DISCUSSION

[1] The IDEA was enacted “to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related ser- vice designed to meet their unique needs.” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). The IDEA sets out a comprehensive educa- tional scheme that confers on disabled students a substantive right to public education. Hoeft v. Tuscon Unified Sch. Dist., 967 F.2d 1298, 1300 (9th Cir. 1992). Under the IDEA, state or local educational agencies can receive federal funding to assist them in educating disabled children. To receive the funding, state and local educational agencies must ensure that children with disabilities — and their parents — are guaran- teed specified procedural safeguards with regard to the provi- sion of free appropriate public education by the agencies. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a).

[2] The IDEA does not restrict or limit the rights of dis- abled students or their parents under other statutes. The IDEA requires, however, that “before the filing of a civil action under such laws seeking relief that is also available under this subchapter, the procedures under subsections (f) [due process hearing] and (g) [appeal] of this section shall be exhausted to the same extent as would be required had the action been 10962 BLANCHARD v. MORTON SCHOOL DISTRICT brought under this subchapter.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l). If a plaintiff is required to exhaust administrative remedies but fails to do so, the federal courts do not have jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff’s claim. Witte v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d 1271, 1274 (9th Cir. 1999). (The policy behind the exhaustion requirement is to ensure that educational agencies have the first opportunities to remedy shortcomings in their educational programs for disabled students. See Hoeft, 967 F.2d at 1303; see also Christopher S. v. Stanislaus County Office of Educ., 384 F.3d 1205, 1209 (9th Cir. 2004). Relief under the IDEA therefore must be appropriate in light of the primary purpose of the IDEA. Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ. of Mass., 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1985). Relief is available under the IDEA when “[b]oth the genesis and the manifestations of the problem are educational.” Charlie F. v. Bd. of Educ. of Skokie Sch. Dist. 68, 98 F.3d 989, 993 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Robb v. Bethel Sch. Dist. #403, 308 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002). At the same time, courts have rec- ognized that the IDEA’s administrative remedies cannot com- pensate for a plaintiff’s injuries that are completely non- educational. Padilla v. Sch. Dist. No. 1 of Denver, 233 F.3d 1268, 1274 (10th Cir. 2000).

[3] Thus, under the relevant statute, exhaustion of adminis- trative remedies is required when a plaintiff is seeking “relief that is also available under” the IDEA. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l). Blanchard argues that the district court erred in concluding that she failed to exhaust required administrative remedies before filing this suit. Blanchard did not pursue administrative remedies on her own behalf before filing suit. The issue in this appeal therefore is whether Blanchard was seeking “relief that is also available under” the IDEA, so that exhaustion was required.

[4] For purposes of exhaustion, “relief that is also available under” the IDEA does not necessarily mean relief that fully satisfies the aggrieved party. Rather, it means “relief suitable to remedy the wrong done the plaintiff, which may not always BLANCHARD v. MORTON SCHOOL DISTRICT 10963 be relief in the precise form the plaintiff prefers.” Robb, 308 F.3d at 1049. But there must be some relief available.

[5] Blanchard’s complaint sought money damages for emo- tional distress and for lost wages caused by the District’s alleged deliberate indifference toward her son’s IDEA claims and the District’s alleged violations of the IDEA. Money damages for retrospective and non-educational injuries are not available under the IDEA. See Witte, 197 F.3d at 1275; see also Polera v. Bd. of Educ. of the Newburgh Enlarged City Sch. Dist., 288 F.3d 478, 486 (2d Cir. 2002); Charlie F., 98 F.3d at 991; Hall v. Knott County Bd. of Educ., 941 F.2d 402, 407 (6th Cir. 1991). That alone is not dispositive, for a plain- tiff cannot avoid the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement simply by limiting a prayer for relief to money or services that are not provided under the IDEA. Robb, 308 F.3d at 1049. The dispo- sitive question therefore is whether Blanchard is seeking rem- edy for injuries that could be redressed to any degree by the IDEA’s administrative procedures. Id. at 1050.

[6] The remedies available under the IDEA include educa- tional services for disabled children. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400- 1482. They do not provide an adequate remedy for Blanchard.

[7] We held in Witte that a plaintiff seeking monetary relief for alleged past physical and emotional abuse by school staff was not required to exhaust administrative remedies under the IDEA. 197 F.3d at 1276. We emphasized that “all educational issues already have been resolved to the parties’ mutual satis- faction through the [administrative] process.” Id. at 1275. That is true here, as well. Following Witte, we hold that Blan- chard had no remedies under the IDEA to exhaust. Blanchard has resolved the educational issues implicated by her son’s disability and has obtained the educational relief available under the IDEA on behalf of her son.

The District relies on Robb. In that case, a student with cerebral palsy and her parents sought damages for lost educa- 10964 BLANCHARD v. MORTON SCHOOL DISTRICT tional opportunities, emotional distress, humiliation, embar- rassment, and psychological injury after the student was removed from the classroom for extended tutoring. Robb, 308 F.3d at 1048. We held that because these injuries could be remedied to some degree by the IDEA’s administrative proce- dures and remedies, the plaintiffs must exhaust those adminis- trative remedies before filing suit. Id. at 1054. We stated: “Where, as here, a plaintiff’s injuries are part and parcel of the educational process, we must give the local administrators the first opportunity to remedy them.” Id. at 1053 n.4. In this case, however, Blanchard’s emotional distress injuries and lost income could not be remedied through the educational remedies available under the IDEA. See Witte, 197 F.3d at 1275.

[8] The District also stresses that the IDEA requires school districts to provide “related services” to education, including “psychological services, . . . social work services, [and] coun- seling services, . . . as may be required to assist a child with a disability to benefit from special education.” 20 U.S.C. § 1401(26)(A). See Robb, 308 F.3d at 1050. The regulations implementing the statute provide that the required psychologi- cal services may include “[p]lanning and managing a program of psychological services, including psychological counseling for children and parents.” 34 C.F.R. § 300.24(b)(9)(v). The act thus has some provision for counseling parents, but only with respect to assisting the child. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(26)(A). The psychological services available under the IDEA would not provide a remedy for Blanchard’s own claims of emotional injury.

We emphasize that our holding is a narrow one: that there is no procedural barrier to Blanchard’s claim that the defen- dants’ acts (as distinct from her child’s disability) have caused her to incur damages for emotional distress. In the present posture of the case we are not called on to decide whether Blanchard’s claim is, substantively, cognizable under federal law nor, even if so, whether her claim is meritorious. We hold BLANCHARD v. MORTON SCHOOL DISTRICT 10965 only that, because the IDEA provides no remedy for Blan- chard, she need not exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit. We therefore reverse the district court’s dismissal of Blanchard’s complaint and remand the case for further pro- ceedings.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.