Circuit Judge, dissenting, with whom Circuit Judges BROWNING, DUNIWAY and ELY concur:

I cannot agree that Ouzts has failed to allege sufficient facts to entitle him to a trial on the merits of his claim that defendants acted under color of state law to deprive him of federally protected rights, in affirming the district court’s dismissal of Ouzts’ civil rights action, the majority ignores well-established Supreme Court authority and threatens to frustrate the congressional purpose underlying enactment of section 1983’s provision for an expansive, comprehensive remedy for the deprivation of federal constitutional and statutory rights. (See generally Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co. (1970) 398 U.S. 144, 162-169 ; id. at 203-206 , 90 S.Ct. 1598 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).)

I.

The pleadings and affidavits filed prior to the district court’s dismissal of Ouzts’ section 1983 action, viewed in the light most favorable to Ouzts’ claim, 1 indicate that Ouzts was arrested in Las Vegas, Nevada, in October 1965 on a charge of obtaining money under false pretenses. Ouzts was released three days later, after Maryland National Insurance Company, through William Em-bry, its attorney-in-fact, executed a bail bond on Ouzts’ behalf; the Petersons signed Ouzts’ bail application as resident guarantors.

On May 9, 1966, by stipulation of counsel, the preliminary hearing on the criminal charge was continued to January 1967; the court ordered the bond to continue. On November 3, 1966, allegedly acting in furtherance of an agree *556 ment between Embry and the Petersons, Darrow and Iola Peterson forcibly entered Ouzts’ home in Long Beach, California. Ouzts was compelled to accompany the Petersons from his home by threats of violence. Eventually the police were called; Ouzts was arrested and jailed pending a determination of his fugitive status. Darrow Peterson then sought an order, pursuant to Cal.Penal Code § 847.5, authorizing him to return Ouzts to Nevada by filing a false affidavit stating that Ouzts was in fact a fugitive from justice. After a hearing, the Long Beach Municipal Court refused to order Ouzts’ extradition unless Peterson obtained a Nevada warrant for Ouzts’ arrest. Ouzts was then released on his own recognizance; the case was continued and eventually dismissed without any further appearance by the defendants.

Following the refusal of the Long Beach court to authorize Ouzts’ return to Nevada, defendants hired Wilfred La-gatella, a self-employed bail bond “skip tracer,” to aid in their attempt to transport Ouzts to Nevada. To accomplish this purpose, on November 18, 1966, La-gatella and an associate forcibly entered Ouzts’ home to arrest him. Lagatella admitted that in entering the home and effecting the arrest, he relied on the authority vested in bail bondsmen by Cal. Penal Code § 1301 to re-arrest a principal. Ouzts alleges that Lagatella flashed a badge and told him that he and his companion were “special officers” of Los Angeles County. 2 Using a great amount of force, the two men subdued Ouzts, handcuffed him, and transported him against his will to San Pedro, California, although they initially told him that he was being taken to the Long Beach police department. Embry and the Petersons were waiting at San Pedro, and they then forced Ouzts to accompany them to Las Vegas.

Upon arrival in Las Vegas, Ouzts was jailed by the sheriff,, whe relied upon defendants’ false allegations that Ouzts was a fugitive from justice. Ouzts remained in custody from November 18 to November 29, 1966. The pending criminal complaint against Ouzts was dismissed on January 6, 1967, before Ouzts received any hearing on the charge.

II.

Apparently conceding that, if true, Ouzts’ amended complaint and affidavit establish a right to some form of relief against the defendants, the majority nevertheless affirms dismissal of his section 1983 action on the ground that Ouzts has failed to allege sufficient facts to permit a finding that the defendants were acting under color of state law when they violated Ouzts’ civil rights. I believe that the governmental nature of the bail system in general, California’s and Nevada’s comprehensive statutory scheme for licensing and regulating bail bondsmen, and, in particular, California’s grant to bail bondsmen of police powers not enjoyed by private citizens generally, together with the fact that defendants expressly relied upon their statutory powers in effecting the second arrest and informed Ouzts at that time that they were special Los Angeles County officers, compel the conclusion that defendants were acting under color of state law.

