(dissenting) :

This case presents serious constitutional questions arising from warrant-less interception and recordation of a *61 telephone conversation between appellant Holmes, a lawyer, and his client, Mar-burger. The recording was used to convict Holmes of grand theft by false pretenses. Arizona law enforcement officers induced Marburger to place the call and obtained his consent to the officers’ monitoring and recording the conversation. Holmes knew nothing about the officers’ conduct until he was prosecuted. Throughout the state court proceedings and his federal habeas attack that brings Holmes here, he has insisted that under Katz v. United States (1967) 389 U.S. 347 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 , the warrantless interception and re-cordation of his conversation without his knowledge or consent was constitutionally impermissible and that the admission of the evidence thus obtained invalidated his conviction. 1 Katz held that electronic interception and recordation of one end of a telephone conversation without the knowledge or consent of the person whose conversation was overheard and without prior approval by a neutral magistrate was per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

The narrowest constitutional issue is whether the state overcame the per se unreasonableness of the warrantless electronic surveillance of Holmes’ conversation by proof alone that Marburger gave his consent to the surveillance of Holmes. In my view, the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, as interpreted by controlling Supreme Court authority, compel a negative answer. Electronic surveillance of Holmes would have been legal if the state had obtained a warrant, a simple procedure in this case. The state’s failure to obtain a warrant rendered the search and seizure constitutionally impermissible.

I.

Marburger, who owned a liquor store, retained Holmes for an agreed fee of $2000 to represent him in connection with charges against him pending before the Arizona Liquor Department. According to Marburger, Holmes told him in March 1968 that he had settled the charges upon the basis of Marburger’s paying a $1000 fine to the Department and receiving a five-day suspension of his liquor license. The day after this conversation Marburger paid Holmes $1000. The Department, in fact, had not levied any fine. Marburger contended that Holmes did not give him a receipt for the $1000. Marburger went to the Arizona Liquor Department for conferences on several occasions, and he eventually agreed to help the Department obtain corroborating evidence of Holmes’ duplicity. For about two weeks, Mar-burger, under the direction of the Arizona authorities, tried unsuccessfully to record face-to-face and telephone conversations with Holmes. On August 23, 1968, more than five months after the alleged commission of the crime, Mar-burger made the telephone call in issue. Marburger placed the call from the Arizona Liquor Department’s office to Holmes’ residence. With Marburger’s consent, the law enforcement officers listened to the conversation on an extension telephone and electronically recorded it. A transcript of the complete conversation as recorded is set forth below. 2

*62 Holmes’ version of the facts differed sharply from Marburger’s. He admitted that he received the $1000, denied that he told Marburger that the money was for a fine, insisted that he had given Marburger a receipt for it, and maintained that the payment was part of his legal fees and costs.

Holmes’ conviction could not have been sustained without the admission of the recorded conversation because Arizona law requires that a grand theft by false pretenses charge be corroborated by the testimony of two witnesses or of one witness and corroborating circumstances. (Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 13-664 (1956).) The only evidence against Holmes was Marburger’s testimony and the tape of the conversation which was thrice played to the jury.

At no time during the months elapsing between the alleged commission of *63 the offense and the interception of Holmes’ conversation in August 1968 did the officers attempt to obtain prior court approval for monitoring and recording Holmes’ telephone conversations.

II.

The fate of any one man enmeshed in the criminal process is never inconsequential. But this is one of those cases in which the issues involved far transcend the particular factual setting in which the constitutional battle is fought. The case presents some of the most vexing and pressing problems of our day. What are the constitutional limitations on governmental electronic intrusions into privacy? Do the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments circumscribe warrantless electronic intrusions as effectively as they limit corporeal invasions of privacy? Are the protections of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments diluted if the person subjected to the warrantless electronic intrusion is suspected of a crime ?

Fear of invisible eyes and ears is pervasive. Today’s sophisticated electronic devices are capable of surreptitious probing of every aspect of our lives, thus fulfilling Mr. Justice Brandéis’ ominous prophecy:

Public fear of omnipresent electronic surveillance has escalated with increasing revelations of widespread wire-tapping, bugging, monitoring, and recording. Reported statistics of court-ordered interceptions of wire and oral communications show that, since the enactment of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 ( 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 ), authorized interceptions increased 184 percent. 3 “National Security” installations of electronic surveillance devices reported by *64 the Department of Justice during the period 1969-1970, made without court approval, were massive; one of these “national security” wiretaps monitored more than 900 conversations during a 14-month period. 4 Government agencies have installed secret observation booths in offices and restrooms. 5 The Government’s uninvited ears and eyes have conjoined its cybernetic memory to compile hundreds of thousands of dossiers on high political figures, 6 domestic political organizations, 7 dissident groups, 8 black studies programs, 9 and average citizens. 10

See notes 8, 9 & 10 on page 65.

*65 The full measure of the governmental electronic surveillance problem by no means emerges from these reports, which almost entirely involve probing without the knowledge of anyone whose activities were watched, heard, or recorded. The far more pervasive spectre is presented by governmental interceptions and recordings accomplished with the cooperation of one party to a communication but without the knowledge of the other. Such “participant monitoring” and “participant electronic surveillance” are much more widespread; estimates of such participant activities run in the tens of thousands per year. 11

In a pluralistic society dedicated to liberal democratic traditions, confidential communication serves as a lubricant for the smooth functioning of social and political institutions. Without “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” public and private expression on the great issues of our day, as well as private discussion about the mundane, the trivial, and the banal, a once free society will soon become a nation of “hagridden and furtive” people. 12

The corrosive impact of warrantless participant monitoring on our sense of security and freedom of expression is every bit as insidious as electronic surveillance conducted without the consent of any of the parties involved. In terms of the individual’s reluctance to speak freely no qualitative difference exists between the danger posed by third party interception and the risk that his auditor has sanctioned a secret recording of their conversation. 13 Extensive police-instigated and clandestine participant recordings, coupled with their use as evidence of any self-incriminating remarks of the speaker, pose “a grave danger of chilling all private, free, and unconstrained communication. . . . In a free society, people ought not to have to watch their every word so carefully.” Lopez v. United States, supra note 12, 373 U.S. at 452, 83 S.Ct. at 1395 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

III.

