Plumb

The respondents published in their newspaper a charge that appellant had committed a burglary and that he was suspected of having committed another burglary. The appellant lived and carried .on business within the city in which the libel was published. The respondents admit that the charge is untrue, and thereby admit the commission of the libel. The appellant sued for damages. The language charged is clearly libelous per se. Words of doubtful import and words of two or more meanings are not libelous unless the jury finds that they were used in a libelous sense. [1] But it has always been held that it is libel per se to charge a person with the commission of a crime involving moral turpitude. In this case there is no pretense that the libel was not published and no pretense that the language used is true. [2] Under this state of facts the appellant was entitled to a verdict for damages, and it was error for the court to charge the jury that they might find to the contrary. The publication being admitted, it was error to charge the jury that it was their province to determine whether or not damages should be allowed. Under the law the appellant should have had a verdict.

In…

In denying the petition in this case for a rehearing, it is proper to add that it was error to require the witness, Mrs. Plumb, to testify on cross-examination, as to the whereabouts of her son and as to other matters concerning him and his companion. These matters were not in issue and their truth or falsity was a matter of no moment in this case. Likewise, the testimony of Officer Malone along the same lines should not have been admitted.

Evidence of the publication in the newspaper of respondents, about one month prior to the publication of the libel in question, and entitled “Crook Tried to Rob Store,” was for like reasons improperly admitted. That someone attempted to commit the burglary in the publication mentioned may be conceded, but the respondents do not claim that the appellant did it or was in any manner connected with it. The proofs showed that the store referred to is under the office used by the appellant as a taxicab office. The evidence could only have been offered for the purpose of prejudicing the ease of the appellant, in view of the charge in the libel that he was suspected of having attempted the burglary. It was otherwise wholly immaterial.

Other points…