It is now well-settled that to satisfy the “under color of” requirement of section 1983, the involvement of the state need not be either exclusive or direct. (E. g., United States v. Guest (1966) 383 U.S. 745, 755 , 86 S.Ct. 1170 , 16 L.Ed.2d 239 .) 3 In evaluating Ouzts’ allegations that defendants acted under col- *557 or of state law, accordingly, the critical question is not whether defendants were in fact public officials, but rather whether the state “significantly involved itself” with defendants’ unlawful conduct. (Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis (1972) 407 U.S. 163, 173 , 92 S.Ct. 1965 , 32 L.Ed.2d 627 ; Reitman v. Mulkey (1967) 387 U.S. 369, 380 , 87 S.Ct. 1627 , 18 L.Ed.2d 830 .) Whether or not state involvement is “significant,” of course, can be determined only “by sifting facts and weighing circumstances.” (Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority (1961) 365 U.S. 715, 722 , 81 S.Ct. 856, 860 , 6 L.Ed.2d 45 .) But the absence of a “precise formula” for recognition of the degree of state involvement in private conduct necessary for an action under section 1983 does not leave us free to find the presence or absence of state action without regard to the many cases from the Supreme Court that indicate which factors are relevant to a determination of the state action question.

In a variety of contexts the Supreme Court has found state action of a nature sufficient to create rights under the Fourteenth Amendment even though the official conduct was only one of several cooperative forces leading to the constitutional violation. (United States v. Guest, supra, 383 U.S. 755 -756, 86 S.Ct. 1170 ; see e. g., Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., supra; Evans v. Newton (1966) 382 U.S. 266 , 86 S.Ct. 486 , 15 L.Ed.2d 373 ; Shelley v. Kraemer (1948) 334 U.S. 1 , 68 S.Ct. 836 .) This form of official conduct is present in the case at bar, for only through substantial governmental cooperation is it possible to maintain the system of quasi-private bail that led to the violation of Ouzts’ civil rights. State officers are responsible for determining whether an offender is eligible for bail and, if he is, a magistrate or judge both sets the amount of bail required for release and determines the form of bail that the surety will be allowed to deposit. (See, e. g., Cal.Penal Code §§ 1270-1272, 1275, 1298; Nev. Rev.Stat. §§ 178.484, 178.498, 178.502.) In addition, judicial officers are empowered to impose conditions on both the surety and the principal to insure the principal’s appearance in court (see, e. g., Nev.Rev.Stat. § 178.502; cf. Cal.Penal Code §§ 1273, 1292), and, when deemed necessary, to revoke bail and order recommitment of the defendant. (See, e. g., Cal.Penal Code § 1310; Nev. Rev.Stat. 178.506, 178.532.) Perhaps of greater importance, as demonstrated in at least two instances in the case at bar, state police and judicial officers make available to bail bondsmen judicial process and the coercive power of the state to aid in rearrest and detention of the principal, in order to protect the surety’s investment. (See, e. g., Cal.Penal Code §§ 847.5, 1300-1301. See generally ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Pretrial Release § 5.4 (Approved Draft 1968).)

Moreover, state involvement in the bail system does not inure solely to the benefit of the private bondsman. By permitting a defendant to be released into the custody of a private surety, the state saves the expense that it would otherwise incur in constructing additional jail facilities, feeding and clothing the prisoner, and using its own governmental personnel to guard the defendant and insure his appearance in court. In maintaining custody over a defendant, therefore, the bail bondsman is performing an important public function, as the Supreme Court has recognized on several occasions: “When bail is given the principal is regarded as delivered to the custody of his sureties. Their dominion is a continuance of the original imprisonment.” (Taylor v. Taintor (1872) 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 366, 371 , 21 L.Ed. 287 .) “When a prisoner is out on bond he is still under court control, though the bounds of his confinement are enlarged. *558 His bondsmen are his jailers.” (Carlson v. Landon (1952) 342 U.S. 524, 547 , 72 S.Ct. 525, 738 , 96 L.Ed. 547 .) 4