The constitutional issues that Holmes raises could be avoided and the opinion confined to the application of the federal statute outlawing all nonjudicially authorized interceptions of any wire or oral communications (Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968), 14 if the Holmes’ surveillance did not fall within one of the kinds of surveillance expressly excepted by the Act. That avenue is foreclosed, however, because governmental participant monitoring is expressly exempted by 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2)(c):

*67 Nothing in the brief legislative history of the Act disturbs the literal reading of the text of the subparagraph. 15

The constitutional problem must be faced whether we ignore the Act altogether and concentrate on Holmes’ direct constitutional attack, or we begin with the Act and confront the same constitutional challenge to the quoted exception to the Act. The frontal assault is conceptually neater. I therefore undertake the constitutional analysis independent of the Act, although I am aware of the impact of the analysis on the exception.

For the purpose of this constitutional analysis, I adopt Professor Westin’s concept that “privacy” is “the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others.” (A. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967) at 7.) This constitutionalized right to privacy protects the individual’s interest in preserving his essential dignity as a human being. 16

The generic term “electronic surveillance” is used here to encompass all forms of electronic interception, overhearing, or recording of wire or oral communications. (Cf. ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Electronic Surveillance § 2.1, at 106-07 (Approved Draft, 1971).). “Participant monitoring” includes three situations; in each, one participant to a communication at the instance of, or under the direction of, a governmental agent or agency, without the knowledge of the second party, (1) himself records the conversation with the second party, or (2) uses an electronic device to transmit the conversation to a government agent or his nominee, or (3) consents to a government agent’s or informant’s using an electronic device to overhear and to record the communication. 17 (See Greenawalt, su *68 pra note 11, at 190 n. 9.) Holmes was subjected to participant monitoring of the third type.

IY.

As Mr. Justice White warned: “Unregulated use of electronic surveillance devices by law enforcement officials and by private parties poses a grave threat to the privacy and security of our citizens.” (Berger v. New York (1967) 888 U.S. 41 , 112, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 1911 , 18 L. Ed.2d 1040 (dissenting op’n).)

The Supreme Court’s struggle with this threat began more than 40 years ago with the decision of Olmstead v. United States, supra, 277 U.S. 438 , 48 S.Ct. 564 , 72 L.Ed. 944 . Speaking for the majority, Mr. Chief Justice Taft held that warrantless wiretapping offended neither the Fourth nor Fifth Amendments because there was no corporeal search, no tangible seizure, no trespass, and no coercive physical presence of a government officer. 18

In the decades following Olmstead , two significant developments have occurred : The technology of electronic surveillance has catapulted beyond the crude instrumentalities used by the officers who intercepted the Olmstead bootleggers’ conversations, and the exclusionary rule of Weeks v. United States (1914) 232 U.S. 383 , 34 S.Ct. 341 , 58 L. Ed. 652 , became applicable to state courts in Mapp v. Ohio (1961) 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 . Nevertheless, the lines of argument drawn by the majority and dissenting opinions in Olmstead have endured.

A.

The Olmstead majority perceived the Fourth Amendment as little more than a criminal code to be strictly construed to prevent the escape of the guilty through the aperture created by the Weeks exclusionary rule. Mr. Justice Brandéis envisioned the amendment, as did Mr. Justice Bradley before him, 19 as a great constitutional bulwark against unjustified encroachments upon the dignity and autonomy of all men. In his view, the constitutional draftsmen had no crabbed concepts about the need to protect all persons from the oppressive tactics of foreign governments despised by our founders. More than physical intrusions, they would have abhorred an invisible governmental presence against which the householder could neither set his dog nor bar his door. 20 He knew *69 that governmental interception of the whispers in a closet might reveal dark plots of conspirators instead of confidences exchanged between young lovers, but he realized that the innocent cannot be protected without procedures that may sometimes provide a shield for the wicked. He reminded us that it is “immaterial that the intrusion was in aid of law enforcement. Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficient. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachments by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.” ( 277 U.S. at 479 , 48 S.Ct. at 572 . Footnote omitted.)

Nothing on the face of the Fourth Amendment compelled Mr. Chief Justice Taft’s confining it to corporeal presence or to the seizure of tangibles. The Olmstead opinions supply strong evidence that the majority’s pinched interpretation of the Fourth Amendment was primarily motivated by their distaste for Weeks. (See, e. g., 277 U.S. at 462-63, 467, 468 , 48 S.Ct. 564 .) 21 To strike a glancing blow to the exclusionary rule, the Olmstead majority was willing to contract the Fourth Amendment.

The holding of Olmstead was finally overruled in Katz v. United States (1967) 389 U.S. 347 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L. Ed.2d 576 . “[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.” (Id. at 351, 88 S.Ct. at 511 .) But the tension between the Taft views and those expressed by Justices Holmes and Brandeis has not dissipated. (E. g., compare the majority/plurality with the dissenting and concurring opinions in United States v. White (1971) 401 U.S. 745 , 91 S.Ct. 1122 , 28 L.Ed.2d 453 ; Osborn v. United States (1966) 385 U.S. 323 , 87 S.Ct. 429 , 17 L.Ed.2d 394 ; Lopez v. United States (1963) 373 U.S. 427 , 83 S.Ct. 1381 , 10 L.Ed.2d 462 ; On Lee v. United States (1952) 343 U.S. 747 , 72 S.Ct. 967 , 96 L.Ed. 1270 ; Goldman v. United States (1942) 316 U.S. 129 , 62 S.Ct. 993 , 86 L.Ed. 1322 .) In contrast to these opinions are those in which unjustified governmental interference with the autonomy of personality has occurred in a setting free from concern over the exclusionary rule. (E. g., Roe v. Wade (1973) 410 U.S. 113 , 93 S.Ct. 705 , 35 L.Ed.2d 147 ; See v. City of Seattle (1967) 387 U.S. 541 , 87 S.Ct. 1737 , 18 L.Ed.2d 943 ; Camara v. Municipal Court (1967) 387 U.S. 523 , 87 S.Ct. 1727 , 18 L.Ed.2d 930 ; Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) 381 U.S. 479 , 85 S.Ct. 1678 , 14 L.Ed.2d 510 ; Louisiana v. NAACP (1961) 366 U.S. 293 , 81 S.Ct. 1333 , 6 L.Ed.2d 301 ; Shelton v. Tucker (1960) 364 U.S. 479 , 81 S.Ct. 247 , 5 L. Ed.2d 231 ; Watkins v. United States (1957) 354 U.S. 178 , 77 S.Ct. 1173 , 1 L. Ed.2d 1273 .)

