to the Arizona Supreme Court. State v. Busta-mante, 103 Ariz. 551 , 447 P.2d 243 (1968). Thereafter, he sought a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 . His petition was denied, and this appeal followed.

Upon the filing of the petition, the district court found that “[o]n its face, the petition raises several issues as to the constitutionality of petitioner’s confinement”. It directed the appellee to file .the record of the state court proceedings, including the reporter’s transcript of the preliminary hearing, the reporter’s transcript of the trial, minute entries of record and photostated instruments of record. The appellee disregarded the district court’s order, stating that “it is unnecessary to file such a voluminous addendum”. The cause was then heard by the district court, based solely on the allegations of the petition and legal argument.

The petition sets forth nine separate contentions as constituting grounds for the allegation of illegal confinement. The fifth contention was “ [petitioner was denied his right to be personally present during the rereading of the instructions to the jury”. The district court resolved that issue against appellant as follows:

It appears from the petition that—

1. When the jury was instructed by the court, the appellant was present, and the instructions were tape recorded.

2. When the cause was submitted to the jury, the appellant was taken from the courthouse to the county jail.

3. After seven hours of deliberation, the jury returned to the courtroom and requested a rereading of the instructions. The appellant was not brought back from jail. A judge different from the one who presided over the trial presided over the proceedings. Appellant was not informed of the court proceedings and did not even know that they had taken place until a year later.

4. The following appears from the clerk’s minutes of the proceedings:

5. Shortly after midnight, the appellant was taken from the jail into the courtroom where the jury pronounced its verdict of guilty.

On that record alone, the district court held that the harmless error rule of Chapman applied. Chapman states: “[T]here may be some constitutional errors which in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant and insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring the automatic reversal of the conviction.” Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. at 22 , 87 S.Ct. at 827 . However, the burden of proving harmless error is a heavy one. The state must “prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained”. 386 U.S. at 24 , 87 S.Ct. at 828 .

In the setting of this case, the state has not proved that appellant’s absence was harmless. All the district court had before it and all this court has, are the allegations in the petition set forth above, and the assertion of the appellee that “[i]t is impossible to comprehend how Bustamante was prejudiced by the replay of the taped instructions in his absence. He was present at the time the court instructed the jury and recorded the instructions. He could then have objected, requested additional instructions, or suggested changes, if any he had. We are living in a day of instant replay. As in the observation of a replay in a televised football game, it may definitely be determined whether the receiving player of a passed football is in bounds or out of bounds or a ball carrier has crossed the goal line for dear old Arizona, so was the jury better able to consider the court’s instructions especially after seven hours of deliberation in a jury room.”

It is unfortunate that the trial of a capital offense would be categorized like a sporting event. In habeas corpus petitions “it is not a needle we are looking for in these stacks of paper, but the rights of a human being”. Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 Harv.L.Rev. 1, 25 (1956). Neither the district court nor this court knows what transpired in the courtroom during the 30 minutes the appellant was absent. The realities of life and the experience of everyone who has tried a lawsuit require the conclusion that statements are made by the court, counsel and jurors beyond what is contained in simple minute entries. The minute order involved here, on its face, shows that such statements were made by the jury, the court and counsel. Arizona was or-, dered by the district court to provide a complete record of the state trial court proceedings, but chose instead to withhold it.

The basic question is whether a defendant in a capital case has a federal constitutional right to be personally present at all the proceedings in the courtroom. If he does, then the state has not met the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the error here was harmless.

Rule 231 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 A.R.S., provides that in a prosecution for a felony the defendant shall be present at all proceedings before the court when the jury is present. That rule has been interpreted by the Arizona courts not to reach constitutional proportions; a defendant must prove prejudice. State v. Busta-mante, supra, and State v. Cufio, 12 Ariz.App. 461 , 471 P.2d 763 (1970).