The importance of the public function performed by bail bondsmen is evidenced by the pervasive regulation of the industry by the state. (Cf. Evans v. Newton, supra, 382 U.S. at 301-302, 86 S.Ct. 486 . See generally Public Util. Comm’n v. Pollak (1952) 343 U.S. 451 , 72 S.Ct. 813 , 96 L.Ed. 1068 .) Both California and Nevada require that bail bondsmen be licensed by the state and both set stringent qualification requirements for license applicants. Each state requires extensive record keeping and each places strict limitations on the business practices and range of services that can be offered by licensed bail bondsmen. Fee schedules are established by the state, and filing of a personal bond is required. In addition, both California and Nevada provide criminal penalties for violations of the licensing regulations. 5

In short, the state-licensed and regulated bondsman is an integral part of the state’s program of pretrial release. The state, through its law enforcement and judicial officers, and private sureties are joint participants in the present system of bail, “insinuated itself into a position of interdependence,” so that conduct that flowed naturally from that system “cannot be considered to have been so ‘purely private’ as to fall without the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment.” (Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, supra, 365 U.S. at 725 , 81 S.Ct. at 862 .)

Finding a sufficient allegation of state action in the case at bar, however, does not depend solely on the overall governmental nature of the bail bond system or on the mutual benefits enjoyed because of state-private surety cooperation. Similarly, although state restriction of entry into the bail bondsman profession and comprehensive regulation of general business practices make finding state action substantially easier, it too need not be deemed “significant” state involvement in order to sustain Ouzts’ allegations that defendants acted under color of state law. On the other hand, a finding of state action is compelled when these factors are considered together with the fact that California has delegated to bail bondsmen coercive state police powers not enjoyed by private citizens generally and that the defendants both relied upon that statutory authority and informed Ouzts of their “special” status when they forcibly entered his home and transported him to Nevada against his will. (Griffin v. Maryland (1964) 378 U.S. 130 , 84 S.Ct. 1770 ; Williams v. United States (1951) 341 U.S. 97 , 71 S.Ct. 576 , 95 L.Ed. 774 .)

California has vested in defendants, through Cal.Penal Code § 1301, the coercive power of the state. Unlike the limited authority possessed generally by private citizens to arrest for public offenses committed in their presence or when a felony has actually been committed (Cal.Penal Code § 837), under ssction 1301 bail bondsmen and their agents are authorized to arrest a defendant free on bond at any place in California, at any time before the surety has been discharged. 6 This delegation of police power played an essential role in *559 defendants’ unlawful conduct. Defendant Lagatella acknowledged that he was expressly relying on the arrest power authorized by section 1301 when he entered Ouzts’ home and forced Ouzts to accompany the other defendants to Nevada. 7 In addition, after he entered the home, Lagatella allegedly flashed a ■badge and informed Ouzts that he was a special officer of Los Angeles County. Lagatella also told Ouzts that he was taking Ouzts to the Long Beach police department in connection with the events that led to the unsuccessful section 847.5 proceedings.

More than sixty years ago the Supreme Court held that state involvement in private activity reached the requisite level of “significance” for a finding of state action “if the commission of the wrong itself is rendered possible or is efficiently aided by the state authority lodged in the wrongdoer.” (Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles (1913) 227 U. S. 278, 287 , 33 S.Ct. 312, 315 , 57 L.Ed. 510 .) It seems to me to be beyond dispute that the authority to arrest Ouzts conferred on defendants by section 1301 and expressly invoked by Lagatella “efficiently aided” the defendants in their efforts to remove Ouzts to Nevada. Accordingly, the Home Telephone standard requires that we hold that the defendants forcibly entered Ouzts’ home, arrested him, and transported him to Nevada “under color of” state law. (See, United States v. Classic (1941) 313 U.S. 299, 326 , 61 S.Ct. 1031, 1043 , 85 L.Ed. 1368 : “Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken ‘under color of’ state law.”)

