OPINION

This is an appeal by the Helix Irrigation District from an interlocutory order denying its motion to dismiss the complaint of appellee Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians on the ground that the action is barred by the California statutes of limitations. Upon denying the motion the district court authorized an appeal (on that issue only) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (b) and this court certified the appeal.

In the district court suit, filed on July 17, 1972 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1362, the Band sought declaratory *467 relief and money damages in trespass for alleged wrongs committed by Helix and its predecessors between 1885 and 1935 in the process of construction and maintenance of a waterworks facility on the Capitan Grande Indian Reservation. The land involved was held in trust by the United States until 1934 when it was conveyed by fee patent to the City of San Diego.

Appellant contends that the application of the California state statutes of limitations is compelled by the enactment by Congress in 1953 of Public Law 280, the civil jurisdiction provisions of which were codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1360 . 1 Appellee, on the other hand, contends that not only does this cause of action fall outside the scope of § 1360 but that either there is no applicable statute of limitations, or, as a minimum, the applicable statute is 28 U.S.C. § 2415 , the general federal statute of limitations to which suits brought by the United States on behalf of the Indians are subject. We agree, for the reasons stated below, that the applicable statute of limitations is the one contained in § 2415. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s denial of the appellant’s motion to dismiss the appellee’s complaint.

I

An examination of the legislative history of P.L. 280 indicates that the measure had two coordinate aims: “First, withdrawal of Federal responsibility for Indian affairs wherever practicable; and second, termination of the subjection of Indians to Federal laws applicable to Indians as such.” H.R.Rep.No.848, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1953), adopted in S.Rep.No.699, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1953), 2 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1953, p. 2409 (1953). 2 The report also stated that:

The emphasis upon laws “of general application to private, persons or private property” is significant. While by the terms of P.L. 280 Congress, inter alia, may have “intended to grant to the state the full exercise of police power,” 3 and thus the ability to enforce, e. g., zoning ordinances 4 or gambling ordinances, 5 and to apply its statutes of limitations to ordinary commercial transactions “between Indians or to which Indians are parties,” it is not at all clear that Congress meant for a state statute of limitations to apply in a lawsuit initiated by an Indian band against a third party for damages to its property interests held in trust by the United States for the benefit of the band. 6 Indeed, according to above-quoted House Report on P.L. 280, “[PJrovision was made for permitting the California State courts to adjudicate civil controversies of any nature affecting Indians within the State, except where trust or restricted property was involved.” H.R.Rep.No.848 at 5, S.Rep. No.699 at 5, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News, at p. 2411. (Emphasis added).

We also note the effect of the construction of P.L. 280 urged by appellant. To apply the California statutes of limitations without qualification would bar appellee’s suit even if it had been filed on the date that P.L. 280 became law. Such a result would be discordant with the Supreme Court’s view that the constitutionality of statutes of limitations depends upon whether “a reasonable time is given for the commencement of an action before the bar takes effect.” Terry v. Anderson, 95 U.S. 628, 632-33 , 24 L.Ed. 365 (1877). Elaborating on this proposition in a subsequent decision, the Court explained:

Thus had Congress intended to bar claims such as the appellee’s with respect to trust property it must be presumed that it would have preserved them for some “reasonable” period after the promulgation of P.L. 280. It might have, for example, taken the approach of 28 U.S.C. § 2415 (g), see infra, and provided that any cause of action with respect to such property arising prior to the date the measure was enacted would be deemed to have accrued upon that date. This failure to preserve such *469 claims in any manner provides strong reason for interpreting P.L. 280 in a manner that does not suggest constitutional difficulties. This is accomplished by our holding that P.L. 280 does not require the application of the California statutes of limitations to the claims set forth in the complaint of the Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians involving redress for rights in Indian trust lands and property.

II

Given that the California statutes of limitations are not applicable in the case at bar, we agree with appellee that the proper limitations period is to be found in 28 U.S.C. § 2415 . 7

In 28 U.S.C. §§ 2415 and 2416 Congress for the first time established a general statute of limitations on tort and contract actions brought by the United States on its own behalf and in carrying out its trust responsibilities toward the Indians. Originally enacted on July 18, 1966 and amended during a ninety-day extension period in 1972, § 2415 now directs as follows: Causes of action governed by the section which arose prior to July 18, 1966, are deemed to have accrued on that date. All claims brought by the United States for damages for trespass to Indian lands accruing on July 18, 1966, must be filed within eleven years of that date and all subsequently-arising claims are subject to a six-year and ninety-day limitations period.

The legislative history of § 2415 demonstrates a concern for the preservation of the type of claim involved here, i. e., a *470 cause of action for an historic trespass to Indian land. 8 On the other hand, there is nothing in the history to indicate that Congress meant for the provisions of § 2415 to apply to a suit filed by an Indian Band on its own behalf, and one Interior Department official testified otherwise. 9 However, although an examination of the legislative history does not compel our conclusion, we agree with the decision of the court below that ap-pellee should benefit from the provisions of § 2415.

