Lamont Johnson v. Robert Horel

MEMORANDUM

1. Petitioner Lamont Johnson seeks habeas relief on the ground that the government destroyed material exculpatory evidence in violation of his due process rights. See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57-58 , 109 S.Ct. 333 , 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988); California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488-89 , 104 S.Ct. 2528 , 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984). To prevail on this claim, Johnson must show that the government failed to preserve consti tutionally material evidence. See Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 56-57 , 109 S.Ct. 333 ; Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 489 , 104 S.Ct. 2528 . Constitutionally material means that the exculpatory value of the evidence was apparent before it was destroyed, and that the evidence was “of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.” Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 489 , 104 S.Ct. 2528 .

The California Court of Appeal found, as a factual matter, that Johnson had received “everything of an exculpatory nature.” We cannot say this finding was based on “an unreasonable determination of the facts” in light of the record before the state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(2). By the time of his second trial, Johnson…