Respondents in this case are the heirs at law of Stephen D. Curtis, who was killed in an automobile accident in the county of Fresno, California, on the twenty-sixth day of August, 1928. Deceased at the time he met his death was operating his automobile in which T. M. Wells was riding with him. The machine came into collision with one driven by appellant. The case was tried before a jury, and a verdict was rendered in favor of respondents and against appellant in the sum of seven thousand five hundred dollars.

Appellant relies upon two grounds for a reversal of the judgment. First he maintains that prejudicial error resulted from a question asked by counsel for respondents of the witness T. M. Wells and in the argument following it. This question was whether or not Wells had been compensated for the injuries in the accident resulting in Curtis’ death. To this question Wells replied that he had, and during the ensuing argument between counsel for the parties 'the following occurred:

It is contended by appellant that the question asked of the witness as to whether or not he had been compensated for his injuries received in this accident was improper, upon the ground that it tended to prove a compromise between Wells and appellant, and, therefore, was improper under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure prohibiting proof of compromises. He also maintained that in the argument of counsel there was prejudicial error. Eespondents contend that the evidence was admissible upon the theory that it amounted to a declaration against interest by the appellant, in effect admitting his negligence in the operation of this car at the time of the accident.

It will be noted that the deceased was the driver of the car and that Wells was riding with him. Whether Wells was a passenger or a guest, or whether Wells and deceased were engaged in a joint undertaking, does not clearly appear. If Wells was a passenger or a guest an entirely different rule of liability for his injuries would arise than would apply to the deceased Curtis. We think the evidence was inadmissible under any theory of the case. The argument between counsel, which we have heretofore set forth at length, should not have been permitted in the presence and hearing of the jury. Many of the statements of counsel for respondents should not have been made in the hearing of the jury and probably left an impression in their minds that would be difficult to erase by the court’s striking from the record parts of these statements, as well as the question to the witness Wells and Ms answer that he had been compensated by appellant for his injuries in the accident.

The second ground for reversal relied upon by appellant refers to references made by counsel for respondents during the examination of the jurors upon their voir dire to the fact that appellant was indemnified by an insurance company.

In this connection the transcript shows that the following occurred:

The right to interrogate jurors upon their voir dire as to whether any of them were stockholders or interested, in corporations writing indemnity insurance has been upheld by the courts in this state. (Roche v. Llewellyn Iron Works, 140 Cal. 563 [ 74 Pac. 147 ]; Pierce v. United Gas & Elec. Co., 161 Cal. 176 [ 118 Pac. 700 ]; Dameron v. Ansbro, 39 Cal. App. 289 [ 178 Pac. 874, 878 ]; Arnold v. California Portland Cement Co., 41 Cal. App. 420 [ 183 Pac. 171 ]; Citti v. Bava, 204 Cal. 136 [ 266 Pac. 954 ].)

In the case of Dameron v. Ansbro, supra, the court said:

We have in mind the rule laid down in the cases of Cozad v. Raisch Improvement Co., 175 Cal. 619 [ 166 Pac. 1000 ]; Nichols v. Nelson, 80 Cal. App. 590 [ 252 Pac. 739 ] Williamson v. Hardy, 47 Cal. App. 377 [ 190 Pac. 646 ]; Baldarachi v. Leach, 44 Cal. App. 603 [186 Pac. 1060]; Arnold v. California Portland Cement Co., 41 Cal. App. 420 [ 183 Pac. 171 ], and other cases which permit interrogation of the jurors on their voir dire as to whether or not they were stockholders in or interested in an indemnity insurance company. We believe that counsel for respondents went far beyond the rule announced in these cases in his interrogation of the respective jurors, and in his argument to the court. The rule established in these cases goes far enough, and we cannot approve any extension of it. We believe that the questions propounded to the jurors and the arguments, which we have quoted constitute prejudicial error which will require a reversal of the case.

The judgment appealed from is reversed.

Barnard, Acting P. J., and Owen, J., pro tem., concurred.