Tucked into Olmstead was a passing reference to the theory that persons subjected to warrantless electronic interception volunteer their statements to the Government by their very act of talking to each other. 22 This theory later emerged as the constructive consent and assumption of the risk fictions relied on in On Lee v. United States, supra, 343 U.S. at 753-754 , 72 S.Ct. 967 23 and Lo *70 pez v. United States, supra, 373 U.S. at 439 , 83 S.Ct. 1381 . In Lopez , the majority added the variation that a person talking face-to-face with a known government agent assumes the risk that the agent will be able to repeat the conversation either by total personal recall or by a corroborative recording which in its nature is more reliable than human recollection. 24 The theme was replayed in a slightly different key by the plurality in United States v. White, supra, 401 U.S. 745 , 91 S.Ct. 1122 , 28 L.Ed.2d 453 . 25

Using familiar jurisprudential tools, Holmes can be successfully distinguished from every Supreme Court decision directly bearing on the case other than Katz . Thus, On Lee and Lopez not only are factually dissimilar but, more importantly, were based on trespassory concepts discredited by Silverman v. United States (1961) 365 U.S. 505 , 81 S.Ct. 679 , 5 L.Ed.2d 734 , Osborn v. United States, supra, 385 U.S. 323 , 87 S.Ct. 429 , 17 L. Ed.2d 394 , and Berger v. New York, su pra, 388 U.S. 41 , 87 S.Ct. 1873 , 18 L.Ed. 2d 1040 , and destroyed by Katz. Rathbun v. United States (1957) 355 U.S. 107 , 78 S.Ct. 161 , 2 L.Ed.2d 134 , dealt with governmental eavesdropping by extension telephone without electronic recording, and the decision was confined to an interpretation of section 605 of the 1934 Federal Communications Act ( 47 U.S.C. § 605 ). Schwartz v. Texas (1952) 344 U.S. 199 , 73 S.Ct. 232 , 97 L. Ed. 231 , involved facts similar to Rathbun, but the decision was based on the pre-Mapp authority refusing to apply the exclusionary rule to state courts. Schwartz was overturned by Lee v. Florida (1968) 392 U.S. 378 , 88 S.Ct. 2096 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1166 , a post-Mapp case, holding inadmissible under section 605 telephone conversations overheard on a party line and recorded. Lewis v. United States (1966) 385 U.S. 206 , 87 S.Ct. 424 , 17 L.Ed.2d 312 , and Hoffa v. United States (1966) 385 U.S. 293 , 87 S.Ct. 408 , 17 L.Ed.2d 374 , like Holmes, concerned *71 the use of confidants who were secretly governmental informers, but in neither case was electronic surveillance employed. The facts in White were closer to those in On Lee than to Olmstead or Holmes. But of much greater significance, White necessarily applied pre- Katz law because the electronic surveillance of White occurred before Katz was decided, and Katz had been earlier held nonretroactive in Desist v. United States (1969) 394 U.S. 244 , 89 S.Ct. 1030 , 22 L.Ed.2d 248 . United States v. White, supra, 401 U.S. 745 , 91 S.Ct. 1122 , 28 L. Ed.2d 453 , is nevertheless important because it reveals continuing reliance by some of the Justices on the assumption of the risk doctrine. 26

B.

Katz does apply to Holmes because the interception occurred after Katz became effective. However, two factual dissimilarities exist: (1) the mechanics of interception were not the same in both cases, and (2) Katz did not involve participant monitoring. In Katz , without the knowledge of either party to the conversation, the Government placed an electronic listening and recording device outside the public booth in which Katz was telephoning and thereby obtained evidence used to convict him for illegally transmitting wagering information. Katz itself defeats any argument that governmental choice of electronic devices is constitutionally significant. (See, e. g., 389 U.S. at 352-353 , 88 S.Ct. 507 .) Thus, the only remaining issue is whether the participant feature of Holmes can defeat the warrant requirement of Katz . The majority opinion argues that it does, relying on the theories of consent and assumption of the risk. Neither theory is acceptable.

Holmes never consented to having his conversations overheard by third parties or recorded by Marburger or other government agents. As the Court observed in Katz , “the very nature of electronic surveillance precludes its use pursuant to the suspect’s consent.” ( 389 U.S. at 358 , 88 S.Ct. at 515.) Moreover, Mar-burger cannot waive Holmes’ Fourth Amendment rights. To say that Mar-burger’s consent is Holmes’ consent is a fiction that has been expressly rejected by the Supreme Court in the context of warrantless searches and seizures. Mar-burger can no more consent for Holmes than a hotel manager can consent to a search of a guest’s room on behalf of the guest (Stoner v. California (1964) 376 U.S. 483 , 84 S.Ct. 889 , 11 L.Ed.2d 856 ; see United States v. Jeffers (1951) 342 U.S. 48 , 72 S.Ct. 93 , 96 L.Ed. 59 ), or a landlord can give permission attributable to his tenant to search his tenant’s quarters (Chapman v. United States (1961) 365 U.S. 610 , 81 S.Ct. 776 , 5 L. Ed.2d 828 ). 27

Although a majority of the Supreme Court has never relied on the assumption of the risk doctrine to validate interception of private conversations, references to the doctrine have threaded through a number of opinions applying pre-Katz law. This doctrine, relied upon by the majority in the case at bench, is a hybrid of factual and fictitious elements and of individual and societal judgments. If Holmes knew that his *72 conversation might be electronically intercepted by the government, or if war-rantless electronic monitoring were so pervasive that he is chargeable with such knowledge, a factual foundation would exist for invoking the venerable assumption of the risk doctrine. However, if he did not know and if he had no reason to be aware of the risk, that doctrine is inapt. To. say that a person “assumes the risk” of electronic surveillance, although he was rightfully oblivious to the risk, is to mislabel a newly created rule of law limiting the scope of the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, none of the opinions in which the doctrine has been invoked to defeat Fourth Amendment claims attempts to justify its application on factual grounds. Instead, the result is explained by resorting to two intertwined theories: First, one must realize that a person in whom he confides may repeat the conversation to another; and he must also realize that his confidant may be a government informer who will choose to repeat the conversation by electronically recording and transmitting it. Assignment of both risks to a person who may be totally ignorant of the opportunity for electronic surveillance is considered appropriate because no significant difference exists between talking to a person who is electronically unaided and to one who is “wired for sound.” (See, e. g., United States v. White, supra, 401 U.S. at 751 , 91 S.Ct. 1122 (White, J.); Lopez v. United States, supra, 373 U.S. at 439-440 , 83 S.Ct. 1381 .) Second, a person contemplating' illegal activity assumes some risks that others do not. Among these risks is subjection to warrantless electronic surveillance. (United States v. White, supra, 401 U.S. at 752 , 91 S.Ct. 1122 .) Neither theory withstands analysis.