The right of a defendant charged with a felony to be personally present in the courtroom at every stage of his trial conducted there is fundamen *272 tal to our system of justice. This right was recognized by the Supreme Court many years ago: “A leading principle that pervades the entire law of criminal procedure is that, after indictment found, nothing shall be done in the absence of the prisoner.” Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 372 , 13 S.Ct. 136, 137 , 36 L.Ed. 1011 (1892). This principle has been consistently upheld and continually reaffirmed. See Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 , 4 S.Ct. 202 , 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884); Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442 , 32 S.Ct. 250 , 56 L.Ed. 500 (1912); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 , 90 S.Ct. 1057 , 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970). The rule includes the defendant’s right to be present whenever the court communicates with the jury. Shields v. United States, 273 U.S. 583 , 47 S.Ct. 478 , 71 L. Ed. 787 (1927).

At common law the accused enjoyed a “privilege of presence”. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 , 54 S.Ct. 330 , 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934); 8A J. Moore, Federal Practice, ¶ 43.02[1], The principle that the defendant was to be present at every stage of the trial was explicitly recognized in Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in 1946. The Advisory Committee Note thereto indicated that this was merely a restatement of existing law, citing Lewis, supra, and Diaz, supra. Similarly, the principle has long been recognized by constitution, statute or rule in most states. Since many of the reported cases rest upon an application of these statutes and rules, it has seldom been necessary to plumb the federal constitutional depths of the principle. Nevertheless, that the principle is embodied in the Constitution of the United States is clear.

In the early case of Hopt v. Utah, supra, the Court said:

In Diaz v. United States, supra, the Court reemphasized the fundamental character of the right. “In cases of felony our courts, with substantial accord, have regarded [the accused’s right to be present] as extending to every stage of the trial, inclusive of the empaneling of the jury and the reception of the verdict, and as being scarcely less important to the accused than the right of trial itself.” 223 U.S. at 455 , 32 S.Ct. at 254 .

This rationale went unchallenged until in Shields v. United States, supra, the Court declined to characterize the right as one encompassed within due process, choosing instead to view it as a “rule of orderly conduct of jury trial”. 273 U.S. at 588-589 , 47 S.Ct. at 479 : In Snyder v. Massachusetts, supra, the Court held that the defendant accused of murder had no constitutional right to accompany the jury on a view. The Court stated:

The Court summarized its position:

*273 This decision was not unanimous. In a vigorous dissent, four Justices argued:

Snyder is clearly distinguishable. First, a complete record of everything that transpired during the jury view was prepared, and the court found as a fact that nothing which was done was prejudicial to the defendant. Here, we are entirely unaware of what happened during the court session. Secondly, Justice Cardozo was careful to set forth in great detail the fact that a view was not any part of a trial in the sense in which a trial was understood at common law. Here, the proceedings during which the appellant was absent occurred in the courtroom at a time when the most fundamental aspects of his trial took place. In Stein v. United States, 313 F.2d 518 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 918 , 83 S.Ct. 1307 , 10 L.Ed.2d 417 , reh. denied, 375 U.S. 872 , 84 S.Ct. 32 , 11 L. Ed.2d 102 (1963), this court refused to extend the right of presence to a conference in chambers. However, there, the record of the conference detailed the absolute lack of any prejudice to the absent defendant; indeed, the trial court during the conference ruled in the defendant’s favor.

Recently the Court reaffirmed the rule that the accused’s right to be present in the courtroom is of constitutional magnitude. In Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 , 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1058 , 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970), the Court emphasized that “[o]ne of the most basic of the rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause is the accused’s right to be present in the courtroom at every stage of his trial. Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370 , [ 13 S.Ct. 136 , 36 L. Ed. 1011 ] (1892)”. (Emphasis added.) Since Allen involved the defendant’s absence from the courtroom during a portion of the prosecution’s ease-in-chief, the defendant’s right to confront the witnesses against him was directly involved. The Court’s citation to Lewis , however, indicates, the broad intent of the holding. In effect, the Court took the opportunity in Allen to reaffirm the principle that “after indictment found, nothing shall be done in the abseence of the prisoner”. 146 U.S. at 372 , 13 S.Ct. at 137 . The combined force of the Court’s opinions in Hopt, Lewis and Allen indicates that this principle is founded upon both the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Furthermore, the defendant’s right to be present during trial is obligatory upon the states. Illinois v. Allen, supra; Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 , 85 S.Ct. 1065 , 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965).

