MEMORANDUM

David Wayne Wilson, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing with prejudice his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action claiming that regulatory amendments to the prison quarterly package program violate the Constitution and various federal and state statutes. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review de novo the district court’s dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir.2000), and we affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Wilson’s federal claims. First, Wilson failed to allege a violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) Act, 18 U.S.C. § § 1961 et seq., because his claim that state-approved package vendors were run by retired correctional officers or prison guard unions fails to allege a pattern of racketeering or the other elements of a RICO Act violation. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 482-83, 496 , 105 S.Ct. 3275 , 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985). Moreover, Wilson lacks standing to sue under the RICO Act because he had no business interests that were injured and was not deprived of any property interests by being required to receive packages only from state-approved vendors for valid security reasons. See id. at 496 , 105 S.Ct. 3275 . Second, Wilson failed to allege a claim of retaliation under Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir.2005), because the return of one of his packages was not in reprisal for his constitutionally protected act of filing grievances and did not chill his exercise of his First Amendment rights. Instead, the package was returned because Wilson was in administrative segregation when it arrived. Moreover, Wilson successfully exercised his right to administrative relief, obtaining both an acknowledgment from the institution that the package should have been held until Wilson was released from segregation, and payment by the institution to have the package reshipped. Third, Wilson failed to allege a claim for deliberate indifference because his right to adequate nutrition under the Eighth Amendment does not entitle him to packaged food from outside, but only requires the prison to provide food that is adequate to maintain health. See LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1456 (9th Cir.1993).

Finally, the district court properly concluded that neither of Wilson’s alleged state-law violations stated a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , and Wilson’s contention that the district court was nonetheless required to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these claims lacks merit. See Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 826 (9th Cir.2001). We decline to address the issues Wilson raises for the first time on appeal, see Dodd v. Hood River County, 59 F.3d 852, 863 (9th Cir.1995), and we find his remaining contentions unpersuasive.

AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.