Repetition of conversations thought to be confidential is a known risk. However, the risk that one’s trusted friend may be a gossip is of an entirely different order than a risk that the friend may be transmitting and recording every syllable. The latter risk is not yet rooted in common American experience, and it should not be thrust upon us: the differences between talking to a person enswathed in electronic equipment and one who is not are very real, and they cannot be reduced to insignificance by verbal legerdemain. All of us discuss topics and use expressions with one person that we would not undertake with another and that we would never broadcast to a crowd. New of us would ever speak freely if we knew that all our words were being captured by machines for later release before an unknown and potentially hostile audience. No one talks to a recorder as he talks to a person.

Proponents of the assumption of the risk doctrine, apparently recognizing the significant intrusion upon an individual’s privacy caused by participant monitoring, do not say that everyone must anticipate and risk warrantless surveillance; rather, they limit its application to those who contemplate illegal activity. But never do these proponents explain how, absent the Fourth Amendment requirement of antecedent justification before a neutral magistrate, the sinful can be separated from the saintly without probing everyone or leaving the selection to the unbridled discretion of government agents. What is left of anyone’s justifiable reliance on privacy (see Katz v. United States, supra, 389 U.S. at 353 , 88 S.Ct. 507 ) if everyone must realize that he will be free from warrantless electronic intrusion only so long as someone in the government does not suspect him of improper conduct or wrong thinking? 28

Adoption of the assumption of the risk theory ultimately rests on the cynical conclusion that a warrantless search is justified by what it reveals. The conclusion has been firmly rejected in the context of physical entries and tangible *73 seizures (e. g., United States v. Di Re (1948) 332 U.S. 581, 595 , 68 S.Ct. 222 , 92 L.Ed. 210 ; Byars v. United States (1927) 273 U.S. 28, 29 , 47 S.Ct. 248 , 71 L.Ed. 520 ) and in nonparticipant electronic surveillance (Katz v. United States, supra, 389 U.S. at 357 , 88 S.Ct. 507 ). It should not be given vitality in participant monitoring cases.

C.

After mistaken notions of consent are corrected and the rubble of fictions is removed from electronic surveillance, participant monitoring is revealed to be squarely within the rule of Katz . 29 In terms of expectations of privacy, expressed either as a subjective state of mind of the monitored suspect or as a societal judgment, Holmes’ situation cannot be distinguished from Katz’s. Holmes was just as ignorant as Katz of the presence of hovering governmental ears; and society has not yet reached a judgment that a lawyer talking on his residential telephone to a client must have a lesser expectation of privacy than a bookmaker transmitting wagering information to a confederate from a public telephone booth. Holmes’ expectation of privacy, which was surely no less reasonable than Katz’s, did not become unreasonable simply because his client, without his knowledge, invited the government to overhear and to record the conversation. Katz refused to leave the choice of suspects to be electronically monitored to the unreviewed discretion of government agents. The Government cannot escape Katz by committing the responsibility for surveillance to a private citizen. The guardian of the individual’s right of privacy is the neutral magistrate, not a government informant.

The burden was on the state to obtain a warrant prior to subjecting Holmes to electronic surveillance ( Katz, supra), or to prove facts that would bring the search and seizure within one of the carefully delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement. (United States v. United States District Court, supra, 407 U.S. at 318 , 92 S.Ct. 2125 .) Neither burden was met, and the surveillance was constitutionally impermissible. 30

D.

Even if Katz could be successfully distinguished from Holmes, leaving the question of the constitutionality of participant surveillance open, the denouement would be the same. The constitutional values - restated and reinforced in Katz and United States v. United States District Court, supra, are equally threatened by participant and nonparticipant warrantless electronic surveillance. Nevertheless, this constitutional bedrock has been obscured by three arguments which have been wholly or partially articulated to support warrantless electronic surveillance: (1) electronic recording produces more reliable evidence than human recollection; (2) law enforcement officers need unhampered authority to engage in electronic surveillance to protect us from crime; and (3) the exclusion of evidence obtained *74 by electronic surveillance frees the guilty to the detriment of society.

Are machines more reliable than human beings? Unlike human beings, a machine neither remembers nor forgets. If the concept of reliability rested solely on ability to reproduce a conversation word for word, we would say machines are more reliable. But the concept is not that shallow. Machines are capable of distortion without regard to tampering and despite the invisibility of their presence. A tape recording preserves the spoken words, but not the gestures, facial expressions, and other subtle details which are often far more eloquent media than the words used to convey thoughts and feelings. Focus on a single element in a total environment can produce deceptive results. For example, a snapshot captures a person as he appeared in a fraction of a second. Is the picture an accurate portrayal of the person? Anyone who has seen a newspaper photograph of himself taken at. a singularly unattractive moment will say “no.”

A machine’s capacity for distortion is enhanced when one party to a conversation knows that a recording is being made and the other does not. The knowledgeable person says nothing that he does not want to have graven on tape. The third ear affects his behavior as surely as knowledge of a camera’s eye affects the pose of a witting subject. The behavior of one participant influences the response of the other in a conversation. (See Williamson v. United States, supra, 405 U.S. at 1027 , 92 S.Ct. 1323 , 31 L.Ed.2d 487 (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).) When we evaluate the reliability of the electronic harvest of participant monitoring, we must not overlook the fact that the invisible machine can produce a very different conversation from the one that would have occurred if neither person had a recorder.

The supervening difficulty with the reliability rationale, however, is that it is a response to an irrelevant question. Contraband discovered in the course of an illegal entry by police is inadmissible although it is the best evidence that contraband was present. We exclude the evidence, not because it is unreliable, but because the values preserved by the Fourth Amendment are of greater societal moment than the use of that evidence to obtain a criminal conviction.

