Plaintiff and defendant were found by the court both to be corporations, the latter organized under the laws of California as a building and loan association; that one Wadleigh, plaintiff’s assignor, was the secretary of the defendant corporation from its incorporation until the 19th of June, 1905; that prior to 1900 various persons had become members of said building and loan association, and while Wadleigh was secretary they desired to surrender their stock and accordingly delivered the same to Wadleigh, who thereafter made payments thereon of his own means, but carried the same on the books of the corporation in the names of the members. Wadleigh thereafter surrendered the stock so assigned to him and received the amount thereof, less two dollars per share retained by the corporation under its by-laws as a maturity reserve fund, by which transaction he profited to the extent of $12,000. Under the by-laws of the association it was stipulated that withdrawing members were entitled to a certificate showing the amount of this maturity reserve fund, and, if they were so advised, might thereafter subscribe for stock and be credited upon the dues with the amount of such certificate. Thereafter, Wadleigh made application to retain his membership in the corporation and mature his stock and returned said maturity reserve certificates, together with $200 in cash, the same being received by the association as five months’ advanced dues upon the new subscription, and in 1908 received back from the association the $200 paid and a maturity certificate as follows:

Afterward Wadleigh assigned this certificate to plaintiff, who brings suit thereon.

In 1907 sections 633 to 648a, Civil Code, went into effect, which provide that such loan associations should only have power by their by-laws to charge an entrance or withdrawal fee of not exceeding one dollar on each share, and a transfer fee not exceeding ten cents on each share; that no other fee, charge, or deduction shall be made, or permitted to be made, against any shareholder, or against his shares; that on the expiration of the notice required, the shareholder shall be entitled to receive the full amount paid upon the stock or investment certificate, exclusive of entrance or withdrawal fee, together with a proportion of the profits, and so forth. Under these facts and under the law the court found that plaintiff' as the assignor of Wadleigh was not entitled to recover a judgment for the amount of the certificate and interest, and from this judgment plaintiff appeals.

It is insisted by appellant that on the findings of fget judgment should have been entered for plaintiff as prayed for in the complaint, and that said judgment for defendant is not supported by the findings. The precise questions involved upon this appeal were presented to the trial court on a motion to vacate the judgment and the entry of a judgment in favor of plaintiff. There is contained in the record an opinion of the trial judge in denying such motion, which upon examination seems to cover all of the points involved and to state concisely and clearly the reason why the judgment is supported by such findings. This opinion, which we adopt as the decision of this court, is as follows:

Judgment affirmed.

Shaw, J., and James, J., concurred.

A petition to have the cause heard in the supreme court, after judgment in the district court of appeal, was denied by the .supreme court on January 27, 1911.