Kruly

In an action commenced in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County against the petitioners herein, as defendants, the plaintiff, pursuant to all preliminary proceedings the regularity of which is not in question, introduced his evidence and rested. Some years thereafter the same was reset, whereupon the said defend ants moved to dismiss the action upon the ground that section 583 of the Code of Civil Procedure constituted a mandatory legislative cessation of the cause of action. Said section recites, in part: “ . . . Any action heretofore or hereafter commenced shall be dismissed by the court in which the same shall have been commenced or to which it may be transferred on motion of the defendant, after due notice to plaintiff or by the court upon its own motion, unless such action is brought to trial within five years after the defendant has filed his answer, except where the parties have stipulated in writing that the same may be extended. ...”

The petitioners erroneously interpret numerous decisions requiring the dismissal of actions under the foregoing provisions which had been set for trial but had not been “brought to trial”, as determinative of the question here presented.…