It follows that appellant here had a constitutional right to be personally present in the courtroom when the instructions were replayed for the jury. However, it is necessary to determine whether appellant waived this right or whether the attempted waiver by his counsel was effective. To the court’s knowledge, the earliest case in which the Supreme Court considered the issue whether an accused could waive his right to be present at trial of a capital case was Hopt v. Utah, supra. The Court held that it was “not within the power” of the accused or his counsel to waive this right, because the right reflected the interests of the public in guaranteeing that life and liberty were not taken without due process of law. 110 U.S. at 579 , 4 S.Ct. 202 . See also Lewis v. United States, supra. Both Hopt and Lewis were capital cases. In Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442 , 32 S.Ct. 250 , 56 L.Ed. 500 (1912), the Court formulated the rule as follows:

In Allen, supra, the Court held that a defendant can lose his right to be present at trial if he conducts himself “in a manner so disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful of the court that his trial cannot be carried on with him in the courtroom”. 397 U.S. at 343 , 90 S. Ct. at 1060, 1061 . This “disruptiveness” exception to the general rule that a defendant in a capital case cannot waive his right to be present at trial does not signal the deterioration of the rule. In Allen , the Court was faced with a defendant determined to disrupt the proceedings and prevent any trial from taking place. Viewing this as a threat to the entire judicial system, the Court was compelled to fashion the narrow and specific exception. There is no indication in the opinion that the Court intended to erode the right of presence in any regard beyond the narrow exception there outlined; indeed, the opinion explicitly reaffirms the fundamental character of this right.

Since appellant was in custody for a capital offense and his absence was not necessitated by disruptive behavior, we hold that he did not, indeed could not, waive his right to be present in the courtroom at trial. Furthermore, there is no evidence that he even attempted to waive this right. He could not voluntarily have waived this right before the tape was replayed, because it appears that he was not even aware of this replay until almost a year later. Neither is there evidence that he attempted to waive this right after he gained knowledge of it.

It the appellant in a capital case could not waive his right to be present at trial except by disruptive conduct, it must certainly follow that whatever attempt counsel made in appellant’s absence and without his knowledge to waive this right was without effect. United States v. Crutcher, 405 F.2d 239 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 908 , 89 S. Ct. 1018 , 22 L.Ed.2d 219 (1969); Evans v. United States, 284 F.2d 393 (6th Cir. 1960).

Having determined that appellant was denied a federal constitutional right, the right to be present in the courtroom at every stage of his trial, the next step is to determine whether that error was harmless. Chapman v. California, supra. If the error was harmless, there is no reason to disturb the conviction. If, however, appellant’s absence prejudiced his case, weakened his defense, or was otherwise harmful to his interests, a new trial must be held.

It cannot be argued that appellant’s absence was per se harmless because his counsel was at all times present to guard his interests. In the first place, whether counsel who attempts without the defendant’s knowledge to waive his right to be present can be trusted to protect the defendant’s other rights is a dubious assumption. 1 More importantly, the presence of counsel is no substitute for the presence of the defendant himself. The right to be present at trial stems in part from the fact that by his physical presence the defendant can hear and see the proceedings, can be seen by the jury, and can participate in the presentation of his rights. But the right also rests upon society’s interests in due process. As stated in Hopt, supra, “[t]he public has an interest in [the defendant’s] life and liberty. Neither can be lawfully taken except in the mode prescribed by law”. 110 U.S. at 579 , 4 S.Ct. at 204 . The defendant’s right to be present at all proceedings of the tribunal which may take his life or liberty is designed to safeguard the public’s interest in a *275 fair and orderly judicial system. The presence of counsel alone at trial can never be harmless per se.

We are unable from the record before us to determine whether the error was harmless. We have been told only that a tape recording of the original instructions was replayed in the courtroom in the presence of the jury, a new judge and counsel. The record does not disclose what, if anything, the judge said to the jury, or the contents of any other dialogue which may have transpired. We certainly cannot assume that nothing was said. Nor does the record show whether the tape recording was a full, complete and accurate recording of the original instructions, whether the jury could hear it, or even whether all members of the jury were present. These are crucial questions which must be answered.

We, therefore, reverse and remand to the district court for further proceedings. At that time the district court may wish to examine the other allegations of the habeas corpus petition, in accordance with the procedures mandated in Selz v. California, 423 F.2d 702 (9 Cir. 1970).

. Present counsel was not trial counsel.