Helen Ann BOWERS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. D. C. CAMPBELL Et Al., Defendants-Appellees

Bowers, a federal civilian employee, filed a complaint seeking injunctive and declaratory relief and back pay against the officers of the United States Air Station in Alameda, California (“NAS”), claiming that her removal from a trainee position, denial of later promotions, harassment, and reprimands were based on racial discrimination. Before she brought suit in the federal district court, she fully exhausted her administrative remedies. 1 She then invoked federal jurisdiction under 42 U.S. C. § 1981, 2 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 , 1343(4), and 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 .

The district court held that jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 was lacking because the matter in controversy did not exceed $10,000. Although the court recognized that jurisdiction was properly invoked under both 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (4) and the Administrative Procedure Act ( 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 ), it characterized the action as a request for judicial review of an administrative proceeding. The court thereupon denied her a de novo trial on the merits of her civil rights action and confined its exercise of jurisdiction to a review of the administrative record. After reviewing the record, the court concluded that…

I concur in Judge Hufstedler’s Opinion.

(dissenting):

I dissent.

As the majority opinion points out, the main issue in this appeal is what scope of review should be exercised by the district court when it has jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action both as an appeal from a final agency decision under 5 U.S.C. § 704 , and independently under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (4). It is clear from the statutes involved that if jurisdiction were predicated upon 5 U. S.C. § 704 alone, the narrow and restrictive review provisions of 5 U.S.C. § 706 would apply; and if the case were initially brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (4), and without an intermediary agency adjudication, there would be original jurisdiction in the Federal District Court, which would then hear the case as nisi prius. However, § 1343(4) does not specifically guarantee a plaintiff a de novo trial. A full judicial hearing is merely the result of that section’s grant of original jurisdiction when there has been no prior proceeding. In the case at hand we are faced with an overlap of jurisdictional provisions, but I cannot agree with the majority that this overlap should in effect allow plaintiff a second day in court — a hearing de novo — when she has already had a…

505 F.2d 1155 8 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1307 , 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 9752 Helen Ann BOWERS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. D.C. CAMPBELL et al., Defendants-Appellees. No. 72-1273. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Oct. 24, 1974. Russell W. Galloway, Jr. (argued), Legal Aid Society of Alameda County, Oakland, Cal., for plaintiff-appellant. Brian B. Denton, Asst. U.S. Atty. (argued), San Francisco Cal., for defendants-appellees. Before BARNES, MERRILL and HUFSTEDLER, Circuit Judges. OPINION HUFSTEDLER, Circuit Judge: 1 Bowers, a federal civilian employee, filed a complaint seeking injunctive and declaratory relief and back pay against the officers of the United States Air Station in Alameda, California ('NAS'), claiming that her removal from a trainee position, denial of later promotions, harassment, and reprimands were based on racial discrimination. Before she brought suit in the federal district court, she fully exhausted her administrative remedies. 1 She then invoked federal jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. 1981, 2 28 U.S.C. 1331, 1343(4), and 5 U.S.C. 701-706. 2 The district court held that jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331 was lacking because the matter in controversy did not…