Orton

Concurring.- — I concur in the judgment. Concerning the facts as stated in the main opinion, it should be added that the witness J. H. Stewart testified that the lumber was not placed on the leased land. Also, since the extension agreement, which was signed by defendant as well as by the plaintiffs, contained a recital that the extension was to run from the twenty-third day of September, 1921, this was an admission that the time limited by the original lease, for beginning of work by lessee, had expired at that date; and was an implied admission that the showing of “satisfactory title,” necessary to start time running on the original time limit for beginning of work by lessee, had been completed, at least ninety days before September 23, 1921.

It was provided in the lease as follows: “In the event lessee shall fail to fully perform any covenant or condition hereof on his part to be kept, performed or observed, and except as hereinafter provided, and the lessors desire to enforce a forfeiture on account of such failure to perform and observe, the lessors shall give the lessee notice in writing of such failure to perform and observe, and of lessors’ desire to enforce a forfeiture…

— The defendant appeals from a judgment rendered against him in favor of the respondents quieting title to certain real property, and also a judgment in the sum of $1,130 as and for rent under an oil lease covering such real property.

The respondents, or in some instances their vendors, had executed a so-called community oil lease to the appellant for which they had received approximately $9,000. Subsequently, the respondents, in consideration of appellant agreeing to pay $10 per month per lot, executed what purported to be an extension of that lease. Appellant contends the respondents have no cause of action, and were entitled to no relief because respondents had failed to give appellant a written notice of his failure to perform and of their intention to enforce a forfeiture for that failure, appellant contending that the giving of thirty days’ notice was a condition precedent to the right of respondents to declare the lease forfeited and re-enter the land. Appellant raised the question by demurrer to the complaint and by objecting to the introduction of any evidence at the time of trial. The demurrer was overruled as was the objection. The exact day of the month the original…