United States v. Joaquin Castro-Castro

This is an appeal from the conviction of the appellant of the offense of having smuggled 155 pounds of marijuana into the United States from Mexico, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 176a. We affirm.

The evidence at the trial was undisputed that on October 3, 1970, the defendant, a resident of Mexico, sought to enter California as the driver and sole occupant of a 1965 Ford automobile. Inspection by Customs officials revealed 71 packages of marijuana that had been concealed in compartments located under the front fenders of the car. The defendant was arrested and this prosecution followed.

*337 The defendant stated to the arresting officers, and later testified at the trial, that on the night before his arrest he had encountered one Fuan Hernandez in a bar in Mexicali, Mexico. The latter offered to drive him to Los Angeles and help him find work, but later proposed that they make the journey in separate cars, the defendant to operate a 1965 Ford that Fuan referred to as belonging to his cousin, and which he was obliged to transport to Los Angeles. According to the defendant, he accepted this proposal as an accommodation to Fuan, who paid him $20.00 to cover the expenses of the trip.…

(dissenting):

I respectfully dissent. The declaration by a federal court of one’s inno *338 cence is employed by the prosecution, over objection, as evidence of his guilt of a later crime. Such a procedure is subversive of the whole judicial process, and, the majority’s resolution of the issue is, to say the least, unprecedented and indefensible. The fact that Castro-Castro was previously tried and acquitted of the alleged offense in 1967 should compel the conclusion that the evidence concerning it should have been excluded. The prejudicial effect of the evidence is fully demonstrated by the reasoning employed by the majority, and when such a degree of prejudice inheres in inadmissible evidence, reversal is required. See, e. g., Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 , 84 S.Ct. 229 , 11 L.Ed.2d 171 (1963).

The principal basis for my view is that which I perceive as an important limitation upon the use of evidence intended to prove a common plan, motive or intent. The doctrine of collateral estoppel in some instances precludes — and in most instances should preclude — the prosecution from relitigating such acts of an accused as were previously the focus of a criminal…

464 F.2d 336 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joaquin CASTRO-CASTRO, Defendant-Appellant. No. 71-1682. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. July 6, 1972. Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Sept. 11, 1972. 1 Philip A. De Massa (argued), San Diego, Cal., for defendant-appellant. 2 Shelby Gott, Asst. U. S. Atty. (argued), Howard B. Frank, Robert H. Filsinger, Asst. U. S. Attys., Harry D. Steward, U. S. Atty., San Diego, Cal., for plaintiff-appellee. 3 Before MERRILL and ELY, Circuit Judges, and GRAY, * District Judge. GRAY, District Judge: 4 This is an appeal from the conviction of the appellant of the offense of having smuggled 155 pounds of marijuana into the United States from Mexico, in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 176a. We affirm. 5 The evidence at the trial was undisputed that on October 3, 1970, the defendant, a resident of Mexico, sought to enter California as the driver and sole occupant of a 1965 Ford automobile. Inspection by Customs officials revealed 71 packages of marijuana that had been concealed in compartments located under the front fenders of the car. The defendant was arrested and this prosecution followed. 6 The defendant stated to…