The plaintiff, a shipper of perishable fruits and vegetables, brought this action against defendant carrier to recover for damage to fifteen separate shipments, each shipment being a carload of grapes or vegetables and the damage to each carload constituting a separate cause of action.

The shipments originated between October 1 and December 1, 1922, on the railroad line of defendant in California, and each was billed and transported to a point upon some connecting carrier in another state. The defendant with its connecting carriers maintained schedules for the transportation to its destination of freight such as that contained in said shipments, these being reasonable for the time required therefor under ordinary conditions. The shipments were delivered to the defendant in good condition, and for each was issued to the plaintiff a bill of lading. These the plaintiff held until surrendered to the defendant with its written claims for the damage caused by delays in transit beyond the schedule time and due to which the plaintiff received from the sale of the freight shipped less than it would had the shipments been moved according to schedule. Each bill of lading contained the following clause: “Except in case of negligence of the carrier or party in possession (and the burden to prove freedom from such negligence shall be on the carrier or party in possession) the carrier or party in possession shall not be liable for loss, damage or delay while the property is stopped and held in transit upon the request of the shipper, owner or party entitled to make such request, or resulting from a defect or vice in the property, or for country damage to cotton, or from riots or strikes.”

The defendant claimed that the delays were not due to negligence but to a strike of its employees and those of connecting carriers, and that the losses claimed by the plaintiff were therefore not actionable because of the strike clause in the bill of lading; that it and its connecting carriers at all times insisted in good faith upon the validity and merits of their defense under the above clause, but that nevertheless, after the claims here involved were presented, offered to settle these and all claims of shippers of perishable fruits and vegetables during the strike for fifty per cent of the loss due to the delay, and that the plaintiff with other shippers accepted the offer, settled their claims accordingly and gave to the defendant receipts in full therefor.

The complaint in each cause of action sought to recover the difference between the amount paid by the defendant and the amount claimed as the damage due to the delay.

The findings made by the trial court are voluminous and need not be quoted in full, the portions material here being as follows:

The court further found that the sums so paid by defendant to plaintiff were accepted by the latter in full satisfaction and discharge of its claims and that said claims would and should be settled and compromised by such payments.

Appellant bases its right to recover upon section 20 of the Interstate Commerce Act as amended June 29, 1900, March 4, 1915, and August 9, 1916, which, so far as material, provides:

It is not appellant’s contention that the strike clause in the bill of lading was invalid, or that the act rendered illegal attempts to compromise claims for damage to interstate shipments based upon the alleged negligence of the carrier where such negligence is denied and the facts would otherwise constitute as between the parties a valid accord and satisfaction; nor in our opinion would the language of the act reasonably support such an interpretation. It is claimed, however, that negligence was in effect admitted by the agreement between the carriers set out in finding X above, but notwithstanding, it declared its intention to pay and paid but fifty per cent of the loss caused thereby, and that payment of less than the full actual loss or injury to the property shipped was by the Interstate Commerce Act forbidden.

Whatever the effect of the payments, had the same been made as claimed, such was not the conclusion which the trial court drew from the negotiations, oral and written, between the parties, and we cannot say that it erred in this respect. Under such circumstances the construction given thereto by the trial court must be upheld. (Euless v. Westphal, 71 Cal. App. 611 [ 235 Pac. 742 ]; Manley v. Pacific Mill & Timber Co., 79 Cal. App. 641 [ 250 Pac. 710 ]; Slama Tire etc. Co. v. Ritchie, 31 Cal. App. 555 [ 161 Pac. 25 ].) Moreover, the above findings are supported by direct testimony, which the court believed, that the alleged negligence and liability of the carrier was at all times in dispute between-the parties, and that the payments were made- and received' as a compromise and settlement of the claims.

The findings of the court are fully supported by the evidence and the judgment is accordingly affirmed.

A petition for a rehearing of this cause was denied by the district court of appeal on February 23, 1929, and a petition by appellant to have the cause heard in the supreme court, after judgment in the district court of appeal, was denied by the supreme court on March 25, 1929.

All the Justices concurred.