Statute or Limitations—Acknowledgment op Indebtedness.—A letter to a mortgagee written two days before the expiration of the statutory period of limitations by one of two persons who had previously assumed the mortgage and agreed to pay it, plainly and distinctly acknowledging the existence of the mortgage indebtedness, was sufficient to toll the statute of limitations as to the writer of the letter, although such letter contained no promise to pay the indebtedness.

Id.—Mortgage Foreclosure—Variance Between Pleading and Proof Unprejudicial.—Where the mortgage in such case had been, assumed by a husband and wife who were made defendants in an action to foreclose it, a variance between the pleadings and the proof, in that the complaint alleged an acknowledgment in writing by the defendants, while the proof was that the letter was written by the wife alone, was not fatal as to her, and must be disregarded, since it could not be successfully maintained that .the adverse party was misled to her prejudice by the variance.

Appeal—Objection to Written Evidence—Lack of Proof of Genuineness-—Form of Objection.—Objection to the introduction of a letter in evidence cannot be considered on appeal on the ground that the record contains no proof that the letter was written or signed by the person by whom it purported to have been written, when the only objection made at the trial was that it was “incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial.”

Mortgage—Assumption by Grantee of Mortgaged Premises—Liability, Nature of.—The grantee in a deed of mortgaged premises which contains a clause by which such grantee assumes and agrees to pay the mortgage becomes primarily liable to the mortgagee. Thereafter he is “the party to be charged” within the meaning of section 360 of the Code of -Civil Procedure.

Id.—Action to Foreclose Mortgage — Successive Absences of Defendant from State.-—-In an action commenced in December, 1915, to foreclose a mortgage executed to secure a note -dated December 21, 1908, payable three years thereafter, successive absences from the state of a defendant primarily liable during the period between December 21, 1911, and December 21, 1915, aggregating more than two years of absence during that period, warranted the conclusion that the cause of action against such defendant was not barred.