Deacon

The admission of evidence as to the net profit made in operating a rock and gravel plant on the property being condemned in this action, was error which, it is our opinion, requires a reversal of the judgment. Mr. Newberry, a witness for the defendants, and himself one of them because of his interest as a sublessee of the premises, testified in detail concerning the rich deposit of rock and sand on the property; outlined the commercial future of the rock business in southern California, stating the extent of the demand, the limits of the supply, and the economic advantages his plant possessed over others, and related much more along this line. Then, over timely objections and while still on direct examination, he was permitted to make a statement of his net profit at the plant during the year 1928, after paying rent to his lessor and rent to the owner. The only legitimate object of all this testimony was to obtain an answer to the one question: What was the market value of the property being condemned, "that is to say, the highest price estimated in terms of money which the land *Page 493 would bring if exposed for sale in the open market, with reasonable time allowed in which to…

I concur in the judgment. Not that I am particularly impressed with the "righteousness" of it, but because I believe that (contrary to the rule in many other jurisdictions) it is in accordance with the adopted policy of the law of this state, as expressed in the *Page 498 several opinions of the Supreme Court and the appellate courts, to which attention is directed in the opinion rendered herein. But aside from such authority, to my mind it is incongruous to, and quite at variance with, our ordinary notions relative to the administration of justice that a judgment must be reversed simply and solely because, according to the "rules of the game" certain facts pertaining to pertinent and concededly relevant conditions, the effect of which would be but to present evidence, from a consideration of which the ultimate truth might be ascertained by the court, were "erroneously" admitted in evidence. A petition for a rehearing of this cause was denied by the District Court of Appeal on January 30, 1932, and an application by respondents to have the cause heard in the Supreme Court, after judgment in the District Court of Appeal, was denied by the Supreme Court on February 29, 1932.