OPINION

Weir was cited for civil contempt for failing to answer questions before a grand jury subsequent to a grant of immunity. We affirm.

Weir alleged in his uncontradicted affidavit that he had been captured by Mexican officials in Mexico, had been threatened and tortured and, as a result, had confessed orally and in writing to being involved in a marijuana smuggling scheme. He also alleged that United States officials in Mexico were involved with the Mexican officials in that (1) while he was being interviewed by an agent of the “Federal Bureau of Narcotics,” Mexican officials threatened him and slapped his face; (2) that the American agent had a copy of his prior written confessions; (3) that this agent stated to Mexican officials that more money would be paid to secure those higher up than Weir; and (4) that he was advised by another United States official that his release might be arranged if he cooperated.

Weir was subsequently released and deported to the United States, whereupon he was arrested as a material witness, admitted to bail and subpoenaed to testify before the grand jury. He declined to answer questions, claiming his Fifth Amendment privilege, and was then granted use immunity, over his objection. Upon his return to the grand jury, he still refused to answer questions, which resulted in his being held in civil contempt and sentenced to be incarcerated until he purged himself by testifying.

Weir claims he has just cause not to answer the questions because they were based upon a coerced confession. We believe this avenue of attack was foreclosed by United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 , 94 S.Ct. 613 , 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974), in which the Court held that a grand jury witness may not complain that a grand jury inquiry was based upon materials secured by a search and seizure which violated the Fourth Amendment.

Weir claims Calandra is distinguishable because here we deal with the Fifth rather than the Fourth Amendment. In both instances, the alleged constitutional abridgment occurred prior to the grand jury proceeding. In both, the inquiry in the grand jury proceeding stemmed from the information which was alleged *881 ly secured in violation of the Constitution. To accept Weir’s claim, we would need to elevate the Fifth Amendment over the Fourth Amendment. This we cannot do without more authoritative direction. In Calandra , the Court did state, however, that “an indictment valid on its face is not subject to challenge on the ground that the grand jury acted . on the basis of information obtained in violation of a defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.” Id. at 345 , 94 S.Ct. at 618 .

Weir next - contends, citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 , 72 S.Ct. 205 , 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952), that the brutal treatment which produced incriminating statements should require the court, as a matter of due process, to allow him to assert his privilege. However, one can also conceive of brutality which could be inflicted in relation to Fourth Amendment violations and there is no hint in Calandra that such would obviate application of the Calandra rule.

If what Weir charges is true, it is reprehensible and revolting. But the alleged confessions are not being used to incriminate Weir. Because of the use immunity granted, he cannot incriminate himself by answering the questions. In the grand jury room there is no illegal coercion. He is now many miles away from and has a border between him and the Mexican officials whom he charges with torture. His only fear is a charge of perjury. If he now tells the truth, any charge of perjury based upon prior involuntary statements will result in Weir raising his defense to the alleged coerced confessions. There is no doubt that Weir may defend himself against the use of involuntary confessions, but this is hot the time to do so.

Weir next contends that the immunity granted is insufficient to protect him from prosecution in Mexico. The short answer is that the grand jury proceedings are secret, Fed.R.Crim.P. 6, and we cannot assume that the rule will be broken and the proceedings disclosed to the Mexican government.

Weir filed a motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3504 seeking disclosure of the results of electronic surveillance of himself and his attorneys. He charged that both his appearance before the grand jury and the questions asked him were the result of the electronic surveillance and that such surveillance was unlawful. In response, an affidavit by a Department of Justice attorney denied any electronic surveillance. The attorney stated that all national security electronic surveillance authorized by the Attorney General is conducted by the F.B. I. and that his inquiry of the F.B.I. and other agencies which conduct surveillance pursuant to Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control & Safe Streets Act of 1968 revealed that no surveillance occurred. We hold that the government’s denial of surveillance was adequate. Proving a negative is, at best, difficult and in our review, a practical, as distinguished from a technical, approach is dictated.

Affirmed.