DISCUSSION

To be eligible for asylum, an alien must show that he is unwilling or unable to return to his country of origin “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a partic- ular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). Petitioner argues that he fears future perse- cution on account of his “political opinion” and membership in a “particular social group.” He argues that his opposition 8016 SORIANO v. HOLDER to organized crime constitutes a political opinion and that, as someone who gave information to the police, “he is forever- more a member of a social group of ‘government infor- mants.’ ” We will consider each theory in turn.1

A. Political Opinion

[1] To show that he was persecuted on account of a politi- cal opinion, Petitioner must satisfy two requirements. First, he must show that he held (or his persecutors believed that he held) a political opinion. Ernesto Navas v. INS, 217 F.3d 646, 656 (9th Cir. 2000). Second, he must show that his persecu- tors persecuted him (or that he faces the prospect of such per- secution) because of his political opinion. Id.

[2] Here, Petitioner failed to satisfy either requirement. The record contains no evidence that he held (or that the gang members believed that he held) any political opinion. Nor does the record contain evidence that gang members threat- ened him because of his political opinion. After associating with gang members and criminals for years, Petitioner, imme- diately after being arrested, identified for police two individu- als as criminal suspects. The BIA permissibly found that Petitioner’s fear of future persecution stems from the crimi- nals’ motive to retaliate against him for informing on them. Personal animosity is not political opinion. See Zayas-Marini 1 We review the BIA’s legal conclusions de novo. Azanor v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1013, 1018 (9th Cir. 2004). When, as here, the BIA’s decision is an unpublished decision by one member of the BIA, we give Skidmore deference to the BIA’s “interpretation of the governing statutes and regu- lations,” recognizing that, “ ‘while not controlling upon the courts by rea- son of their authority, [these interpretations] do constitute a body of experience.’ ” Garcia-Quintero v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 1006, 1011, 1014 (9th Cir. 2006) (alteration in original) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)). See discussion infra p. 8018. “Factual findings made by the BIA are reviewed under the deferential substantial evidence standard and will be upheld unless the evidence compels a contrary result.” Ochoa v. Gonzales, 406 F.3d 1166, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005). SORIANO v. HOLDER 8017 v. INS, 785 F.2d 801, 806 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that a peti- tioner who feared persecution because of personal animosity and not a political opinion was not entitled to asylum).

Briones v. INS, 175 F.3d 727 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc), is easily distinguishable. In Briones, the petitioner applied for political asylum because he was actively involved “in a fiercely ideological dispute between the government of the Philippines and the Communist [New Peoples Army].” Id. at 728-29. We held that the petitioner’s “activity as a confiden- tial informer who sided with the Philippine military in a con- flict that was political at its core certainly would be perceived as a political act by the group informed upon.” Id. at 729. Because the petitioner was a participant in a civil conflict, his fear of persecution was connected to his political opinion. Id.

[3] By contrast, here, Petitioner’s only act in opposition to organized crime was informing the police after his arrest about two individuals who had engaged in criminal activities. Petitioner did not provide information to one political party about an opposing political party, let alone do so on a regular basis. For these reasons, the BIA properly found that there was no nexus between Petitioner’s fear of future persecution and his actual or imputed political opinion.

B. Member of a Social Group

[4] We have defined “social group,” for purposes of asy- lum, as any group

united by 1) a voluntary association which imparts some common characteristic that is fundamental to the members’ identities, or 2) an innate characteristic which is so fundamental to the identities or con- sciences of its members they either cannot or should not be required to change it.

Arteaga v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 940, 944 (9th Cir. 2007). In determining whether a social group exists, we consider, 8018 SORIANO v. HOLDER among other factors, “whether a group’s shared characteristic gives members social visibility and whether the group can be defined with sufficient particularity to delimit its member- ship.” Id. at 944-45.

Petitioner argues that he is eligible for asylum because he is a member of a particular social group, namely, a group of “government informants.” Petitioner argues that, having given incriminating information about two individuals to the police, he is a member of such a group. He reasons that membership in the group is unchangeable because he already has given the information to police and because the individuals about whom he told the police know his identity.

