Snell
People v. Snell
Opinion
Lead Opinion
Craig, J.
The appellant was jointly charged by information with two other defendants with having committed forgery and grand larceny in the county of Los Angeles on or about July 5, 1927. One of appellant’s co-defendants pleaded guilty to the crime of forgery, and as to the other the charges were dismissed. Snell was tried by a jury, and on April 19, 1928, was found guilty of having forged the names of Ella E. Thurin and C. J. Thurin upon a promissory note for three thousand two hundred dollars.
The principal ground upon which a reversal is sought is the contention that the evidence is wholly insufficient to warrant or to support the verdict and judgment, although appellant admitted before the jury that he signed the name “C. J. Thurin” to the note in question, and to a deed of trust purporting to secure it. Numerous authorities are cited which hold that intent is the essence of the offense charged, whereas, it is claimed, Snell signed another’s name merely while acting as a “dummy,” under the instructions of his co-defendant, L. M. Cunningham, who represented to him that Mrs. Thurin’s husband’s signature could not be obtained at the time.