In an information filed by the district attorney of Orange County the defendant was charged with failing to support his minor child, alleged to have been committed as follows:

This appeal is from an order sustaining a demurrer to the information without leave to amend.

The pertinent portion of section 270 of the Penal Code, upon which this information was based, reads as follows:

The present controversy relates to the last sentence of this section, which was added by amendment in 1925.

As here presented, the first point raised is one urged by the respondent to the effect that it is not possible to state a public offense with reference to a failure to make provision for an unborn child, since the amendment referred to fails to provide that the offense covered by the section shall also apply to an unborn child. It is argued that, while this amendment provides that a child conceived but not yet born is to be deemed an existing person it does not provide that such an unborn child is to be deemed an existing child or an existing minor child; that the original section does not relate to all existing persons, but is limited to such existing persons as are minor children; and that by sections 25 and 26 of the Civil Code the period of minority of a child is fixed as being that from the date on which it is born to the date on which it reaches the age of twenty-one. Apparently the contention is that within the meaning of this section an unborn child is not a minor child and, therefore, an information attempting to charge a failure to make provision for an unborn child fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a public offense.

We think this contention is without merit. Under the amendment in question an unborn child is to be deemed an existing person “in so far as this section is concerned". The entire section relates to support and provision for minor children only, and to be deemed an existing person for the purposes of the statute is to be deemed a minor child. The plain wording of the amendment, read with the rest of the section, makes an unborn child an existing minor child within the meaning of the act, irrespective of the general period of minority as covered in other connections by other code provisions. It is objected that the legislature should have “stated that the offense applied to an unborn child". This the legislature has done in language sufficiently definite and certain to leave no doubt as to its meaning.

Another question presented, but not argued, is whether a man may be compelled to make the provision required by the statute, in the case of an unborn child, indirectly, when it is obviously impossible to furnish the same directly to the child. This question was considered in People v. Yates, 114 Cal. App. (Supp.) 782 [ 298 Pac. 961 , 962]. We are in accord with the main opinion in that case, from which we quote the following:

By its plain provisions this statute has been so extended as to include this responsibility of a father to his unborn child. In our opinion it is entirely possible, under the provisions- of the statute, to so word an information as to allege a public offense with reference to a failure to make the required provision for an unborn child.

More specifically, it urged that this particular information does not substantially conform to the requirements of sections 950, 951 and 952 of the Penal Code, in that it cannot be determined therefrom “who the person is that defendant is charged with failing to support”. Without question this fact cannot be determined from the information and it seems equally certain that this is a fact of which the defendant should be apprised in order to enable him to meet the charge. While ordinarily an offense may be alleged in the words of the statute, it should be in words sufficient to give the accused notice of the particular offense with which he is charged and must be sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense was intended. In this respect the information under consideration is defective. The demurrer was properly sustained upon that ground but, for the reasons stated above, an amendment should have been permitted.

The order appealed from is reversed, with directions to the trial court to sustain the demurrer with permission to amend the information.

Marks, J., and Jennings, J., concurred.

A petition by respondent to have the cause heard in the Supreme Court, after judgment in the District Court of Appeal, was denied by the Supreme Court on October 26, 1933.