Pylman

makes the mistake of assuming that this is a case for the application of the section of the code relating to the condition wherein there has been not an actual completion of the building, but a mere cessation from labor. If that were true, the building would not be deemed completed until thirty days after such cessation.

But, as pointed out in our former opinion, the evidence and the finding were to the effect that the building was actually completed on May 2, 1914. If respondent, Pylman, had relied upon the circumstance of the cessation of labor, regardless of actual completion, as the starting point for the statutory period within which a claim for lien must be filed, then there might be some merit in appellant’s contention that its lien was filed in time. We have, however, no such case, and there is no occasion to invoke such provision of the code. The language of the statute seems entirely too plain to permit of serious disagreement. Unless we are to disregard its unequivocal mandate, that the lien must be filed in any event within ninety days of the completion of the building, we must hold that appellant was too late. To the authorities cited in our former opinion we may add…