22:I[98912,["/_next/static/chunks/0asocxi83kb~5.js","/_next/static/chunks/0n4z.7yu76je-.js","/_next/static/chunks/0eyt_ou8dj52g.js","/_next/static/chunks/01bcia3bjqt9z.js","/_next/static/chunks/15egrlmmf_yst.js"],"CaseDetailGate"] 23:T4e5,MEMORANDUM Telly Alexander Heath, an Oregon state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging Eighth Amendment violations. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review de novo, Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004), and we affirm. The district court properly granted summary judgment because Heath failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious mental health needs by housing him in the Disciplinary Segregation Unit, Intensive Management Unit, or Behavioral Health Unit. See Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1057-60 (a prison official is deliberately indifferent only if he or she knows of and disregards an excessive risk to an inmate’s health). Further, Heath failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether his placement in these units denied him the “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 , 101 S.Ct. 2392 , 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981). Heath’s motion for appellees’ default is denied. AFFIRMED. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.24:T517,

MEMORANDUM

Telly Alexander Heath, an Oregon state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging Eighth Amendment violations. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review de novo, Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004), and we affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Heath failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious mental health needs by housing him in the Disciplinary Segregation Unit, Intensive Management Unit, or Behavioral Health Unit. See Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1057-60 (a prison official is deliberately indifferent only if he or she knows of and disregards an excessive risk to an inmate’s health). Further, Heath failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether his placement in these units denied him the “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 , 101 S.Ct. 2392 , 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981).

Heath’s motion for appellees’ default is denied.

AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.