In Griffin v. Maryland, supra, the state action decision with the greatest factual similarity to the case at bar, the Supreme Court utilized the principle enunciated in Home Telephone and United States v. Classic to find state action in the discriminatory conduct of a private detective enforcing the racially restrictive policies of a private amusement park. In making its state action determination, the Court emphasized the same three factors that are central to Ouzts’ claim: Detective Collins, pursuant to a county ordinance, had been vested with police powers not possessed by private citizens although he legally remained an agent of his private employer ( 378 U.S. at 132 & n. 1, 84 S.Ct. 1770 ); in performing the unlawful conduct, Collins “purported to exercise the authority of a deputy sheriff” {id. at 135, 84 S.Ct. at 1772 ; emphasis added); and Collins had a badge which he displayed as evidence of his purported state authority {id.). After summarizing these facts, the Court held: “If an individual is possessed of state authority and purports to act under that authority, his action is state action. It is irrelevant that he might have taken the same action had he acted in a purely private capacity or that the particular action which he took was not authorized by state law.” (Id. See Williams v. United States, supra, 341 U.S. at 99-100 , 71 S.Ct. at 578 : “It is common practice (citations omitted) for private guards or detectives to be vested with policemen’s powers. We know from the record that [this] is the policy of Miami, Florida. [T]he manner of [Williams’] conduct of the interrogations makes clear that he was asserting the authority granted him and not acting in the role of a private person.” (Citations omitted.).)

*560 It is of course true that California law does not authorize bail bondsmen to engage in the brutal conduct to which Ouzts allegedly was subjected. There is even some question, apart from the unreasonable use of force to subdue Ouzts and transport him to Nevada, as to the extent to which defendants could properly rely on the statutory authority granted by section 1301. (Compare Cal.Penal Code § 1301 with id,. § 847.5.) But the fact remains that under California law bail bondsmen have been delegated specific police powers and it was pursuant to this grant of authority that defendants acted in attempting to return Ouzts to Nevada. The Supreme Court long ago laid to rest the notion that defendants, acting pursuant to a grant of authority from the state, ceased to be acting under color of law when they exceeded the scope of their legal authority: “[T]he theory of the [Fourteenth] Amendment is that where an officer or other representative of a state, in the exercise of the authority with which he is clothed, misuses the power possessed to do a wrong forbidden by the Amendment, inquiry concerning whether the state has authorized the wrong is irrelevant, and the Federal judicial power is competent to afford redress for the wrong by dealing with the officer and the result of his exertion of power.” (Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles, supra, 227 U.S. at 287 , 33 S.Ct. at 315 . Accord, Monroe v. Pape (1961) 365 U.S. 167, 183-187 , 81 S.Ct. 473 , 5 L.Ed.2d 492 ; United States v. Classic, supra, 313 U.S. at 325-326 , 61 S.Ct. 1031 .) Accordingly, although the specific acts which constitute the alleged violation of Ouzts’ civil rights were not authorized by California law, we must find that defendants’ actions were taken “under col- or of” state law because California vested in defendants specific police powers upon which they relied and which made possible the challenged conduct. (Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles, supra, 227 U.S. at 287 , 33 S.Ct. 312 ; Griffin v. Maryland, supra, 378 U.S. at 135 , 84 S.Ct. 1770 .)