[5] We have not previously considered whether “govern- ment informants” are a particular social group for immigra- tion purposes. The BIA has held in a precedential opinion that “noncriminal drug informants working against the Cali drug cartel,” who act “out of a sense of civic duty and moral responsibility,” do not constitute a “particular social group” for asylum purposes. In Re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 957, 959 (B.I.A. 2006). We accord Chevron deference to that deci- sion, Ramos-Lopez v. Holder, 563 F.3d 855, 859 (9th Cir. 2009), but such deference does not quite answer the question in this case. Here, we face a criminal government informant who neither acts from altruistic motives nor turns in partici- pants in a drug cartel. We therefore turn more specifically to the decision below.

In this case, the BIA has held that a group comprised of government informants “is not a valid social group for asylum purposes.” This court gives Skidmore deference to that hold- ing, Garcia-Quintero, 455 F.3d at 1011, and our own case law accords with the BIA’s ruling.

In Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1572, 1577 (9th Cir. 1986), we held that a purported social group of “young, working class males who have not served in the military of El SORIANO v. HOLDER 8019 Salvador” was too “all-encompassing [a] grouping” to consti- tute “that type of cohesive, homogeneous group to which we believe the term ‘particular social group’ was intended to apply.” A key to establishing a “particular social group” is ensuring that the group is narrowly defined:

Major segments of the population of an embattled nation, even though undoubtedly at some risk from general political violence, will rarely, if ever, consti- tute a distinct “social group” for the purposes of establishing refugee status. To hold otherwise would be tantamount to extending refugee status to every alien displaced by general conditions of unrest or violence in his or her home country.

Id. at 1577. Moreover, “[i]ndividuals falling within the parameters of this sweeping demographic division naturally manifest a plethora of different lifestyles, varying interests, diverse cultures, and contrary political leanings.” Id.

In Ochoa, we relied on the reasoning in Sanchez-Trujillo to reject a claim that “a social group comprised of business own- ers in Colombia who rejected demands by narco-traffickers to participate in illegal activity” was a particular social group because the group was not defined narrowly enough. Ochoa, 406 F.3d at 1170. We reasoned that “[t]here is no unifying relationship or characteristic to narrow this diverse and dis- connected group. This category is too broad to qualify as a particularized social group for the purposes of asylum and withholding of removal.” Id. at 1171.

Finally, in Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738, 745-46 (9th Cir. 2008), we rejected a claim that a group of “young men in El Salvador resisting gang violence” comprises a “so- cial group” for purposes of asylum. We held that the pur- ported group “is too loosely defined to meet the requirement for particularity” and that it “is composed of a variety of dif- ferent individuals who may be victims of civil unrest, but who 8020 SORIANO v. HOLDER do not form a cohesive or particular social group.” Id. In addi- tion, the purported group “lacks social visibility.” Id. at 746. We held that “[s]ocial visibility requires that ‘the shared char- acteristic of the group should generally be recognizable by others in the community.’ ” Id. (quoting In re S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 586 (B.I.A. 2008)).

[6] Those cases lead us to conclude that a “government informant” is not a member of a particular social group for purposes of asylum. Just like the young men who failed to serve in the El Salvadoran military in Sanchez-Trujillo, the business owners in Ochoa, and the young men who refused to join gangs in Santos-Lemus, a “government informant,” as Petitioner defines it, is not a “cohesive, homogeneous” group. Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1577. A person who identifies as a “government informant” can be anyone of any demo- graphic description who passes information to government authorities for any purpose. There is no “innate characteristic which is so fundamental to the identities or consciences” of government informants that identifies them as a particular social group. Arteaga, 511 F.3d at 944. The purported group, therefore, “naturally manifest[s] a plethora of different life- styles, varying interests, diverse cultures, and contrary politi- cal leanings.” Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1577.

[7] Accordingly, we hold that “government informants” do not comprise a particular social group within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). We therefore deny Petitioner’s applications for asylum and withholding of removal.

[8] With regard to Petitioner’s CAT claim, Petitioner must establish that it is more likely than not that he would be tor- tured if returned to the proposed country of removal. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2). There is no evidence showing a likelihood of torture by gang members if Petitioner were to return to the Philippines. Importantly, Petitioner did not present any evi- dence demonstrating that he would be subject to torture com- mitted by or with the consent of Filipino government officials. SORIANO v. HOLDER 8021 Therefore, substantial evidence supports the denial of CAT relief.

Petition DENIED.