MEMORANDUM

Level 8 Communications, LLC (“Level 3”), and Qwest Corporation (“Qwest”) entered into an Interconnection Agreement to provide for the exchange of Internet Service Provider (“ISP”)-bound traffic pursuant to the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (“the Act”). The parties agreed to exchange “ISP-bound traffic (as that term is used in the FCC [Federal Communications Commission] ISP [Remand] Order) at the FCC ordered rate, pursuant to the FCC ISP [Remand] Order.” Level 3 filed a complaint with the Arizona Corporation Commission (“Commission”), claiming that this provision required Qwest to pay inter-carrier compensation to Level 3 for virtual NXX calls (calls to a customer whose area code bears no relation to its physical location). The Commission ruled in favor of Level 3, and Qwest appealed to the district court. Level 3 now appeals an order from the district court that remanded the case to the Commission.

We dismiss the appeal as being from a non-final order. A remand order

Chugach Alaska Corp. v. Lujan, 915 F.2d 454, 457 (9th Cir.1990). Here, the remand order fails the third prong because denying an appeal now would not foreclose review in the future. The district court in this case did not resolve Qwest’s claims for relief, and it did not enter a final judgment. In fact, the district court did not enter judgment on any of the issues presented by Qwest.

Our precedent instructs that a remand order may be considered a final, appeal-able order only when “review would, as a practical matter, be foreclosed if an immediate appeal were unavailable.” Alsea Valley Alliance v. Dep’t of Commerce, 358 F.3d 1181, 1184 (9th Cir.2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). Neither party is foreclosed from seeking appellate review, in the future, of any legal determination made in the district court’s final order. Because the remand order is not a final, appealable order, we must dismiss the appeal. See Williamson v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 160 F.3d 1247 (9th Cir.1998) (holding that a remand order was not a final order); Alsea Valley Alliance, 358 F.3d at 1184 (same).

DISMISSED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.