Ziegler

Action brought on a promissory note dated April 12, 1908, and made payable “on demand after date.” The suit was commenced on the twelfth day of April, 1912. Defendant had judgment upon the finding of the court that the cause of action was barred by the provisions of section 337, subdivision 1, of the Code of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff has appealed from the judgment and presents the judgment-roll. The only matter in controversy on this appeal is whether the trial court correctly determined that the fouryeár period of limitation had fully run against plaintiff’s cause of action. If the day upon which the note was dated is to be included in the computation of the time, then the trial judge was correct in his conclusion,- if that day is to be excluded, then plaintiff’s action was'in time and it should have had judgment. Section 312 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides as follows: “Civil actions, without exception, can only be commenced within the periods prescribed in this title, after the cause of action shall have accrued, unless where, in special cases, a different limitation is prescribed by statute.” Section 337 of the same code, which was pleaded by the defendant, provides…