Taylor

We reversed an Eleventh Amendment dismissal in an earlier appeal of this case. On remand, the district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs appeal this denial.

The district court’s decision was based on two alternative grounds: (1) plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue injunc-tive relief; and (2) even if they had standing, they would not be entitled to such relief. We review questions of standing de novo. We reverse the denial of a preliminary injunction if the district court abused its discretion or based its decision on an erroneous legal standard.

I. Standing

To demonstrate standing to pursue prospective injunctive relief, plaintiffs must demonstrate a concrete injury and a realistic likelihood that the injury will be repeated. Likelihood of recurrence is established when the plaintiff shows that “the defendant had, at the time of the injury, a written policy, and that the injury ‘stems from’ that policy.”

Here, plaintiffs’ securities have been lost to escheat, thus establishing concrete injury. The likelihood of recurrence is also established because the “wrong” plaintiffs seek to enjoin is the escheating of property without written…