Irvin

James M. Irvin, a citizen of Arizona, appeals the judgment of the district court in favor of Southern Union Company, a Delaware corporation, on Southern Union’s claims of tortious interference with a business expectancy and tortious interference with contractual relations, as a result of which Southern Union was ultimately awarded $390,072 in compensatory damages and $60,000,000 in punitive damages. Southern Union cross-appeals the district court’s decision to keep its claim of lost profits from the jury.

*1003 We hold, first, that the appeals were timely filed; second, that the compensatory damage award should be affirmed; and third, that the punitive damages are constitutionally disproportionate to the harm found.

Jurisdiction. The case was brought by Southern Union under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 , and as a suit asserting diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 . In the course of the proceedings, various defendants settled with Southern Union; the RICO claim dropped out; and only the business and contract torts went to the jury. In this court, our first question is the timeliness of Irvin’s appeal; the timeliness of…

Concurring and Dissenting.

I dissent in part because I believe that a new trial is required, although, as I will note, I also concur in part because I do *1012 agree with certain portions of the majority-opinion.

A. Jurisdiction

I do agree with the majority’s pithy opinion that we have jurisdiction over this appeal and that a contrary rule would approach parody. Still and all, at the risk of being unduly prolix, I will say a few more words about my reasons for agreeing on this issue.

The problem we are faced with is the plain language of Fed.R.App. P. 4. While it is usually thought that a party’s time to file a notice to appeal does not start to run until a judgment is filed, the rule itself does not say so on its face. Its plain language states that the time starts to run upon the entry of the judgment appealed from except as provided in Rule 4(a)(4). See Rule 4(a)(1)(A). But Rule 4(a)(4)(A) says that the time runs from the date that certain posttrial motions are decided (entry of an order disposing of them). The plain language suggests that even if no judgment has been entered, the time starts to run when the motions are decided. Like the majority, I do not think that…

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SOUTHERN UNION COMPANY, a  Delaware corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SOUTHWEST GAS CORPORATION, a No. 03-16649 California corporation; ONEOK INC., D.C. Nos. an Oklahoma corporation; CV-99-01294-ROS

MICHAEL MAFFIE; THOMAS

HARTLEY; GENE DUBAY; THOMAS  CV-00-00119-ROS

CV-00-00452-ROS

SHEETS; JOHN GABERINO; JACK D. CV-00-01812-ROS

ROSE; EDWARD ZUB; LARRY W. CV-00-01775-ROS

BRUMMETT,

Defendants, and

JAMES M. IRVIN,

Defendant-Appellant. 

8139 8140 SOUTHERN UNION CO. v. IRVIN

SOUTHERN UNION COMPANY, a  Delaware corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SOUTHWEST GAS CORPORATION, a No. 03-16729 California corporation; ONEOK INC., D.C. Nos. an Oklahoma corporation; CV-99-01294-ROS

MICHAEL MAFFIE; THOMAS

HARTLEY; GENE DUBAY; THOMAS  CV-00-00119-ROS

CV-00-00452-ROS

SHEETS; JOHN GABERINO; JACK D. CV-00-01812-ROS

ROSE; EDWARD ZUB; LARRY W. CV-00-01775-ROS

BRUMMETT, …