The second reason, and the one most often forwarded, is that unfettered governmental electronic surveillance is necessary to protect us from crime. Of course, the government has a great and legitimate interest in detecting and preventing crime, but that interest must be balanced against the individual’s right to be free from unjustified intrusions. The balance was struck by the draftsmen of the Fourth Amendment: the governmental interest in combating crime is fully accommodated by permitting all searches and seizures, subject only to advance authorization by a magistrate upon a showing of probable cause; and the individual’s expectations of privacy are protected by the knowledge that warrantless intrusions into his life will not be tolerated.

The third reason is rarely articulated, but hostility to the exclusionary rule permeates opinion after opinion, commencing with Olmstead . Dissatisfaction with the exclusionary rule as the predominate remedy for conduct violating the Fourth Amendment is understandable arid defensible. Attacks on the constitutional right of privacy as the means of expressing dissatisfaction with the remedy are intellectually indefensible and dangerous. A constitutional right continuously diluted becomes no right. Destroying a right protected by the Fourth Amendmerit because of distaste for the remedy makes little more sense than destroying a patient for failure to respond to chosen medication. If the remedy is wrong, it is time to reexamine the remedy, not to diminish the right.

The threat to fundamental constitutional values and to the quality of life in our country which is created by the ruling of the majority can be revealed by even brief reflection upon the directions *75 in which an insensitive embrace of electronic hardware will carry us. The fact that the issues have arisen in the context of a criminal ease should not obscure the reality that the basic right at stake is the right of all of us to be free from unjustified governmental encroachments upon our privacy. This is the right that Mr. Justice Brandéis accurately described as “the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.” (Olmstead v. United States, supra, 277 U.S. at 478 , 48 S.Ct. at 572 .) It is a right secured not alone by the Fourth Amendment, but by the entire Bill of Rights. (E. g., Roe v. Wade (1973) 410 U.S. 113 , 93 S.Ct. 705 , 35 L.Ed.2d 147 ; Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) 381 U.S. 479 , 85 S.Ct. 1678 , 14 L.Ed.2d 510 .)

If the right protected by the Fourth Amendment is shriveled, how can the First Amendment revitalize it? If Holmes’ conversation can be legally intercepted and electronically recorded because he was suspected of wrongdoing by law enforcement officers exercising their unreviewed discretion, where is the constitutional rock upon which rests anyone’s right to be free from overzealous governmental probing?

Do we want to live in a society in which all of us must anticipate that we are always subject to electronic monitoring? Must we be ever watchful because our clients, friends, and acquaintances may be recording all we say for relay to a suspicious government? Do we want to convert our courtrooms into arenas in which we pit men against machines, or in which a person’s liberty is decided in a contest fought by electronic surrogates because machines are more “reliable” than human beings ?

The chilling atmosphere that these questions evoke is neither fanciful nor remote. In a nation wracked by fear of crime and engulfed by Orwellian devices, that dehumanized world can become our own unless we build constitutional walls that can be breached neither by the boldest leader nor by legions of the timorous. The draftsmen of the Bill of Rights laid the foundation for those walls. Justices Bradley and Brandéis built upon them. Sturdy materials to construct the edifice are available in the decisions of the Supreme Court recognizing a constitutional right of privacy emanating from the whole Bill of Rights.

Express recognition that the same constitutional right to be free from unjustifiable governmental penetrations of personality inheres in all persons, whether or not suspected of crime, would be a major step in constructing an effective barrier against untoward governmental interference with privacy. Yet this substantial protection of the basic right of privacy can be accomplished without any significant impairment of legitimate governmental interests. 31 No one challenges the right of the government to employ modern technology in criminal law enforcement. The only issue is whether to interpose the Fourth Amendment warrant procedure between law enforcement agencies and the ordinary citizen. The warrant requirement will not end electronic surveillance. It would reassure us that “this capability will not be used to intrude upon cherished privacy of law-abiding citizens.” *76 (United States v. United States District Court, supra, 407 U.S. at 312 , 92 S.Ct. at 2134 . Footnote omitted.)

I would overturn United States v. Puchi (9th Cir. 1971) 441 F.2d 697 , as contrary to Katz , and reverse the order denying Holmes’ habeas petition.

. Holmes unsuccessfully raised the issues in his state trial by a pretrial motion to suppress and a renewed motion to suppress at the close of the state’s case, by an appeal to . the Arizona Court of Appeals, on petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court, and on petition for certiorari filed with the United States Supreme Court. He again raised the issue below in his petition for federal habeas relief.

. Child: Hello.

Marburger: Good evening. Is Mr. Holmes at home? Child: Uh, yes.

Marburger: May I speak to him please?

Child: O.K.

Marburger: Thank you.

Mrs. Holmes: Hello.

Marburger: Hi Mrs. Holmes, Sandy.

Mrs. Holmes : Just a minute Sandy.

Marburger: All right.

T. Holmes: Hello.

Marburger: How are you feeling?

T. Holmes: Oh, terrible Sandy, they’re putting me in the hospital I guess.

Marburger: Oh, my gosh, I hear you been under the weather quite some time.

*62 T. Holmes: Yeah.

Marburger: Well, I hate like heck to bother you on this except I, I don’t know I guess I got a problem on it and I . . .

T. Holmes: Well, what is the problem Sandy?

Marburger: Well, now

T. Holmes: I gave you a receipt and you know, if you recall at the time, I deliberately gave you a receipt.

Marburger: No I got the receipt.

T. Holmes: As an attorney’s fees and everything so that you could write it off. In other words you can take it as an expense item.

Marburger: Yeah, but, you see, Uh then I

T. Holmes: Otherwise you can’t.

Marburger: Yeah, Well I didn’t understand that, see. Now I told, when it came up when I put it on the book I put down, you know, that was a fine paid to the Liquor Department, My accountant picked it up.

T. Holmes: Well you just tell him to un-pick it! And, put it down and just write it off as attorney’s fees! He hasn’t filed your income tax yet.

Marburger: No, that’s the whole thing but he’s filed for that month see, that was March.

T. Holmes: Well, he hasn’t — you’ve—what do you mean filed for that month?

Marburger: Look, every month he makes out a profit and loss sheet.

T. Holmes: Oh, well that’s all right, but he can change that. That’s the reason I deliberately did it that way was so you could take it as a write off.

Marburger: So what shall I tell him? Just that . . .

T. Holmes: Tell him to contact me if he wants to and I’ll tell him what to do. It’s real simple like. You have the receipt. You have everything. All you do is turn in the receipt to him. Nancy told me you lost the receipt.

