This was an action for damages for breach of contract. Judgment was rendered for plaintiff for $1,500 and costs, and from this judgment defendants appeal.

Respondent contends that, upon the record presented, none of the appellants’ contentions can be considered because the reporter’s transcript on file is not properly authenticated in that it was not certified by the trial judge as required by section 953a of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The case at bar was tried and decided and the findings and judgment signed by Hon. George P. Buck, a judge of the superior court of San Joaquin County, sitting temporarily in department 24 of the superior court in Los Angeles County, who then returned to San Joaquin County. A motion for a new trial was made in said department 24 and heard by Hon. Walter Guerin, whose regular department it was. Subsequently defendants appealed and noticed the settlement of the reporter’s transcript before the said Judge Guerin in said department 24, whereupon the following entry was made in the clerk’s minutes: “Moore Grocery Co. vs. L. A. Nut House, et al. Case Called. Hunsaker, Britt & Cosgrove by A. L. Keister appearing for pltff. and E. P. Gerecht by phone consenting the reporter’s transcript is settled, allowed and filed as record in this case,” and the said reporter’s transcript was signed and certified to by said Judge Guerin.

In Bell v. Brigance, 194 Cal. 445 [ 229 Pac. 27 ], the court after remarking that section 953a of the Code of Civil Procedure does not require that the judge who tried the case shall certify to the truth and correctness of the transcript, says: “But we may assume for reasons at once apparent without stating them, that such was the intention of the legislature.”

In the case at bar the record contains an affidavit of Judge Buck, who tried the case, as follows:

Appellants argue that respondent consented to and acquiesced in the act of Judge Guerin in certifying the transcript by their appearance in court at that time. The only record as to this before us is the extract from the clerk’s minutes quoted above from which nothing appears except the fact of the appearance of respondent’s attorneys, and there is nothing upon which to base even a presumption that they consented or acquiesced, and to apply the rules laid down by sections 3515 and 3516 of the Civil Code, cited by appellants.

Appellants finally argue that to have required Judge Buck to have returned to Los Angeles for the purpose of certifying the record would have been “an idle act,” and that section 3532 of the Civil Code provides that “The law does not require idle acts.” But it can scarcely be successfully contended that to require compliance with a code provision and a rule of the supreme court is an idle act and non constat, but that Judge Buck, who was familiar with the evidence, rulings, acts or statements of the court during the trial, might have refused to certify to the correctness of the transcript. These code provisions and the rule of the supreme court are based upon substantial and real reasons and are not merely technical, and to require compliance with them cannot correctly be called an idle act.

There is therefore nothing presented from which a review of the evidence can be made. We find no assignment of error by appellants that the findings do not support the judgment. Examining the judgment-roll we find no error which will warrant a reversal being ordered. The findings of the court seem to support the judgment and to have been within the issues made by the pleadings. (Yount v. Arakalian Bros. Co., 26 Cal. App. 472 [ 147 Pac. 467 ].)

Judgment affirmed.

Works, P. J., and Craig, J., concurred.