Alanis-Alvarado

Opinion by Judge GRABER; Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge RAWLINSON.

We must decide whether a conviction under California Penal Code section 273.6, for violating a protective order issued pursuant to California Family Code section 6320, categorically qualifies as violation of a “protection order” under 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a)(2)(E)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). We hold that it does and, therefore, deny the petition for review.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner Carlos Alanis-Alvarado is a 46-year-old native and citizen of Mexico. He became a lawful permanent resident of the United States in 1990. Twice in 2003, he pleaded guilty to violating section 273.6 of the California Penal Code. The relevant parts of the two guilty pleas are identical and read as follows:

After those convictions, the government issued a Notice to Appear. The Notice to Appear asserted that, because of the two convictions, 1 Petitioner was removable under three different provisions of the INA: under 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a)(2)(A)(ii), for having been convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude; under 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a)(2)(E)®, for having been convicted of a crime…

concurring in part and dissenting in part:

I concur in that portion of the majority opinion concluding that Petitioner’s convictions do not constitute violations of a protection order under 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a)(2)(E)(ii) when analyzed pursuant to the categorical approach articulated in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600-601 , 110 S.Ct. 2143 , 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990). I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion concluding that Petitioner’s convictions constitute violations of a protection order under the modified categorical approach articulated in Taylor. See id.

As the majority opinion recognizes, under the modified categorical approach, the pertinent documents in the record must establish that Petitioner’s conviction meets the requirements of 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a)(2)(E)(ii). In this case, the pertinent documents are Petitioner’s guilty pleas and the Complaints. Therefore, for Petitioner’s convictions to constitute disqualifying offenses, the Complaints and guilty pleas must establish that his crimes of conviction fell within the provisions of 8 *972 U.S.C. § 1227 (a)(2)(E)(ii), which proscribes:

8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a)(2)(E)(ii). Our task, under the…

DISCUSSION

[1] To determine whether a petitioner’s prior conviction fits within the statutory definition of a removable offense, we use the “categorical approach” and “modified categorical approach” that were first announced in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990). Ferreira v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 1091, 1095 (9th Cir. 2004). Under the categorical approach, if the “full range of conduct” covered by the state statute falls within the scope of the INA provision, then the petitioner’s conviction is categorically a removable offense. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). If not, “we then proceed to a ‘modi- fied categorical approach.’ ” Id. Under the modified categori- cal approach, we look beyond the statutory text to “a narrow, specified set of documents that includes . . . guilty pleas.”2 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). If the information in those documents does not establish that the petitioner’s conviction meets the requirements of the INA provision, then the convic- tion is not a removable offense under that provision. Id.

The BIA held that Petitioner’s state convictions meet the requirements of 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii), which is titled “[v]iolators of…