Marburger: Well, I couldn’t find the first one but Nancy gave me another one so that part’s no problem.

T. Holmes: Just hand it to him and say, put it on the books this way and this is the way we do it.

Marburger: Yeah, and then if he says to me what about the fine and all?

T. Holmes: Tell him I took care of that personally, which I did, and that’s my business.

Marburger: Tell him you, or me? I mean tell him Sandy Marburger took care of it or what?

T. Holmes: Tell him Tommy Holmes took care of it, but I gave you a bill in that manner and that’s the way that he files your tax.

Marburger: OK, OK and then if he’s got any problems . . .

T. Holmes: I have my reasons for doing that also Sandy.

Marburger: If he’s got any problems, I’ll let him call you.

T. Holmes: Have him give me a call.

Marburger: OK.

T. Holmes: Olive will be back in a couple of weeks, I understand, in a couple of weeks and we’ll get that other seventy five buck deal straightened out.

Marburger: OK fine.

T. Holmes : As quick as she gets back.

Marburger: OK Well then, I’m sorry I had to bother you on this, Mr. Holmes, but you know me, I don’t know anything about and I want to make sure I was doing the right thing.

T. Holmes: Well, you’re doing the right thing and that’s the reason I did it that way was so that you would have a write off and, and wouldn’t have to pay taxes on it.

Marburger: OK fine, OK that’s all.

T. Holmes: OK fine.

Marburger: Thank you, listen feel better now, will you?

T. Holmes: All right, well, they’re gonna put me in the hospital I guess and go through a bunch of tests. You lay there in bed and you never see anybody — for days, you know, when those doctors get you in there.

Marburger: Well, I sure hope everything works out alright.

T. Holmes: Fine, well I know it will.

Marburger: Thank you, You’ll give me a call then when Mrs. Keihl gets back in town.

T. Holmes: I will as quick as she gets back Sandy.

Marburger: OK thank you.

T. Holmes: OK, bye bye.

Marburger: Bye bye.

. FEDERAL AND STATE WIRETAPPING AND ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

Court Authorized Devices

Year Federal State Total No. Total No. of Days In Actual Use

1968 * 0 174 174 (Unavailable)

1969 33 269 302 9,019

1970 183 414 597 11.200.5

1971 285 531 816 14.582.5

1972 206 649 855 15,562 **

The 1968 reporting period covered only June 20, 1968, to December 31, 1968.

This figure is lower than the actual total since this information was not provided by all reporting jurisdictions.

Source: Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Report on Applications for Orders Authorizing or Approving the Interception of Wire Or Oral Communications for 1968, 1969, 1970, 1971, 1972.

See also United States v. United States District Court (1972) 407 U.S. 297 , 313 n. 4, 92 S.Ct. 2125 , 32 L.Ed.2d 752 .

. United States v. United States District Court, supra at 325, 92 S.Ct. 2125 (Douglas, J., concurring).

During the two-year period 1969-1970, the Department of Justice installed, without court approval, 207 “national security” electronic devices. The duration of use of such devices far surpassed those authorized by court orders during the same period. See id. at 334, 92 S.Ct. 2125 (appendix to op’n of Douglas, J., concurring) :

FEDERAL WIRETAPPING AND BUGGING 1969-1970

Court Ordered Devices Executive Ordered Devices Days in Use

Minimum Maximum Year Number Days in Use Number Minimum(Rounded) Minimum(Rounded)

1969 30 462 94 8,100 20,800

1970 180 2,363 113 8,100 22,600

Ratio of Days Used Executive Ordered: Court Ordered

Average Days in Use Per Device Executive Ordered Devices

Year

Minimum

Maximum

Court Ordered Devices

Minimum

Maximum

1969 17.5 * 45.0 * 15.4 86.2 221.3

1970 3.4 9.6 13.1 71.7 200.0

• Ratios for 1969 are less meaningful than those for 1970, since court-ordered surveillance program was in its initial stage in 1969.

Source:

(1) Letter from Assistant Attorney General Robert Mardian to Senator Edward M. Kennedy, March 1, 1971. Source figures withheld at request of Justice Department.

(2) 1969 and 1970 Reports of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.

. See generally Hearings on Invasion of Privacy Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm, on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).

. United States Army domestic intelligence operations have reportedly focused upon United States Senators Sam Ervin, Fred Harris, Harold Hughes, Edward Kennedy, George McGovern, and Edmund Muskie. N. Y. Times, Feb. 29, 1972, at 1, col. 3. Five United States Representatives, three Governors, and a Lt. Governor were also subjected to Army surveillance. Id. cols. 3-4. “Indeed, the electronic ear was said to have turned on a Justice of [the United States Supreme] Court.” Williamson v. United States (1972) 405 U.S. 1026, 1028 , 92 S.Ct. 1323, 1324 , 31 L.Ed.2d 487 (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).

. Senator Sam Ervin, Jr., Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, has disclosed that organizations subjected to Army surveillance have included the NAACP, ACLU, Operation Breadbasket, the Urban League, and the States’ Rights Party. Brief for Senator Sam Ervin, Jr., as Amicus Curiae at 10, Laird v. Tatum (1972) 408 U.S. 1 , 92 S.Ct. 2318 , 33 L.Ed.2d 154 . Army operations also infiltrated Resurrection City, the Poor People’s Campaign, the 1968 Democratic and Republican Party nominating conventions. Federal Data Banks, Computers and the Bill of Rights, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm, on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 197-201 (1971).

. See Federal Data Banks, Computers and the Bill of Rights, supra note 7, at 201-06. See also N. Y. Times, April 12, 1970, at 1, col. 2 (“U. S. To Tighten Surveillance of Radicals”) ; N. Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1969, at 1, col. 1 (“F.B.I.’s Informants and ‘Bugs’ Collect Data on Black Panthers”) ; Washington Post, May 12, 1972, § D, at 21, col. 5 (“When the FBI Calls, Everybody Talks”) ; Washington Post, May 16, 1972, § B, at 15, col. 5 (“Black Activists Are FBI Targets”) ; Washington Post, May 17, 1972, § B, at 13, col. 5 (“Bedroom Peeking Sharpens FBI Files”). The FBI allegedly investigated Daniel Schorr, a CBS television correspondent critical of the Government. N. Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1971, at 95, col. 4; N. Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1971, at 13, col. 1. The FBI has also been charged with electronic surveillance of Dr. Martin Luther King (V. Navasky, Kennedy Justice 135-55 (1971)) and with wiretapping Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt and John L. Lewis (Theoharis & Meyer, The “National Security” Justification For Electronic Eavesdropping: An Elusive Exception, 14 Wayne L.Rev. 749, 760-61 (1968)).