Although the various indicia of state action are closely related, the Supreme Court has generally discussed the “under color of” state law requirement in eases that involve primarily only one or another particular aspect of the problem. Nevertheless, it is clear that in determining the “significance” of the state’s involvement in defendants’ unlawful conduct, we must consider together all the forms of state activity present in the case at bar. (Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, supra, 365 U.S. at 725, 81 S.Ct. 856 .) In other words, we must determine whether the governmental nature of the bail system, the beneficial interrelationship of the state and private sureties in administering that system, the comprehensive regulation of the bail system by the state, and the vesting in bail bondsmen by the state of coercive police powers not possessed by private citizens generally, taken together with the fact that the defendants expressly relied upon their statutory authority and explicitly informed Ouzts that they possessed special state authorization for their conduct, indicate such a substantial governmental involvement in the defendants’ unlawful conduct that the conduct possesses the attributes, prominence, or dignity of state action. Whatever the majority might conclude about the “significance” of only one or several of these measures of state involvement, I believe that the presence of all of them in the ease at bar leads irresistibly to the conclusion that Ouzts has alleged sufficient facts to permit a finding that defendants acted under color of state law.

III.

In his amended complaint and subsequent affidavit, Ouzts alleged that on several occasions defendants forcibly entered his home without consent and without a warrant, restricted his liberty of movement by threats of physical violence, and finally succeeded in transporting Ouzts against his will from California to Nevada, again through use of force and without a warrant. Once it is *561 recognized that defendants in entering Ouzts’ home and forcibly seizing his person were acting under color of state law, it should be readily apparent that Ouzts has alleged that he was deprived of Fourteenth Amendment rights protected by section 1983.

In Monroe v. Pape, supra, the Supreme Court held that petitioners’ claims that defendants invaded their home and arrested and detained Mr. Monroe, all without a warrant, sufficiently alleged facts constituting deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution to fall well within the ambit of section 1983. (Id. at 170-171, 81 S.Ct. 473 .) In Monroe, as in Ouzts, the gravamen of the complaint was that the defendants had violated plaintiffs’ right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Monroe thus clearly stands for the principle that alleged violations of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of due process of law, as it incorporates specific Bill of Rights protections, are actionable under section 1983. Similarly, in United States v. Price, supra, the Court held that allegations of deprivation of liberty without due process of law constituted sufficient claim of denial of federally protected rights to fall within the compass of the Civil Rights Act. 8 Indeed, we could not hold that Ouzts has failed to allege a violation of federally protected rights without patently ignoring a still-expanding line of controlling Supreme Court authority. (See, e. g., Griffin v. Breckenridge (1971) 403 U.S. 88, 103 , 91 S.Ct. 1790 , 29 L.Ed.2d 338 ; Scheuer v. Rhodes (1974) 416 U.S. 232 , 94 S.Ct. 1683 , 40 L.Ed.2d 90 .)

Although Ouzts has plainly alleged that the defendants acted in violation of California law, the availability of a state remedy does not alter the fact that Ouzts has also alleged that defendants deprived him of his constitutional rights, nor does it affect his right to proceed in federal court under section 1983: “It is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked. Hence the fact that Illinois by its constitution and laws outlaws unreasonable searches and seizures is no barrier to the present suit in the federal court.” (Monroe v. Pape, supra, 365 U. S. at 183, 81 S.Ct. at 482 .)

Because I believe that well-established Supreme Court authority requires us to hold that Ouzts’ amended complaint and subsequent affidavit sufficiently allege that defendants acted under color of state law to deprive him of federally protected rights, I would reverse the district court’s dismissal of Ouzts section 1983 action and remand for a trial on the merits. 9

