22:I[98912,["/_next/static/chunks/0asocxi83kb~5.js","/_next/static/chunks/0n4z.7yu76je-.js","/_next/static/chunks/0eyt_ou8dj52g.js","/_next/static/chunks/01bcia3bjqt9z.js","/_next/static/chunks/15egrlmmf_yst.js"],"CaseDetailGate"] 23:T52e,MEMORANDUM Petitioner-Appellant Jacob Bowman appeals the district court’s decision denying his habeas petition. We affirm. The statute of limitations began to run on February 5, 2001, as soon as Bowman’s conviction became final on direct appeal. Bowman’s state court Personal Restraint Petition was not filed for more than a year after that date. The Washington Supreme Court’s decision, In re Bowman, 162 Wash.2d 325 , 172 P.3d 681 (2007), was not a “fact” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(1)(D). Neither Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d 1077, 1081-82 (9th Cir.2003), nor Shelby v. Bartlett, 391 F.3d 1061, 1062 (9th Cir.2004), supports Bowman’s contention that the Washington Supreme Court’s decision served as the factual predicate in his case. Bowman’s petition was not timely filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(1). Bowman has not met his burden of showing that equitable tolling is appropriate in this case. He has not demonstrated that any extraordinary circumstances beyond his control prevented him from filing a timely petition. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 , 125 S.Ct. 1807 , 161 L.Ed.2d 669 (2005); Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir.2008). AFFIRMED. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.24:T560,

MEMORANDUM

Petitioner-Appellant Jacob Bowman appeals the district court’s decision denying his habeas petition. We affirm.

The statute of limitations began to run on February 5, 2001, as soon as Bowman’s conviction became final on direct appeal. Bowman’s state court Personal Restraint Petition was not filed for more than a year after that date. The Washington Supreme Court’s decision, In re Bowman, 162 Wash.2d 325 , 172 P.3d 681 (2007), was not a “fact” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(1)(D). Neither Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d 1077, 1081-82 (9th Cir.2003), nor Shelby v. Bartlett, 391 F.3d 1061, 1062 (9th Cir.2004), supports Bowman’s contention that the Washington Supreme Court’s decision served as the factual predicate in his case. Bowman’s petition was not timely filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(1).

Bowman has not met his burden of showing that equitable tolling is appropriate in this case. He has not demonstrated that any extraordinary circumstances beyond his control prevented him from filing a timely petition. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 , 125 S.Ct. 1807 , 161 L.Ed.2d 669 (2005); Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir.2008).

AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.