. Federal Data Banks, Computers and the Bill of Rights, supra note 7, at 185.

. See generally Federal Data Banks, Computers and the Bill of Rights, supra note 7; A. Westin & F. Baker, Databanks in a Free Society (1972) (Report of the Project on Computer Databanks of the Computer Science and Engineering Board, National Academy of Sciences) ; A. Miller, The Assault on Privacy: Computers, Data Banks, and Dossiers (1971) ; J. Rosenberg, The Death of Privacy (1969) ; A. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967) ; E. Long, The Intruders: The Invasion of Privacy by Government and Industry. See also Laird v. Tatum (1972) 408 U.S. 1, 26 , 92 S.Ct. 2318 , 33 L.Ed.2d 154 (Douglas, J., dissenting), describing “massive and comprehensive” surveillance of civilians.

. E. g., A Westin, Privacy and Freedom 131 (1967) ; Greenawalt, The Consent Problem in Wiretapping & Eavesdropping: Surreptitious Monitoring With the Consent of a Participant in a Conversation, 68 Colum.L.Rev. 189, 212 (1968).

The precise magnitude of this type of clandestine activity defies accurate projection because of the scarcity of reliable empirical data on such police techniques. Cf. Note, Police Undercover Agents: New Threat to First Amendment Freedoms, 37 Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 634, 657 (1969). Nevertheless, in terms of an impact on privacy, any constitutional distinction drawn between participant monitoring and interceptions unauthorized by either party must take into account the practical effect of regulating or not regulating the most pervasive form of electronic surveillance.

. The quoted phrases are borrowed respectively from New York Times v. Sullivan (1964) 376 U.S. 254, 270 , 84 S.Ct. 710 , 11 L.Ed.2d 686 , and Lopez v. United States (1963) 373 U.S. 427, 470 , 83 S.Ct. 1381 , 10 L.Ed.2d 462 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

. Cf. Greenawalt, supra, note 11, at 221: “ [Widespread participant monitoring would be likely to have a subtle negative effect on people’s willingness to communicate.”

. Title III, § 802(1), 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1) :

“(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter any person who—

(a) willfully intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire or oral communication;

(b) willfully uses, endeavors to use, or procures any other person to use or endeavor to use any electronic, mechanical, or other device to intercept any oral communication when — •

shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.”

. The Senate Judiciary Committee report on the bill refers only once to § 2511(2) (c), noting that “it shall not be unlawful for a party to any wire or oral communication or a person given prior authority by a party to a communication to intercept such communication.” S.Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968) ; 2 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad. News 2182 (1968).

The only explicit reference to § 2511 (2) (c) during the Senate floor debate came in the form of an amendment by Senior Philip A. Hart to limit participant wiretapping to police officers and to eliminate private interception by one party. 114 Cong.Rec. 12508-09 (1968) (remarks of Senator Hart). The final version of the Hart amendment, however, was not intended “in any way [to] limit consensual recording by law enforcement officers or by private persons acting in conjunction with law enforcement officers.” Id. at 14694-95 (remarks of Senator Hart). The modified amendment was passed without objection. Id. at 14695. This was the last congressional action on the participant monitoring provision. The Act passed in the Senate 72-4 and 369-17 in the House after limited debate of only one day. Id. at 14798, 16300.

Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting in United States v. White (1971) 401 U.S. 745, 791-792 , 91 S.Ct. 1122 , 28 L.Ed.2d 453 , similarly read the history of § 2511(2) (c).

. “ . . . Maintenance of a sense of personal autonomy depends in large part on being able to control the breadth of dissemination of one’s intimate concerns. If the only choice were to remain silent or expose one’s personal concerns to unknown and unsympathetic listeners, it would be a bleak choice, one that would eventually stultify creative individuality. Private communications are also an important form of emotional release; people need to be able to drop their social masks, to blow off steam against their bosses or the system, to disregard minor social conventions. As Louis Schwartz has put it in answer to' the argument that the innocent have nothing to fear from electronic surveillance, ‘Free conversation is often characterized by exaggeration, obscenity, agreeable falsehoods, and the expression of anti-social desires or views not intended to be taken seriously. The unedited quality of conversation is essential if it is to preserve its intimate, personal and informal character.’ ” Greenawalt, supra note 11, at 216-17. (Footnotes omitted.)

. This conduct is not a wiretap, as that term is usually used. The difference between a wiretap and an eavesdrop accompanied by electronic recording is a difference only in the technology employed. The impact of the intrusion is identical. Section 2511(1) (a) of Title III encompasses both since both are interceptions of a “wire or oral communication.”

Confusing terminology must not be permitted to obscure the realities of the interceptions. *68 See generally S. Dash, R. Schwartz & R. Knowlton, The Eavesdroppers 6-8 (1959).

. Mr. Chief Justice Taft said: “The [Fourth] Amendment does not forbid what was done here. There was no searching. There was no seizure. The evidence was secured by the use of the sense of hearing and that only. There was no entry of the houses or offices of the defendant.” ( 277 U.S. at 464 , 48 S.Ct. at 568 .) “[Liberal construction of the Fourth Amendment] cannot justify enlargement of the language employed beyond the possible practical meaning of houses, persons, papers, and effects, or so to apply the words search and seizure as to forbid hearing or sight.” (Id. at 465, 48 S. Ct. at 568 .)

. “The principles laid down in this opinion [Entick v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029 (1765)] affect the very essence of constitutional liberty and security. They reach farther than the concrete form of the case then before the court, with its adventitious circumstances ; they apply to all invasions on the part of the government and its employees of the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life. It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security. . . . ” Boyd v. United States (1886) 116 U.S. 616, 630 , 6 S.Ct. 524, 532 , 29 L.Ed. 746 .

. “The makers of our Constitution,” Mr. Justice Brandéis said, “. . . recognized the significance of man’s spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone — the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment. And the use, as *69 evidence in a criminal proceeding, of facts ascertained by such intrusion must be deemed a violation of the Fifth.” 277 U.S. at 478-479 , 48 S.Ct. at 572 .

