Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1309 v. Laidlaw Transit Services, Inc.

ORDER

A judge of the court called for a vote on whether to rehear the matter en banc. On such vote, a majority of the non-recused active judges failed to vote in favor of en banc rehearing. But a small minority of active judges has dissented from the majority’s denial of en banc rehearing.

As we stated in our initial Order (the “Order”), when we interpret a statute, “our purpose is always to discern the intent of Congress.” Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1309 v. Laidlaw Transit Serv., Inc., 435 F.3d 1140 , 1146(9th Cir.2006) (citation omitted). And in pursuing that end, we recognized the Supreme Court’s teaching that there is a “strong presumption that Congress has expressed its intent in the language it chose.” Id. (citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 , 432 n. 12, 107 S.Ct. 1207 , 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987)). The dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc (the “dissent”), however, would turn that presumption into an irrebuttable one. It would do so by ignoring the substantial body of both Supreme Court and Circuit case law on which the Order’s interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1453 (c) is grounded. The dissent pretends that the entire office of statutory interpretation is…