The plaintiff commenced an action to recover damages; she was awarded a judgment in the trial court, and the defendants have appealed. The facts are briefly stated in the findings as follows:

[1] There being nothing in the record to the contrary, it will be presumed that the plaintiff’s title extended to the center of Aberdeen Way. (Civ. Code, sec. 831.) Trees whose trunks stand wholly upon the land of one owner belong exclusively to him. (Civ. Code, sec. 833.) [2] In the case of Donahue v. Keystone Gas Co., 181 N. Y. 313 [ 106 Am. St. Rep. 549 , 70 L. R. A. 761, 73 N. E. 1108 ], the supreme court of New York had under consideration a set of facts quite similar. Following some earlier eases in that state, the court held that the plaintiff had a property right sufficient to permit him to maintain an action against any person, except the highway officials, who might wrongfully injure or destroy the trees. (See, also, 3 Dillon on Municipal Corporations, 5th ed., sec. 1126.) The defendants claimed that the trees leaned over the property of the defendant Zeiss and were a menace to his property. The trial court found against him on that contention. Even though the trial court had found the fact the other way, the defendant would not necessarily have had the right to cut the trees down. (Grandona v. Lovdal, 70 Cal. 161 [ 11 Pac. 623 ].) To the same effect is Scarborough v. Woodill, 7 Cal. App. 39 [ 93 Pac. 383 ]. [3] Having the right to some relief, the plaintiff filed her action under the provisions of section 733 of the Code of Civil Procedure. That section authorizes the trial court to award treble damages. But to entitle a plaintiff in one of these cases to treble damages under section 733 of the Code of Civil Procedure, he must allege that the defendant willfully and maliciously removed the trees knowing them to be the property of the plaintiff. (Stewart v. Sefton, 108 Cal. 197 [ 41 Pac. 293 ].) The plaintiff in the case at bar pleaded that the acts of the defendants were done willfully and maliciouly and the court so found. However, the appellants claim that there is no evidence in the record that the defendants’ acts were both willful and malicious. The respondent replies that such evidence is in the record and she cites and relies upon the testimony of Mrs. Barton, a sister of the plaintiff. That witness testified that about two months before the date of the cutting she had a conversation with the defendant Zeiss concerning the trees. The conversation was as follows: “Mr. Zeiss said he was going to cut this tree down. ‘You better not,’ I said; ‘if you do, there will be war in camp. Mrs. Butler would have a fit.’ He said, ‘I will take the initiative and let her do the fighting.’ I said, ‘I wouldn’t do that; she will be awful wild.’ ‘Well,’ he said, ‘the district attorney is a particular friend of my brother’s. He said if I considered these trees a menace to my property I can cut them down.’ I said, ‘There is not a menace to your property. There is not one tree leaning towards your house. There are some branches reaching over to my house. There isn’t one leaning towards yours.’ ”

It appears from the evidence that the plaintiff and her family, and the defendant Zeiss and his family, did, during the summer months, occupy their respective residences at Inverness. When the summer had come to a close and the plaintiff had left the neighborhood, the defendant Zeiss gave directions to his codefendant Reeves, and, acting on such directions, the defendant Reeves executed the act. If the trial court believed the foregoing testimony, and from its findings we must assume that it did, then it had the power to make a finding that the cutting was done willfully and maliciously. (Davis v. Hearst, 160 Cal. 143, 163 [ 116 Pac. 530 ].) Having found the facts accordingly, the trial court had the power to treble the damages.

We find no error in the record. The judgment is affirmed.

Langdon, P. J., and Nourse, J., concurred.