. Mr. Justice Holmes’ famous dissent, championing the exclusionary rule, supports the hypothesis that the underlying quarrel was Weeks. 277 U.S. at 469-471 , 48 S.Ct. 564 .

. “There was no evidence of compulsion to induce the defendants to talk over their many telephones. They were continually and voluntarily transacting business without knowledge of the interception.” 277 U.S. at 462 , 48 S.Ct. at 467 .

. Petitioner had two face-to-face conversations with an old acquaintance in which he made incriminating statements. Unknown to petitioner, the acquaintance was an informer who had secreted on his person a microphone and transmitter by which he sent the conversations to a government agent some distance away. The informant did not testify at trial, but the government agent recited *70 tke conversation he had overheard. Although the holding was based on the majority’s conclusion that the Fourth Amendment was not violated because there had been no trespass, Mr. Justice Jackson introduced the Olmstead subtheme, stating: “Petitioner was talking confidentially and indiscreetly with one he trusted, and he was overheard. This was due to aid from a transmitter and receiver, to be sure, but with the same effect on his privacy as if agent Lee had been eavesdropping outside an open window.” ( 343 U.S. at 753-754 , 72 S.Ct. at 972.)

Agent Lee was nowhere near the conversations and eavesdropping by machine is not the same as overhearing by human ears. No analogy to the ancient art of eavesdropping exists unless a fiction is indulged that a person physically absent becomes constructively present close enough to the conversation to hear and far enough to avoid a trespass. Curiously enough, Mr. Justice Jackson, a few paragraphs earlier, had quickly dispatched the fiction of trespass ab initio as an historical anachronism which should not be transported into criminal cases. (Id. at 752, 72 S.Ct. 967 .)

. Petitioner had a face-to-face conversation with an Internal Revenue Agent, Davis, in which petitioner tried to bribe Davis, who had recorded the conversation using a device hidden on his person. The majority perceived no difference between secret recording and the recollection of the agent for Fourth Amendment purposes, except that the device provided “the most' reliable evidence possible of a conversation in which the Government’s own agent was a participant and which that agent was fully entitled to disclose.....We think the risk that petitioner took in offering a bribe to Davis fairly included the risk that the offer would be accurately reproduced in court, whether by faultless memory or mechanical recording.” ( 373 U.S. at 439 , 83 S.Ct. at 1388 .) Mr. Justice Harlan, who wrote the opinion, later repudiated that view. (United States v. White, supra., 401 U.S. at 788 n. 24, 91 S.Ct. 1122 .)

. Acting without a warrant, government agents overheard incriminating conversations between White and a confidant-government informant who transmitted his conversations with White to the agents by means of a radio transmitter concealed on his person. The informant was not produced at trial. The electronically eavesdropping government agents testified to the intercepted conversations. Mr. Justice White, speaking for a plurality (he did not command a majority on the point), said that a person contemplating illegal activity “must realize and risk” that his confidant may be a police informer who is fully wired for sound. ( 401 U.S. at 752-753 , 91 S.Ct. 1122 .)

. See United States v. White, supra at 754 , 91 S.Ct. 1122 (White, J.). Although the holding in White was based upon the nonre-troactivity of Katz , several of the Justices did express views on the effect of Katz on participant electronic surveillance. Mr. Justice White, writing for the Chief Justice and Justices Stewart and Blackmun, suggested that On Lee remained sound law. Justices Brennan, Douglas, Harlan, and Marshall each wrote separate opinions arguing that the result in On Lee could not survive Katz . Mr. Justice Black, concurring in the judgment of the Court, did not address this issue, merely reasserting the position taken in his Katz dissent that electronic surveillance was not within the ambit of the Fourth Amendment.

. See also Note, Consent Searches: A Reappraisal After Miranda v. Arizona 67 Colum.L.Rev. 130 (1967) ; The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Committees on Federal Legislation and Civil Rights, Proposed Legislation on Wiretapping and Eavesdropping After Berger v. New York and Katz v. United States 23 (1968).

. See A. Westin, supra at 340-49 and authorities cited. See generally Fried, Privacy, 77 Yale L.J. 475 , 478-83 (1968).

. I have not overlooked the impact of the Fifth Amendment on participant surveillance. As Mr. Justice Bradley observed in Boyd v. United States, supra note 19, in the area of warrantless intrusion accompanied by extraction of incriminating testimony, the Fourth and Fifth Amendments “run almost into each other.” ( 116 U.S. at 630 , 6 S.Ct. 524 .) Tlie Court has repeatedly recognized the interaction of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments in protecting privacy and freedom. E. g., Lopez v. United States, supra, 373 U.S. at 456 , 83 S.Ct. 1381 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ; Wong Sun v. United States (1963) 371 U.S. 471, 484 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L. Ed.2d 441 ; Feldman v. United States (1944) 322 U.S. 487, 489 , 64 S.Ct. 1082 , 88 L.Ed. 1408 .

. I am aware of the authorities from this circuit and others upholding the constitutionality of warrantless participant electronic surveillance. Some of the cases cited by the majority can be effectively distinguished from Holmes. Others cannot. In my view, howevei', none of the circuit decisions can be harmonized with controlling Supreme Court authority. None of them undertake any independent analysis that supplies a defensible rationale for depriving a person subjected to warrantless participant surveillance of the protection of the Fourth Amendment.

. In the event that in some instances governmental interests do collide with a person’s constitutionally secured right of privacy, the conflict would be adjudicated by sensitive utilization of the balancing tests developed in cases arising under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. E-g., In re Stolar (1971) 401 U.S. 23 , 91 S.Ct. 713 , 27 L.Ed.2d 657 ; United States v. O’Brien (1968) 391 U.S. 367 , 88 S.Ct. 1673 , 20 L.Ed.2d 672 ; DeGregory v. Attorney General (1966) 383 U.S. 825 , 86 S.Ct. 1148 , 16 L.Ed.2d 292 ; Shelton v. Tucker, supra, 364 U.S. 479 , 81 S.Ct. 247 , 5 L.Ed.2d 231 . See also Bursey v. United States (9th Cir. 1972) 466 F.2d 1059 . The same technique could be applied in the context of either criminal or civil litigation. (See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil remedy for vindication of constitutional right to privacy violated by state action) ; Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics (1971) 403 U.S. 388 , 91 S.Ct. 1999 , 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (civil remedy for action of federal agents).)