This action is to quiet title.

J. W. Roman and Quida Roman, his wife, on May 21, 1925, executed a deed of trust to a bank later merged into defendant Citizens Trust and Savings Bank, as trustee for Charles Stone, beneficiary. June 26, 1925, Stone assigned to defendant Brian K. Welch. Defendant John D. Beyer as trustee in bankruptcy for Beverly Ridge Company, a copartnership, received a grant deed from J. W. Roman and wife dated January 29, 1927. The deed of trust from Roman and wife was recorded June 29, 1925.

One E. P. Erwen brought an action to foreclose a claim of lien against the property involved, and after default by the above-named Citizens Bank, J. W. Roman and his wife and Charles Stone, a judgment ivas entered in the action foreclosing his claim of lien against all of these named defendants. The property was sold by the sheriff under a writ of enforcement in this last-mentioned action and said E. P. Erwen, plaintiff therein, became the purchaser. Thereafter, on May 3, 1926, the certificate of this sheriff’s sale was recorded. On April 19, 1927, plaintiffs redeemed the property from said sale, and thereafter, no redemption having been made by any defendant, the sheriff executed to plaintiffs a deed for the property.

Judgment in the instant case was for plaintiffs, and defendants appealed.

Appellants urge three grounds for a reversal:

It will be noticed that grounds 2 and 3 above rather overlap.

Appellants expressly admit in the opening brief (no reply brief having been filed) that the lien of Erwen took effect the moment he commenced to furnish labor and materials, on June 2, 1925, and that on that date Erwen did not know of the deed of trust executed May 21, 1925. They assert, however, that the deed of trust became effective as of its date—which is true as between the parties to it.

Appellants then argue that a deed of trust is “not a lien, mortgage or encumbrance, but the legal title itself”, and; therefore, not subject to the provisions of section 1186 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that a mechanic’s lien is a prior claim to liens, mortgages or encumbrances which are not recorded until after labor and materials are furnished by the mechanics.

In the case of Sax v. Clark, 180 Cal. 287 [ 180 Pac. 821 ], the plaintiff-respondent held title under a trust deed given as security for a loan, bearing date October 21, 1912. Appellant’s title was based on a sheriff’s deed given on foreclosure of mechanics’ liens on claims recorded in March and in April of 1913. The construction of the building for which lien claimants furnished materials was begun September 15, 1912, and the materials were furnished from October 1, 1912, to January 15, 1913. The court held that the judgment adjudging the lien claims superior to the claim of the trustee was binding upon plaintiff Sax and reversed a judgment in her favor.

In the decision of MacLeod v. Moran, 153 Cal. 99 [ 94 Pac. 604, 605 ], Chief Justice Angellotti discusses the interest conveyed to a trustee by a deed of trust given to secure a loan and says:

These cases, and many others, justify a holding that the deed of trust constituted only a lien on the property; that it was subsequent and subject to the mechanic’s lien claim of Erwen for work done and materials furnished which Erwen began to furnish before the recordation of the trust deed; and that the rights of holders of the trust deed were duly foreclosed in the action on the Erwen lien.

Defendant Beyer’s title, based on a grant deed after the foreclosure of the mechanic’s lien, was also foreclosed in that action.

The judgment should be, and is, affirmed.

Plummer, J., and Pullen, P. J., concurred.