. The district court’s dismissal of Ouzts’ section 1983 claim followed its grant of appellees’ motion for summary judgment. Before ruling, therefore, the district court was able to consider not only Ouzts’ amended complaint, but also affidavits filed by both the defendants and Ouzts. Summary judgment may be granted in these circumstances only if the pleadings, together with the affidavits submitted, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the defendants are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. (Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).) Because Ouzts and the defendants do not agree entirely on the factual allegations underlying Ouzts’ claim, summary judgment for the defendants is proper only if these disputes are immaterial — that is, the district . court’s grant of summary judgment can be affirmed only if the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law when all disputed factual issues are resolved in favor of Ouzts. (See, e. g., Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., supra, 398 U.S. at 157 , 90 S.Ct. 1598 , United States v. Diebold (1962) 369 U.S. 654, 655 , 82 S.Ct. 993 , 8 L.Ed.2d 176 . See generally 6 J. Moore, Federal Practice ¶¶ 56.15 [1-0], 56.15 [3] (2d ed. 1974).) Accordingly, in evaluating the sufficiency of Ouzts’ claim, we must consider the facts alleged in the light most favorable to Ouzts. In so doing, of coui’se, I indicate no view as to the likelihood that at a trial on the merits Ouzts would be able to convince the factfinder that his version of the relevant events is correct and that he therefore is entitled to a judgment against tire defendants.

. Because Ouzts alleged that in entering his home and forcibly removing him Lagatella was acting pursuant to an agreement with the other defendants, Lagatella’s conduct, including his alleged announcement of his “special officer” status, is attributable to the other defendants for the purpose of determining whether they acted “under color of” state law. (See United States v. Price (1966) 383 U.S. 787, 794 , 86 S.Ct. 1152 .)

. United States v. Guest involved a determination of the sufficiency of a criminal indictment under 18 U.S.C. § 241 , rather than a civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . Because the majority of the Court interpreted § 241 as incorporating no more than the *557 equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (383 U.S. at 754, 86 S.Ct. 1170 ), the Court had to consider whether the criminal complaint sufficiently alleged that tlie defendants had acted under color of state law.

. Nee alno Hearings on S. 2855 Before the Subconnn. on Constitutional Rights & Sub-oomin. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm, on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1966) (statement of Sen. Ervin) : “[I]n modern times, the bail bondsman is an arm of the court performing a service in aid of civil law. As such, he should be subject to procedures that recognize and protect the rights of the accused as much as do other agents of law enforcement.”

. The California statutory provisions relating to licensing of professional bail bondsmen and regulation of their business practices are contained in Cal.Insurance Code §§ 1800-1822. At the time Ouzts was released on bail, the Nevada licensing and regulatory provisions were codified in sections 685.-210-685.300 of the Nevada Revised Statutes. The Nevada provisions were recodified in 1971 without any significant modification, and are presently found in Nev.Rev.Stat. §§ 697.010-697.370.

. California has by statute delegated this arrest power to bail bondsmen for more than 120 years. (See Cal.Stats.1851, c. 29, p. 271, § 533.)

. Defendants’ admission that § 1301 was expressly relied upon in effecting Ouzts’ arrest is of substantial importance for a finding of state action. Knowledge of and action pursuant to a state statute is an “essential” element in a finding that a person has acted under color of a state statute for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . (Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., supra, 398 U.S. at 161 -162 n. 23, 174 n. 44; Id. at 212 , 90 S.Ct. at 1610 -1611 n. 23, 1617 n. 44; Id. at 1631 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) : “A private person acts ‘under color of’ a state statute or other law when he, like the [public] official, in some way acts consciously pursuant to some law that gives him aid, comfort, or incentive.”)

. Price involved a determination of the sufficiency of a criminal indictment under 18 U. S.C. •§ 242, rather than a private action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . It has been held repeatedly, however, that § 1983 is the civil counterpart of § 242 and that the two sections are to be interpreted similarly. (See, e. g., Monroe v. Pape, supra, 365 U.S. at 185, 81 S.Ct. 473 .)

. Because I would hold that the district court erred in dismissing Ouzts’ section 1983 claim, I would also hold that it was an abuse of discretion to dismiss his pendent state law claim. Both claims arose from “a common nucleus of operative fact,” and there appear to be no jurisdictional considerations that would justify requiring Ouzts to litigate his two claims in separate forums. (UMW v. Gibbs (1966) 383 U.S. 715, 725-727 , 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1138-1139 , 16 L.Ed.2d 218 .)