The following statement is taken from appellant’s opening brief:

The foregoing statement, commendably frank and fair, relieves the court of the necessity of passing upon any question except the single one of whether the evidence shows, as a matter of law, that Groth was acting outside the scope sof his employment at the time of the accident. The plaintiff testified:

Another witness testified:

Both of the conductors testified that Boehm was relieved by Groth at Fifth and Spring Streets and that the former “continued to collect fares and issue transfers on the car from Third street to Fifth street.”

It cannot be held, as a matter of law, that the foregoing evidence is insufficient to warrant the inference that Groth boarded the car at Third Street for the purpose of there relieving Boehm and that the former immediately took charge of the car. The question to be determined on this appeal, for the purposes of the appeal, is whether Groth, in boarding the car for the purpose stated, was acting within the scope of his employment. Appellant cites cases arising under the Workmen’s Compensation Act to the effect that while an employee is traveling to and from his place of employment he is not acting within the scope of his employment. But in this case Groth had reached the place of his employment, if the evidence produced by the plaintiff is true, and was entering the car by a means of access provided by his employer.

“It is not necessary, in order to entitle the employee to compensation, that at the time of accident he have reached the place of employment and have actually begun there to render service. It is sufficient if he has come to the employer’s premises and is seeking entrance thereto by a means of access provided by the employer or reasonably used by the employee. ... On the other hand, it is not doubted that if the employee is merely on his way to his employment and is injured, the injury is not one sustained in the course of his employment.” (Starr Piano Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 181 Cal. 433, 435 [ 184 Pac. 860 ]; Makins v. Industrial Acc. Com., 198 Cal. 698, 701 [49 A. L. R. 411, 247 Pac. 202 ].)

“The employment may begin in point of time before the work is entered upon and in point of space before the place where the work is to be done is reached. Probably, as a general rule, employment may be said to begin when the employee reaches the entrance to the employer’s premises where the work is to be done.” (Bountiful Brick Co. v. Giles, 276 U. S. 154 [ 72 L. Ed. 507 , 48 Sup. Ct. Rep. 221].)

Under the cases cited, it is clear that if Groth was boarding the car for the purpose of taking immediate charge thereof he was acting within the scope of his employment.

The order granting a new trial is affirmed.

Thompson (R. L.), J., and Plummer, J., concurred.

A petition for a rehearing of this cause was denied by the District Court of Appeal on January 10, 1930, and a petition by appellant to have the cause heard in the Supreme Court, after judgment in the District Court of Appeal, was denied by the Supreme Court on February 6, 1930.