It is clear that if the United States had been the plaintiff here, suing on behalf of the Capitan Grande Band, the applicable limitations period would be the one in § 2415. It is also settled that Indians may sue on their own behalf, with respect to property interests held in trust for them by the United States, even though the United States could have sued independently. Poafpy-bitty v. Skelly Oil Co., 390 U.S. 365 , 88 S.Ct. 982 , 19 L.Ed.2d 1238 (1968); Fort Mojave Tribe v. Lafollette, 478 F.2d 1016 (9th Cir. 1973); Skokomish Indian Tribe v. France, 269 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1959). Moreover, an Indian band cannot compel the United States to sue on its behalf in such suits. Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. Escondido Mut. Water Co., 459 F.2d 1082 (9th Cir. 1972).

Indian bands and tribes have no assurance that all their claims, or even all their plainly reasonable claims, with respect to trust lands will be pursued in a timely fashion by the United States. Such assurance is precluded by the magnitude of the administrative burdens imposed on the United States by reason of its fiduciary responsibilities, and the inherently discretionary manner in which these responsibilities must be discharged. To provide such assurance would be substantially illusory were such suits barred *471 by state statutes of limitations more restrictive than that to which the United States would have been subject had it brought the suit.

Viewed against this backdrop, we adopt with approval the approach of the lower court in its application of the principles we set out in Agua Caliente Band of Mission Indians v. County of Riverside, 442 F.2d 1184 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 933 , 92 S.Ct. 930 , 30 L.Ed.2d 809 (1972). In that case, the plaintiff Indian band was contesting the imposition of a California state possessory interest tax on the lessees of Indian land. Before reaching the merits, this court was confronted with the question of the applicability of the federal “anti-injunction” statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 , which provides that where a “plain, speedy and efficient remedy” is available in state court the federal courts shall not enjoin the assessment, levy, or collection of any tax under state law. In holding that the plaintiff Indian band could pursue its case in federal court in the face of § 1341, we explained:

Analogizing from the treatment. of § 1341 by the Agua Caliente court, the court below concluded:

In a subsequent decision dealing with § 1341 we followed Agua Caliente and permitted an individual Indian and a tribe to proceed in federal court on the ground that they were within the instrumentality doctrine’s exception to the jurisdictional bar of § 1341. Moses v. Kinnear, 490 F.2d 21, 25 (9th Cir. 1973). We pointed out that the federal instrumentality doctrine applies “where the United States is not a party plaintiff, if the suit could have been brought by the United States and is in fact brought by parties who could properly be co-plaintiffs with the United States. [Citing Agua Caliente.]” The plaintiffs in Moses v. Kin-near we held were such parties.

Ill

In approving the foregoing reasoning of the trial court, we also wish to indicate our approval of the trial court’s express refusal to accept one of appellee’s contentions viz., that the legislative history of 28 U.S.C. § 1362 10 somehow should be read into § 2415 so as to exempt the Indians from the state statutes *472 of limitations. This contention rests upon legislative history that indicates that Congress sought in 28 U.S.C. § 1362 to assure the “same judicial determination whether the action is brought in their behalf by the Government or by their [the tribes’] own attorneys.” 11 We agree with the trial court that this legislative history should not be used to expand the scope of another measure. The trial court was correct when it said:

The order denying the motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the action is barred by the California statutes of limitations is Affirmed.

. 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (a) provides:

State or Territory of

Indian country affected

California

All Indian country within the State.

. According to one author, the heyday of the “termination theory” is over:

Comment, State Jurisdiction Over Indian Land Use: An Interpretation of the “Encumbrance” Savings Clause of Public Law 280, 9 Land and Water L.Rev. 421, 428-29 (1974). (Footnotes omitted).

. Agua Caliente Band of Mission Indians’ Tribal Council v. City of Palm Springs, 347 F.Supp. 42, 49 (C.D.Cal.1972), vacated and remanded by this court in an unpublished order, January 24, 1975.

. Id. at 51 .

. Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. County of San Diego, 324 F.Supp. 371 (S.D.Cal.1971), rev’d on other grounds, 495 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1008 , 95 S.Ct. 328 , 42 L.Ed.2d 283 (1974).

. Qur recent decision in Dillon v. Antler Land Co., 507 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1974), aff’g, 341 F.Supp. 734 (D.Mont.1972), is distinguishable in that it involved the application of the Montana statutes of limitations to land owned by an Indian in fee simple, which had lost its character as a trust property interest entitled to federal protection.

. 28 U.S.C. § 2415 , in relevant part provides:

. According to a Department of Interior report to the Senate in support of the 1972 extension of the limitations period:

. See the following excerpts from the testimony of William A. Gershuny, Associate Solicitor for Indian Affairs, Department of the Interior, at the Senate hearings on the 1972 amendment:

Hearings on S. 3377 and H.R. 13825 Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the Senate Comm, on Interior and Insular Affairs, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 19, 23 (1972).

. 28 U.S.C. § 1362 provides:

With the enactment of § 1362, “arising under” claims brought by Indian groups were no longer subject to a $10,000 amount in controversy prerequisite to federal court jurisdiction. The district court in this case held that the invocation of § 1362 does not dispense with the requirement of properly pleading a federal question.

. According to the report of the House Judiciary Committee: