Honolulu Rapid Transit (HRT) is a Hawaii corporation that provides public transportation services in the City of Honolulu. It was formed in 1898, when it received its first franchise from the Territory of Hawaii to operate a public street railway. With expiration of the franchise due within a few years the Legislature of Hawaii in 1921 enacted a new franchise, Act 186 Session Laws of Hawaii, 1921, which was duly approved by the Congress and submitted to HRT for its acceptance. On recommendation of the board of directors, the shareholders voted to accept the franchise and HRT has since operated under it.

The franchise, by § 20, permits the City of Honolulu to purchase HRT’s property. Respecting the purchase price, it provides:

In 1970 the City resolved to purchase HRT’s property and applied to the Hawaii Public Utilities Commission for valuation pursuant to the franchise terms.

HRT then • brought this suit seeking (1) a declaration that § 20 is unconstitutional since it provides for the taking of HRT’s property for public use without payment of just compensation, and (2) an injunction against further proceedings before the Public Utilities Commission. The suit was dismissed by the District Court for failure to state a claim. We affirm.

HRT’s position is that even though the Government has an absolute power to grant or withhold a privilege such as the statutory franchise here in question, it cannot exact a waiver of constitutional rights as the price of the grant. HRT construes the purchase and price provisions of the franchise as such an exaction: a waiver of HRT’s rights to receive just compensation should its property be taken by the City for public use.

HRT relies upon Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm. (1926), 271 U.S. 583 , 46 S.Ct. 605 , 70 L.Ed. 1101 . There the Court struck down state action conditioning use of its highways by a private trucker upon the trucker’s assumption of the status and burdens of a common carrier. The Court stated:

But HRT disregards the fact that there was here no “taking” by the City. This was not a unilateral exercise by the City of its power of eminent domain. The right of the City to acquire HRT’s property at a certain price was not based upon its power to take, but upon agreement between the parties. Thus there was no event to which HRT’s asserted constitutional rights attached. The transaction had “passed out of the range of the Fifth Amendment” and was a situation where “Parties, supposedly with due regard to their own interests, bargain between themselves as to compensation.” Albrecht v. United States, 329 U.S. 599, 603-604 , 67 S.Ct. 606, 609 , 91 L.Ed. 532 (1947). To the same effect, United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 , 61 S.Ct. 291 , 85 L.Ed. 243 (1940); Fox River Paper Co. v. R. R. Comm., 274 U.S. 651 , 47 S. Ct. 669 , 71 L.Ed. 1279 (1927); Portland General Electric Co. v. Fed. Power Comm., 328 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1964). And see Oppenheim, Unconstitutional Conditions and State Powers, 26 Mich. L.R. 186, 189 (1941).

HRT’s contentions, if valid, would . gravely prejudice if not destroy the power of government to utilize options to- acquire property, through making it impossible for the seller to commit himself to a sale price. Hindsight would always be available to compel price adjustments on the theory that the price no longer constituted just compensation.

An exchange of economic benefits such as this franchise represents, underlies every commercial contract and the Supreme Court has left no doubt that the Federal Government enjoys power to conclude commercial bargains. Further, it may employ the remedies available to private citizens in enforcing a contract. Rex Trailer Co., v. United States, 350 U.S. 148 , 76 S.Ct. 219 , 100 L.Ed. 149 (1956); Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 133 , 60 S.Ct. 869 , 84 L.Ed. 1108 (1940). The states enjoy a parallel power. United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 , 58 S.Ct. 811 , 82 L.Ed. 1137 (1938). The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions does not strip state and federal governments of this indispensible and long acknowledged power.

Nor does the fact that the alternatives to the franchise available to HRT in 1921 were unattractive render the agreement a coerced one. The acceptance of HRT was an act of free choice.

Judgment affirmed.

. U.S. Public Law No. 61 (1921), 42 U.S.Stat. 185. . It is well settled that the state may not condition the grant of a benefit upon the surrender of religious freedom (Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 , 83 S.Ct. 1790 , 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963)), freedom of speech (Lamont v. Postmaster, 381 U.S. 301 , 85 S.Ct. 1493 , 14 L.Ed.2d 398 (1965)), freedom from self-incrimination (Garrity v. N. J., 385 U.S. 493 , 87 S.Ct. 616 , 17 L.Ed.2d 562 (1967)), freedom to use the federal courts (Terral v. Burke Construction Co., 257 U.S. 529 , 42 S.Ct. 188 , 66 L.Ed. 352 (1922), freedom from unconstitutional tace assessments (Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 U.S. 494 , 47 S.Ct. 179 , 71 L.Ed. 372 (1926)), and the freedom to operate oneis business as a private rather than public instrumentality (Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm., 271 U.S. 583 , 46 S.Ct. 605 , 70 L.Ed. 1101 (1926)). . The parties do not dispute that, in 1921, HRT had the following option: The company could continue to operate under the original franchise at a profit until 1929, as it had since 1898. And, at the end of this period, it could sell its assets at fair market value to any willing buyer. Instead, however, HRT chose to conclude a second franchise agreement with the state. This resulted in fifty years additional operation as a state created monopoly in the street railway business. The quid pro quo, of course, was the transfer of company equipment to the state upon termination of franchise at ,a predetermined price. The choice confronting HRT was not a Hobson’s choice. The Government merely demanded some recompense, in the public interest, for the continuation of exclusive franchise rights and the economic benefit conferred thereby. This entails no coercion. 8ee I Restatement of the Law of Contracts, §§ 490-99.