OPINION

This is an action in habeas corpus seeking the release of the appellant, John Dean Wallace, Jr., from the United States Navy on the basis that he has been improperly denied discharge as a conscientious objector under the applicable Navy regulations. Appeal tq this court followed denial of relief by the district court.

*118 Wallace is a dental officer in the Navy. He joined the Naval Reserve in 1963 while a college student and received his commission upon graduation. In April, 1972, several months before completing his internship, he received orders to report for duty on the USS KITTY HAWK in the Gulf of Tonkin in the summer of 1972. On April 24, 1972, he submitted a letter to Rear Admiral E. C. Raffetto, Chief Dental Division, requesting a non-combat assignment on the basis of his opposition to the Vietnam War. The Admiral denied the request on May 17, 1972, stating that Wallace’s reasoning was untenable and that he should either serve as ordered or seek to resign his commission on the basis of conscientious objection. Wallace took no action at that time. He reported for active service on July 1, 1972, and served on the USS KITTY HAWK in the Gulf of Tonkin. In early 1973, shortly after his return, he applied to resign his commission on the basis of conscientious objection. While that application was still pending and before it was denied, he applied for a discharge on the same basis under the applicable Navy regulations.

The Navy followed its usual procedure in processing appellant’s application for discharge. He was interviewed by a chaplain, who found him sincere and recommended discharge. The interviewing psychiatrist found “no psychiatric contraindication to this man making C. O. application.” The hearing officer recommended denial of the application. The pertinent paragraph from the hearing officer reads as follows:

This was a recommendation, not a decision, and was no more binding on the deciding authority than other recommendations placed in Wallace’s file as it wended its way to the deciding authority.

The final administrative action was by the Assistant Chief for Military Personnel Security and Performance (the Assistant Chief), acting for the Chief of Naval Personnel. The pertinent paragraph of the Assistant Chief’s letter reads:

There is no finding that Wallace was insincere. The Assistant Chief’s finding relates to the regulation, 32 C.F.R. § 730.18 (b), which provides that a request *119 for discharge based solely on conscientious objection which existed but was not claimed prior to entry into the Navy and which would have sufficed to keep the person out of military service will not qualify as a basis for discharging an in-service conscientious objector.

There is no basis in fact in the record for the Assistant Chief’s finding. Under these circumstances, reversal is required. Under our decisions in Tellez v. Chaffee, 9 Cir., 1972, 467 F.2d 218 , Christensen v. Franklin, 9 Cir., 1972, 456 F.2d 1277 , and Pinkus v. Pearson, 9 Cir., 1971, 449 F.2d 162 , Wallace is entitled to his discharge.

Zemke v. Larsen, 9 Cir., 1970, 434 F.2d 1281 , is not in point. In that case the deciding body was the Army Conscientious Objectors’ Review Board and, while the Board gave as its reason its conclusion that Zemke’s views were not based upon religious training and belief, it also appeared from the decision that the Board, which was the deciding body, had a second independent reason for disapproval of Zemke’s CO application, namely, that his beliefs were not sincerely held. We held that the first ground was ruled out by the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in Welsh v. United States, 1970, 398 U.S. 333 , 90 S.Ct. 1792 , 26 L.Ed.2d 308 , but that we could not tell whether the Board based its decision wholly or primarily on that ground or also on the ground of insincerity, and we remanded to permit the Board to decide whether insincerity was an independent ground. The situation in the present ease is different. There is nothing in the decision of the Assistant Chief, who had the ultimate deciding authority, to indicate that he considered that Wallace was insincere. Under these circumstances, Tellez, supra, Christensen, supra, and Pinkus, supra, are in point. Zemke is not.

The order appealed from is reversed and the case is remanded to the district court with directions to issue the writ, unless within 30 days the Navy grants Wallace a discharge as a conscientious objector pursuant to 32 C.F.R. § 730 .-18(p)(l).