DISCUSSION

Minor contends that the records relating to his prior dismissed petition should be

sealed under amended section 786, which became effective on January 1, 2016, after the

court terminated its jurisdiction over him. (Stats. 2015, ch. 368, § 1.) He relies on the

3 rule established by In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 (Estrada), to argue that amended

section 786 may be retroactively applied to his case.3 We disagree.

We are guided by the well-established rule that a "new or amended statute applies

prospectively only, unless the Legislature clearly expresses an intent that it operate

retroactively." (People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 664; see Evangelatos v.

Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1207 [" '[it] is an established canon of

interpretation that statutes are not to be given a retrospective operation unless it is clearly

made to appear that such was the legislative intent' "].)

Furthermore, to ascertain the Legislature's intent, "[w]e must look to the statute's

words and give them their usual and ordinary meaning. [Citation.] The statute's plain

meaning controls the court's interpretation unless its words are ambiguous. If the plain

language of a statute is unambiguous, no court need, or should, go beyond that pure

expression of legislative intent." (Green v. State of California (2007) 42 Cal.4th 254,

260.)

Applying the above principles, amended section 786 does not operate

retroactively. The amended statute contains a similar requirement as its former version

for sealing records pertaining to a pending petition if the minor satisfactorily completes

3 Minor does not argue that the juvenile court erred under former section 786, apparently conceding the court's order was correct based on the law in effect at the time. Thus, we do not address the issue of whether the court erred under former section 786.

4 probation.4 However, the Legislature added a number of new subdivisions, including

subdivision (e)(1), which states in part that "[t]he court may, in making its order to seal

the record and dismiss the instant petition pursuant to this section, include an order to seal

a record relating to, or to dismiss, any prior petition or petitions that have been filed or

sustained . . . ." (§ 786, subd. (e)(1), italics added.) There is no legislative indication in

the language of amended section 786 that it should be applied in lieu of the relevant law

in effect at the time of the court's sealing order, former section 786.

Minor's reliance on the Estrada rule is misplaced. Estrada teaches that "[w]hen

the Legislature amends a statute so as to lessen the punishment it has obviously expressly

determined that its former penalty was too severe and that a lighter punishment is proper

as punishment for the commission of the prohibited act. It is an inevitable inference that

the Legislature must have intended that the new statute imposing the new lighter penalty

now deemed to be sufficient should apply to every case to which it constitutionally could

apply. . . . This intent seems obvious, because to hold otherwise would be to conclude

that the Legislature was motivated by a desire for vengeance, a conclusion not permitted

in view of modern theories of penology." (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 745, italics

added.)

In People v. Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314, our Supreme Court affirmed that the

Estrada rule applies only when a legislative act "mitigate[s] the punishment for a

4 Amended section 786 provides in pertinent part: "If the minor satisfactorily completes . . . a term of probation for any offense, the court shall order the petition dismissed. The court shall order sealed all records pertaining to that dismissed petition in the custody of the juvenile court . . . ." (§ 786, subd. (a).) 5 particular criminal offense" based on the inferred legislative intent to impose a lighter

penalty. (Id. at pp. 324-325.) Estrada "supports an important, contextually specific

qualification to the ordinary presumption that statutes operate prospectively . . . ."

(Brown, at p. 323, italics added.) As a result, the challenged statute that recalculated

custodial conduct credits to the defendant's benefit could not be retroactively applied

because the statute did not alter the penalty for any crime, even if its effect would be to

reduce a punishment. (Id. at p. 325.) The Court discussed that the statute addresses

future conduct by providing increased incentives for good behavior. (Ibid.)

Here, amended section 786 does not impose a punishment or penalty for any

offense; it addresses circumstances that require and permit a court to seal juvenile

records. Contrary to Minor's position, the statute is not punitive in nature. (See § 202,

subd. (e) [listing punishments for delinquent minors].) Accordingly, it does not lend

itself to the inference discussed in Estrada of legislative intent to impose a new, reduced

penalty to nonfinal cases. Amended section 786 operates prospectively, providing an

incentive for minors to satisfactorily complete probation for offenses alleged in pending

(i.e., "instant") petitions. (§ 786, subd. (e)(1).)

Minor is not without a remedy. As the juvenile court advised him, Minor may

petition the court to seal his juvenile records under section 781. (§ 781; California Rules

of Court, rule 5.830.)

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DISPOSITION

The order denying Minor's motion to seal G4294 is affirmed.

HALLER, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

McDONALD, J.

IRION, J.

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