Kirch

[1] In this action a decree was entered agreeable to the prayer of the complaint requiring specific performance of the agreement made between defendant Wattell and the plaintiff. In the decree it was further determined that a deed made by Wattell-to his codefendant was void' as to the plaintiff. The cause of action grew out of a transaction had wherein plaintiff sold to Wattell the furniture, furnishings, and her leasehold interest in a certain lodging-house located in the city of Los Angeles. The agreement was ex pressed in part in a memorandum made at the time and signed by both parties, and in part 'by certain escrow instructions, given to a trustee selected by the parties. Counsel for appellants in insisting that there was no mutuality such as would entitle the plaintiff to the remedy which she obtained in this action, refers only to the memorandum first made, which is only in part expressive of the admitted agreement intended to-be entered into. In order to arrive at the full purpose of' the contracting parties, the escrow instructions constituted a. necessary part of the contract. The lodging-house sold by-plaintiff to Wattell was furnished and the agreed price was $3,750…