This ease now comes before the court upon hearing granted after the court had entered an order denying the application for the writ. On both hearings the cause was heard upon notice, and upon demurrer to the petition, and upon the petition and the answer of respondents. The opinion which accompanied said former order reads as follows:

In the petition for rehearing it was pointed out that in Mayberry v. Whittier, 144 Cal. 322 [ 78 Pac. 16 ], it was decided that the provisions of section 140 of the Civil Code, relating to the giving of security for providing maintenance or making any payments required under provisions of the chapter in which the section is contained, cannot be extended “so as to embrace the matter of the division of common property.” That decision is clear and positive on the point involved. It follows that said section 140 may not be relied upon as furnishing authority for the appointment of a re ceiver in the court below as shown in the present proceeding. Counsel for respondents suggests that the decision in Mayberry v. Whittier, supra, has been practically overruled by the decision in Meyer v. Meyer, 184 Cal. 687 [ 195 Pac. 387 ], but we are satisfied that in the latter case it was not intended to overrule said earlier decision.

It is conceded by petitioner that there are no decisions by our Supreme Court directly bearing upon the question as to whether or not a receiver can be appointed to take over the business of a corporation where there is an allegation to the effect that the corporation is the alter ego of an individual. It is claimed, however, that in the case of Fischer v. Superior Court, 110 Cal. 129 [ 42 Pac. 561 ], the point was in principle determined against the power to appoint such receiver. In that ease it was held that a mere averment that the corporation was only a medium of the partnership and not an independent corporation was not sufficient to remove the case from the general rule against the appointment of receivers of actually existing and operating corporations. It was admitted that the corporation was duly organized, and for some years had been actually operating the business of the properties conveyed to it, which properties were the real subject of controversy.

In the case at bar there are additional elements tending to support the contention in favor of the power to appoint a receiver. In addition to the complaint, the court had before it several affidavits, which contain direct evidence of some of the principal facts which the plaintiff in her complaint had been obliged to allege only on information and belief, since they were not personally known to her. This removes from further consideration a large part of petitioner’s argument based upon the fact that many of the allegations of the complaint were made upon information and belief. The facts thus shown in these affidavits, and which the court was entitled to consider in passing upon the question of its power to appoint the receiver, are facts tending to prove not only that the corporation, Patents Process Inc., is the alter ego of Williams and entirely owned by him, but, further, that said corporation was organized by said Williams and certain of his co-defendants acting in concert with him for the purpose of secreting assets which were the community property of said Prank D. Williams and said Mildred E. Williams, and for the purpose of depriving said Mildred E. Williams of any interest in said property.

In Elliott v. Superior Court, 168 Cal. 727, 734 [ 145 Pac. 101, 105 ], the Supreme Court, after again affirming its adherence to the general rule against the power to appoint a receiver of the entire assets of a corporation in a suit prosecuted by a private party, said: “This opinion is not to be construed as an authority opposed to the appointment of a receiver of specific property of a corporation where such appointment would be proper under section 564 of the Code of Civil Procedure in certain actions between private parties. Our vieivs must be taken as applying to an action of the kind now before the court and not as applicable to all hinds of cases against corporations.” The general rule to which we have referred is based in part upon those provisions of law which declare that the powers of a corporation must be exercised, managed and controlled by its board of directors, and that to take away that control from the board of directors at the suit of a private person, whether creditor or stockholder, is in effect to bring about a dissolution of the corporation in a manner not authorized by law. But if a case is presented wherein it appears that the corporation, in the very creation thereof, is nothing but a fraudulent mask fabricated for the purpose of depriving the plaintiff of his rights, and there is no remedy at law adequate to meet the situation, we believe that the powers of equity are broad enough to authorize the appointment of a receiver, not for the purpose of dissolving a genuine corporation, but for the purpose of reaching the man hidden behind the mask and compelling him to do equity. Of course, we cannot now know what the ultimate finding of facts will be when the case has been tried on its merits. In deciding upon the appointment of a receiver the Superior Court is dealing with the prima facie case made by the pleadings and affidavits upon which it acts in making its order. (Marblehead Land Co. v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. App. 408, 410 [ 217 Pac. 536 ].) The case so made was, in our opinion, sufficient to sustain the jurisdiction of the court which it exercised in appointing the receiver in this case.

The application for writ of prohibition is denied.

Houser, J., and York, J., concurred.