Alfred Walker appeals from an order of the District Court for the Northern District of California, entered July 6, 1971, denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He questions the validity of his 1963 conviction in Alameda County for the possession for sale of marijuana on the ground that there was no probable cause for his arrest and the seizure of marijuana under the mattress of the bed on which he had been sleeping. We hold, as found by Judge Harris in the district court, that there was ample evidence before the Superior Court for Alameda County to show probable cause for Walker’s arrest. In addition, we find that the lengthy proceedings in the federal courts commencing November 1965, have failed to develop any evidence from which it may be argued that full and fair consideration was not given to petitioner’s claim by the Alameda County Court. Accordingly, the petition was properly denied. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 , 83 S.Ct. 745 , 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963); 28 U.S.C. § 2254 .

For the facts established at the 1963 state trial, it suffices to quote from the opinion of Presiding Judge Shoemaker of the California District Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, filed October 15, 1964:

At his trial, while Walker denied the sale of marijuana or any knowledge of the bag under the mattress, he admitted meeting the female informant, Frances Jenkins, on the morning of August 23, 1963, and offering her 50 cents to drive him to Oakland. He further testified that Miss Jenkins took him to the Dunbar Hotel where he secured a room, number 3, that she briefly accompanied him to that room, and that he was registered in the hotel under an assumed name.

Petitioner’s claim that there was no probable cause for his arrest and the search and seizure that followed centers largely on evidence developed during the discovery proceedings in the district court regarding the veracity of Frances Jenkins and the extent to which the Oakland police had found her reliable. While this evidence raised questions about how many times Jenkins had given information and how many convictions had resulted therefrom, there is ample evidence in the record to support the conclusions of the district judge that Miss Jenkins “did furnish information to Sergeant Hilliard, as testified to by the latter, upon which at least 12 arrests were made and four convictions obtained.” Therefore, Hilliard had a sufficient basis, in light of his past experience with information furnished by Jenkins, to believe that she was a reliable informer. This, in combination with the fact that the information related by Jenkins was based on her personal observations, was sufficient to conclude that Hilliard’s actions taken in reliance on the information were based on probable cause. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 113-114 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964); see Whitely v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 566 , 91 S.Ct. 1031 , 28 L.Ed.2d 306 (1971), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 , n. 5 at 417, 89 S.Ct. 584 , 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969). In any event, even if some question of Jenkins’ reliability at the time she gave Hilliard the information could be raised, we are of the opinion that, when the officers gave Jenkins the $20 bill and she entered the hotel where petitioner was staying and emerged with marijuana claimed to have been purchased from petitioner, this was sufficient to verify her information. See Gabriel v. United States, 366 F.2d 726 (9th Cir. 1966). This is especially the case when viewed in light of the fact that petitioner was in the room stated by, and registered under the name specified by, the informant. See United States v. Jiminez-Badilla, 434 F.2d 170, 173 (9th Cir. 1970).

We find it unnecessary to deal with the argument of the Attorney General that Fourth Amendment issues cannot be raised on collateral attack. It should be noted, however, that this issue may be passed upon by the Supreme Court in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte wherein certiorari was granted on February 28, 1972, 405 U.S. 953 , 92 S.Ct. 1168 , 31 L.Ed.2d 230 .

Affirmed.

. After filing his petition for habeas corpus, petitioner served written interrogatories upon the respondent warden. Although respondent argued that discovery was not available in habeas corpus cases, the district court held otherwise and ordered respondent to reply to the interrogatories. Thereupon respondent petitioned this court for a writ of mandamus forbidding enforcement of the district court’s order, and this petition was granted. Wilson v. Harris, 378 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1967). The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the writ, and remanded to this court for further proceedings. Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286 , 89 S.Ct. 1082 , 22 L.Ed.2d 281 (1969). This court then remanded the cause to the district court, whereupon respondent filed an answer to petitioner’s interrogatories.